All About Michael WITTMANN
All About Michael Wittmann…
| Michael Wittmann | |
|---|---|
| 22 April 1914 – 8 August 1944 (aged 30) | |
 Michael Wittmann |
|
| Nickname | The Black Baron |
| Place of birth | Vogelthal |
| Place of death | Between the towns of Cintheaux andSt. Aignan de Cramesnil near the farm of Gaumesnil |
| Resting place | La Cambe German war cemetery(reinterred) |
| Allegiance |  Nazi Germany |
| Service/branch |  Waffen SS |
| Years of service | 1934 – 1944 |
| Rank | Hauptsturmführer |
| Unit | Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler andSchwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 |
| Battles/wars | World War II
|
| Awards | Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords |
Michael Wittmann (April 22, 1914 – August 8, 1944) was a German Waffen-SS tank commander during the Second World War. Wittmann would rise to the rank of SS-Hauptsturmführer (captain) and was a Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross holder.
He was credited with the destruction of 138 tanks and 132 anti-tank guns, along with an unknown number of other armoured vehicles, making him one of Germany’s top scoring panzer aces, together with Johannes Bölter, Ernst Barkmann, Otto Cariusand Kurt Knispel who was the top scoring ace of the war with 168 tank kills.
Wittmann is most famous for his ambush of elements of the British 7th Armoured Division, during the Battle of Villers-Bocage on 13 June 1944. While in command of a single Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger he destroyed up to 14 tanks and 15 personnel carriers along with 2 anti-tank guns within the space of 15 minutes.
The circumstances behind Wittmann’s death have caused some debate and discussion over the years, but it had been historically accepted that Trooper Joe Ekins, the gunner in a Sherman Firefly, of the 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry was his killer. However, in recent years, some commentators have suggested that members of the Canadian Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment may have been responsible instead.
Early life and career…
Michael Wittmann was born on April 22, 1914 in the village of Vogelthal in the Oberpfalz region of Bavaria. He was the second son of local farmer Johann Wittmann and his wife Ursula. In February 1934, Michael joined the Volunteer Labour Service, the FAD (what later became the RAD) and on October 30, 1934 he joined the German Army. He was assigned to the 19. Infantry Regiment based at Freising by Munich, eventually reaching the rank of Gefreiter (lance-corporal). In October 1936 the 22-year-old Wittmann joined the Allgemeine-SS. On April 5, 1937, he was assigned to the premier regiment, later division Leibstandarte-SSAdolf Hitler (LSSAH) and was given the rank SS-Mann (private). A year later, he participated in the occupation of Austria and theSudetenland with an armoured car platoon.
Second World War…
Early War…
His first experience of action came in the Polish Campaign, followed by the Battle of France as a commander of the new self-propelled assault guns, the Sturmgeschütz III Ausf. A. The Greek campaign – Operation ‘Marita’ – was launched on April 6, 1941. Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) captured the Greek capital and formed the spearhead, alongside the 9th Panzer Division, which punched through the Greek countryside. After three weeks of campaigning, Nazi Germany had conquered Greece. Wittmann and his unit were sent to Czechoslovakia for a refit.
Eastern Front…
The rest would not last long, however, as Wittmann’s unit was soon dispatched to the Eastern Front to participate in the invasion of the Soviet Union. He initially served as a commander of a StuG III assault gun. He was assigned for both officer and tank training in the winter of 1942–43.
Returning to the Eastern Front as a newly commissioned officer, Wittmann was reassigned to the SS Panzer Regiment 1, a tank unit with the rank of SS-Untersturmführer (second lieutenant), where he commanded a Panzer III tank. By 1943, he commanded a Tiger, and by the time of the Battle of Kursk (Operation Citadel), he was a platoon leader. On January 14, 1944, he was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Crossand on January 30, the Oak Leaves for his continued excellence in the field. By this time, he had destroyed 88 enemy tanks and a significant number of other armoured vehicles. In Agte’s book on Wittmann (Michael Wittmann And The Tiger Commanders Of The Leibstandarte) it calculates his kills thusly: In the 5 days of Zittadelle Wittmann destroyed ‘at least’ 30 tanks.(page 100) ‘destroyed 13 T34’s’ on 21 November 1943 (page 130) 56 enemy tanks in the period July 1943-7/1/44 (page 158) In summary:
56 kills on 7/1/44 (page 213)
66 kills on 9/1/44 (page 181)
88 kills on 13/1/44 (page 213)
114-117 kills on 29/1/44 (page 185)
It would seem over half his total were claimed in a three week period in January 1944.
Normandy
In April 1944, the LSSAH’s Tiger Company was transferred to the SS Heavy Panzer Battalion 101. This battalion was assigned to the I SS Panzer Corps and was never permanently attached to any division or regiment within the corps. Wittmann commanded the 2nd Company of the battalion and held the rank of SS-Obersturmführer (first lieutenant). Following the Allied Invasion of Normandy, the battalion was ordered to move from Beauvais to Normandy on 7 June, a move that was completed on 12 June after a five day road march.
Due to the Anglo-American advances from Gold and Omaha Beachs, the German 352nd Infantry Division began to buckle; as it withdrew south, it opened up a 7.5-mile (12.1 km) wide gap in the German lines near Caumont-l’Éventé. Sepp Dietrich ordered his only reserve, the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, to position itself behind the Panzer-Lehr-Division and 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend to cover his open left flank. Anticipating the importance the British would assign to the high ground near Villers-Bocage, Wittmann’s company was positioned near the town.
The British 7th Armoured Division was ordered to exploit the gap in the German lines and capture Villers-Bocage and a nearby ridge, Point 213. The British occupied the town and ridge during the morning of 13 June. Wittmann’s company consisted of five tanks, of which two were damaged. He was surprised to discover the British in the Villers-Bocage area much sooner than had been expected.He later stated:
I had no time to assemble my company; instead I had to act quickly, as I had to assume that the enemy had already spotted me and would destroy me where I stood. I set off with one tank and passed the order to the others not to retreat a single step but to hold their ground.
At approximately 09:00 Wittmann’s Tiger emerged from cover onto Route Nationale 175 and engaged the rearmost British tanks on Point 213, destroying them. Wittmann then moved towards Villers-Bocage engaging several transport vehicles parked along the roadside, the carriers bursting into flames as their fuel tanks were ruptured by machine gun and high explosive fire. Moving into the eastern end of Villers-Bocage, Wittmann engaged a number of light tanks followed by several medium tanks. Alerted to Wittmann’s actions, light tanks in the middle of the town quickly got off the road while medium tanks were brought forward. Wittmann, meanwhile, had accounted for a further British tank, two artillery observation post (OP) tanks followed by a scout car and a half-track. Accounts differ as to what happened next. Historians record that, following the destruction of the OP tanks, Wittmann briefly duelled without success against a Sherman Firefly before withdrawing. The Tiger is then reported to have continued eastwards to the outskirts of the town before being disabled by an anti-tank gun.Wittmann’s own account, however, contradicts this; he states that his tank was disabled by an anti-tank gun in the town centre.
In less than 15 minutes, 13–14 tanks, two anti-tank guns and 13–15 transport vehicles had been destroyed by the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, the vast majority attributed to Wittmann. Wittmann would however play no further role in the Battle of Villers-Bocage. For his actions during the battle, Wittmann was promoted to SS-Hauptsturmführer (captain) and awarded Swords to his Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross.
Historian Wolfgang Schneider calls into question Wittmann’s tactical ability, claiming „a competent tank company commander does not accumulate so many serious mistakes”. Schneider also criticises Wittmann’s disposition of his forces before the battle by having his Tigers position themselves in a sunken lane with a vehicle with engine trouble at the head of a stationary column thereby hampering mobility of his unit. It also risked blocking the entire company. However, Schneider saves his real opprobrium for Wittmann’s solitary advance into Villers-Bocage. Although he acknowledges Wittmann’s courage, he points out that such an action „goes against all the rules”. No intelligence was gathered beforehand, and there was no „centre of gravity” or „concentration of forces” in the attack. Schneider claims that because of Wittmann’s actions, „the bulk of the 2nd Company and Mobius 1st Company came up against an enemy who had gone onto the defensive”.He calls Wittman’s „carefree” advance into British-occupied positions „pure folly”, and states that „such over hastiness was uncalled for”. Schneider goes on to surmise that if Wittmann had properly prepared an assault involving the rest of his company and the 1st Company, far greater results could have been achieved. He concludes with the belief that „thoughtlessness of this kind was to cost [Wittmann] his life on August 9, 1944, near Gaumesnil, during an attack casually launched in open country with an exposed flank.”
Following the Battle of Villers-Bocage, Adolf Hitler requested that Wittmann become a tank instructor, but he refused. In response, Hitler forbade Wittmann to take part in action again. On 10 July, Wittmann took over command of the battalion as the commanding officer was sent on sick leave.
Death…
Wittmann was killed on 8 August 1944 while taking part in a counterattack ordered by Kurt Meyer, of the 12th SS Panzer Division to retake tactically important high ground near the town of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil. The town and surrounding high ground had been captured a few hours earlier by Anglo-Canadian forces during Operation Totalize. Wittmann had decided to participate in the attack as he believed the company commander who was supposed to lead the attack was too inexperienced.
A group of seven Tiger tanks from the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, supported by several other tanks, was ambushed by tanks from A Squadron, 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry, A Squadron, the Sherbrooke Fuisilier Regiment, and B Squadron, the 144 Royal Armoured Corps.
The killing shots have long been thought to have come from a Sherman Firefly of ‘3 Troop’, A Squadron, 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry (commander – Sergeant Gordon; gunner – Trooper Joe Ekins), which was positioned in a wood called Delle de la Roque on the advancing Tigers’ right flank at approximately 12:47.
It appears the shells penetrated the upper hull of the tank and ignited the Tiger’s own ammunition, causing a fire which engulfed the tank and then blew off the turret.
Discredited claims…
For such a junior officer, there has been quite a lot of speculation surrounding how he died. At the time of his death, although the majority of Allied soldiers had never heard of him,[49]Wittmann had become a household name within Germany.
In 1985, issue 48 of After the Battle Magazine was published, containing an article on the last battle of Michael Wittmann. In this issue, Les Taylor, another member of the 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry during the war, stated that Joe Ekins was the man who was responsible for the death of Wittmann.
The 1st Polish Armoured Division, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, the 144 Regiment Royal Armoured Corps and the RAF Second Tactical Air Force have also been the subject of claims to have killed Wittmann. No Holding Back, a book by Brian Reid on Operation Totalize, contains an entire appendix devoted to the death of Michael Wittmann, in which these claims are completely discredited.
Examination of the armoured divisions’ war diaries revealed that they were too far north of St. Aignan de Cramesnil to have taken any part in the defeat of the German armoured counterattack. Investigation also ruled out the 144 Royal Armoured Corps; although they did take part in defeating the counterattack, they were positioned around Cramesnil and therefore out of effective range of Wittmann’s tank. The regiment did originally claim that they destroyed two Tigers during this German counterattack. However, their commanding officer changed this claim to one Tiger and one Panzer IV destroyed, post-battle.
The main source of controversy surrounding Wittmann’s demise comes from the claim that he was killed when an RP-3 rocket from a Royal Air Force Hawker Typhoon struck his tank.
This myth, originating in German propaganda, stated Wittmann had fallen in combat to the dreaded fighter-bombers. This was further enhanced when a French civilian, Serge Varin, who took the only known photo of the destroyed Tiger, stated that in his opinion the tank had been destroyed by an air attack. He said he had found an unexploded rocket nearby and could not see any other penetration holes, other than the one on the upper hull. However, some accounts describe this as an exit hole and state the engine was intact and not damaged from any explosion.
Brian Reid has also discredited this explanation after examining the logs of the RAF Second Tactical Air Force. Reid notes that they made no claim of engaging or destroying any tanks in the area during the battle. He concludes:
„…no tanks were claimed destroyed or damaged in the forward areas by immediate support aircraft”
„…the only tanks claimed were by Typhoons on armed reconnaissance missions in areas away from the actual battle. Therefore Wittmann and his crew almost assuredly did not fall victim to an attack from the air.”
Reid also notes that Kurt Meyer, the divisional commander of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend who had ordered the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 to counterattack,
„…made a point of remarking on the Allies’ failure to use their tactical fighters on the morning of August 8.”
There is also no evidence to support any other aircraft outside of the Second Tactical Airforce attacked the tank.
The final piece of evidence, which rules out air attack upon the attacking German tanks, comes from eyewitness testimony. German tank crews and other members of the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101, such as Alfred Bahlo, Hans Dollinger, Hans Höflinger and Doctor Rabe, along with Allied tankers such as Captain Boardman, Trooper Ekins and Major Radley-Walters have all stated in interviews (as well as other media such as letters) that the Tiger tanks came under tank attack only and do not mention any air attacks.
The most recent claim…
After discrediting the main claimants other than Joe Ekins, Brian Reid then discusses another possibility, as there was another armoured regiment much closer to Wittmann’s tank. A Squadron of The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment, 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, commanded by Major Sydney Radley-Walters, was positioned in the chateau grounds at Gaumesnil. This area, south of Hill 112, is parallel with the Delle de la Roque woods and the location of Joe Ekin’s Firefly. The regiment at this time was made up of several Sherman III and 2Sherman VC, whose tankers had created firing holes in the property’s wall. From this position, based on verbal testimony of the Canadian tankers, they engaged several tanks (including Tigers) and self-propelled guns driving up the main road and across the open ground towards Hill 112.
Reid puts forth the opinion that, with the range Joe Ekins would have to fire over to hit Wittmann’s tank, the proximity of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment to the tank, no other evidence to suggest anything other than tank-to-tank combat, that the latter are most likely responsible for Wittmann’s death. Because of changes in land use from orchards to ploughed fields since 1944, it is problematic to establish the exact location of Ekin’s Firefly at the beginning of the engagement and even more difficult to know the position of the claimed kill shot as Ekins’ tank moved during the engagement. At a minimum, the 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry was positioned over 1,000 metres (1,100 yd) away, possibly as much as 1,200 metres (1,300 yd), while the Canadian tanks were only around 500 metres (550 yd) away. Recent field studies that located the exact position of the Sherbrooke tanks puts the range at less than 150 yards (140 m) and the firing angle from their position behind the Chateau’s now removed east wall coincides exactly with the damage area to Wittman’s Tiger in the left rear engine compartment. There are no official Canadian records to back up this position due to the Regimental Headquarters halftrack being destroyed by a stray USAAF bomb.
Ken Tout, who at the time of Operation Totalize, was a member of C Squadron of the 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry, published a postwar account of the battle and of Wittmann’s demise. Tout credited Joe Ekins at that time. However, when researching his new book on the subject, he interviewed former members of A Squadron, Sherbrooke Fusiliers. In this book, for the first time, he does not claim Wittmann for the 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry and acknowledges that other regiments were in the area at the time and had engaged the attacking Tigers.
With the Tigers caught in a crossfire between the Northamptonshire Yeomanry and the Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment, it is understandable that both regiments claimed to have destroyed his tank. The significant hole in the belief that Ekins was Wittman’s killer is that, if Wittman’s Tiger was one of three Tigers engaged and destroyed by Ekins that afternoon – a truly remarkable feat of tank gunnery, who then is responsible for one of the three Tigers nearest to where Ekins fired from. He killed three Tigers and if one was Wittman’s, someone else had to engage and kill one of these three destroyed Tigers within 800 yards (730 m) of Ekins position. There is no record or claim by any other Allied tank for any of these three Tigers.
In the appendix of “No Holding Back”, devoted to Wittmann’s demise, there is a topographical map of the engagement, diagrams of the tank and the location of the shell strike.Using this and Google Earth, it is quite easy to re-create the engagement scenario and measure the distances involved, an exercise that strongly supports the Canadian claim.
Christie included an interview with Sherbrooke Fusiliers’ commanding officer, retired-General Sidney Radley-Walters, who heard Wittmann’s tank violently explode and watched it hurl its turret into the air, all the while smoking fiercely from a shot made by one of his squadron’s Shermans. The fatal shot had shattered the Tiger’s left track and ignited its fuel and ammunition, thus blowing the turret completely off its hull only a few moments later. He was not sure which of his tanks fired the shot, as it was the middle of a fierce German counterattack and there were other enemy armoured vehicles coming down the main roadway, immediately in front of his position and leading to the German stronghold a mile or so further south (up the roadway to his right at Cintheaux), but there is no other even vaguely reasonable conclusion to be reached.
Compounding Radley-Walters’ difficulty in assigning Wittmann’s kill to any particular crew in his squadron were the untimely deaths of several of his men in combat over the next few days and, both paradoxically and incredibly, the destruction of the regiment’s records the very next day when the Americans accidentally dropped a bomb destroying the one halftrack that may have carried the evidence.
No one on the Allied side knew it was Wittmann who had been killed until many years after the war. Indeed, everyone involved on the Allied side was completely unaware of Wittmann’s reputation in wartime Germany.
Burial…
The German war graves commission, either with help of veterans from the s.SS-Pz Abt. 101 or from the author of Panzers in Normandy – Then and Now, located Wittmann and his crew’s unmarked grave in 1983. They were then reinterred together at the German war cemetery of La Cambe in France.
Al About Jagdpanzer 38(t) HETZER…
All about JagdPanzer 38(t) Hetzer…
| Jagdpanzer 38(t) | |
|---|---|
 |
|
| Type | Light tank destroyer |
| Place of origin | Nazi Germany |
| Service history | |
| In service | 1944–1945 |
| Used by | Nazi Germany, Czechoslovakia,Hungary, Switzerland |
| Wars | World War II |
| Production history | |
| Designer | Skoda |
| Designed | 1943 |
| Manufacturer | Böhmisch-Mährische Maschinenfabrik, Škoda |
| Produced | March 1944–May 1945 |
| Number built | Approx. 2827 |
| Variants | See Variants |
| Specifications | |
| Weight | 15.75 tonnes (34,722 lbs) |
| Length | 6.38 m (21 ft) |
| Width | 2.63 m (8.62 ft) |
| Height | 2.17 m (7.11 ft) |
| Crew | 4 |
|
|
|
| Armor | 8-60 mm (.31-2.36 in) |
| Primaryweapon | 1x 7.5 cm PaK 39 L/48 41 rounds |
| Secondary weapon |
1× 7.92 mm Maschinengewehr 34 1,200 rounds |
| Engine | petrol R6, 7.8 liters 160 hp (120 kW) at 2800 rpm |
| Power/weight | 10 hp/tonne |
| Suspension | leaf spring |
| Fuel capacity | 320 L |
| Operational range |
177 km (110 mi) |
| Speed | 42 km/h (26 mph) |
The Jagdpanzer 38(t) (Sd.Kfz. 138/2), later known as Hetzer („baiter”), was a German light tank destroyer of the Second World War based on a modified pre-war Czechoslovakian Panzer 38(t) chassis. The project was inspired by the Romanian „Mareşal” tank destroyer.
JPz 38(t) in museum at CFB Borden in Ontario, Canada
The name „Hetzer” was at the time not commonly used for this vehicle. It was the designation for a related prototype, the E-10. The Škoda factory for a very short period confused the two names in its documentation and the very first unit equipped with the vehicle thus for a few weeks applied the incorrect name until matters were cleared. However, there exists a memorandum fromHeinz Guderian to Hitler incorrectly claiming that an unofficial name, Hetzer, had spontaneously been coined by the troops. Post-war historians basing themselves on this statement made the name popular in their works, the vehicle was never named as such in official documents.
Development…
The Jagdpanzer 38(t) was intended to be more cost-effective than the much more ambitious Jagdpanther and Jagdtiger designs of the same period. Using a proven chassis, it avoided the mechanical problems of the larger armoured vehicles.
It was better armored than the earlier Panzerjäger Marder and Nashorn with a sloped armour front plate of 60 mm sloped back at 60 degrees from the vertical (equivalent in protection to about 120 mm), carried a reasonably powerful gun, was mechanically reliable, small and easily concealed. It was also cheap to build. Its main failings were the cramped working condition of the crew, the very limited gun traverse, and poor visibility from the commander’s station.
The Jagdpanzer 38(t) succeeded the Marder III (based on the same chassis) in production from April 1944; about 2584 were built until the end of the war. The older Marder III Panzerjager series retained the same vertically-sided chassis as Panzer 38(t). In the Hetzer, the lower hull sides slope slightly to increase the available interior space and enable a fully-enclosed fighting compartment. Because of the fully enclosed armor, it was 5 tons heavier than the Marder III. To compensate for the increased weight, track shoe width was increased from 293 mm to 350 mm.
The Hetzer equipped the Panzerjägerabteilungen (tank destroyer battalions) of the infantry divisions, giving them some limited mobile anti-armor capability. After the war Czechoslovakia continued to build the type (versions ST-I and ST-III for training version, about 180 units built) and exported 158 vehicles (version G-13) to Switzerland. Most vehicles in today’s collections are of Swiss origin.
By order of Adolf Hitler in November 1944, a number of Jagdpanzer 38(t)s were refurbished straight from the factory with a Keobe flamethrower and accompanying equipment instead of the normal gun. The flame projector was encased in a metal shield reminiscent of that of a gun barrel, and easily prone to damage. Less than 50 of these vehicles, designated Flammpanzer 38, were completed before the end of the war, but they were used operationally against Allied forces on the Western Front.
Further variants were a Hetzer carrying the 150 mm sIG33/2 Howitzer, of which 30 were produced before the end of the war, and the Bergepanzer 38(t)Hetzer, a light recovery vehicle of which 170 were produced. Plans were made to produce other variants, including an assault gun version of the Hetzer carrying a 105 mm main cannon, and an anti-aircraft variant mounted with a flak turret. The war ended before these proposed models were put into production.
Performance…
The Jagdpanzer 38(t) fitted into the lighter category of German tank destroyers that began with the Panzerjäger I, continued with the Marder series and ended with the Jagdpanzer 38(t). The 75 mm gun fitted on the Jagdpanzer 38 (t) was a modified 75 mm Pak 39 L/48 very similar to the late Panzer IV marks) 75 mm kwk 40 L/48 could destroy nearly all allied tanks in service at long ranges and its fully-enclosed armor protection made it a safer vehicle to crew than the Marder II or Marder III series.
The Jagdpanzer 38(t) was one of the most common late-war German tank destroyers. It was available in relatively large numbers and was generally mechanically reliable. Also, its small size made it easier to conceal than higher vehicles.
The Jagdpanzer 38(t)’s weaknesses were its very limited gun traverse, poor internal ergonomics and poor visibility. The gun traverse was so limited the entire vehicle sometimes needed to be turned to track a fast-moving target. The gun was designed to be loaded from the right but was also placed on the far right of the vehicle, making operation difficult for the gunner and loader and leading to a lower rate of fire than would be ideal. The confines of the vehicle were also very cramped with four men squeezed into the small machine. The commander sat far back in the vehicle, with a flat roof to his front and without a cupola. Thus his visibility was limited when the vehicle was even slightly elevated in front, for example, in a classic hull-down position. Some versions attempted to alleviate the space problem by removing the recoil-absorbing mechanism for the gun, though at the cost of forcing the vehicle itself to absorb the recoil.
Like some other late-war German SPGs, the Hetzer mounted a remote-control machine gun mount which could be fired from within the vehicle. However, to reload the crew needed to expose themselves to enemy fire.
Gully in Don Steppe_01… built by Alexander Zelenkov…
Gully in Don Steppe_01…built by Alexander Zelenkov…
All About Jagdpanzer IV Sd.Kfz 162…
All About Jagdpanzer IV Sd.Kfz 162 …
| Jagdpanzer IV/48
|
|
|---|---|
| The 0 Serie pre-production vehicle at Deutsches Panzermuseumin Munster, Germany | |
| Type | Tank destroyer |
| Place of origin | Germany |
| Specifications | |
| Weight | 24 tonnes (52,910 lbs) |
| Length | 6.85 m (22 ft 6 in) |
| Width | 3.17 m (10 ft 5 in) |
| Height | 1.85 m (6 ft 1 in) |
| Crew | 4 |
|
|
|
| Armor | 10-80 mm (.39-3.14 in) |
| Primary weapon | 1x 7.5 cm PaK 39 L/48 79 rounds |
| Secondary weapon |
1x 7.92 mm Maschinengewehr 34 600 rounds |
| Engine | Maybach HL 120 TRM 300 hp (223.71 kW) |
| Power/weight | 12.5 hp/tonne |
| Suspension | Leaf springs |
| Operational range |
210 km (130 mi) |
| Speed | 40 km/h (25 mph) |
The Jagdpanzer IV, Sd.Kfz. 162, was a tank destroyer based on the Panzer IV chassis built in three main variants. As one of the casemate-style turretless Jagdpanzer („Hunting tank”) designs, it was developed against the wishes of Heinz Guderian, the inspector general of the Panzertruppen, as a replacement for the Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III). Guderian objected against the needless, in his eyes, diversion of resources from Panzer IV tank production, as the Stug III and Sturmgeschütz IV were still more than adequate for their role.
Development…
After the Battle of Stalingrad, in September 1942 the Wehrmacht’s arms bureau, the Waffenamt, called for a new standard for assault weapons: 100 mm of armor to the front, 40–50 mm on the sides, wider tracks, ground clearance of 50 cm, top speed of 26 km/h and the lowest possible firing positions. The new Panzerjager („tank hunter”) design would be armed with the same 7.5 cm gun as fitted to the Panther: the Pak 42 L/70. Initially a new chassis were planned, but that of the Panzer IV had to be used.
Previous efforts to mount bigger guns on smaller chassis resulted in the Marder series as well as StuG IIIs. The Marder series were tall and had open crew compartments. The new design had a low silhouette and completely enclosed fighting compartment.
The Jagdpanzer IV used Panzer IV chassis 7 (known as BW7), but the almost-vertical front hull plate was replaced by sloped armor plates. Internally, the layout was changed to accommodate the new superstructure, moving the fuel tanks and ammunition racks . Since the Jagdpanzer lacked a turret, the engine which originally powered the Panzer IV’s turret could be eliminated.
The new superstructure had 80 mm thick sloped armour, which gives a much greater armor protection than a vertical armor of 100 mm. To make the manufacturing process as simple as possible, the superstructure was made out of large, interlocking plates which were welded together.
Armament consisted of a 7.5 cm main gun, originally intended to be the PaK 42 L/70, but shortages meant that for the preproduction and the first production run different older guns were used, the 7.5 cm PaK 39 L/48. These were shorter and less powerful than the PaK 42.
Installing the much heavier PaK 42 meant that the Jagdpanzer IV was nose heavy, especially with the heavy frontal armor. This made them less mobile and more difficult to operate in rough terrain, leading their crews to nickname them Guderian-Ente „Guderian’s duck”. To prevent the rubber rims of the roadwheels being dislocated by the weight of the vehicle, some later versions had steel roadwheels installed on the front.
The final prototype of the Jagdpanzer IV was presented in December 1943 and production started in January 1944, with the PaK 39 L/48 armed variant staying in production until November. Production of the PaK 42 L/70 armed variants started in August and continued until March/April 1945.
On August 19–22, 1943, after the Battle of Kursk, Hitler received reports that StuG IIIs performed better than Panzer IV within certain restraints of how they were deployed. It was thus intended to stop production of the Panzer IV itself at the end of 1944 to concentrate solely on production of the Jagdpanzer IV, but the Panzer IV was in production all the way until the end of the conflict along with Jagdpanzer IV.
Variants
| Jagdpanzer IV/70(V) | |
|---|---|
| Jagdpanzer IV/70 (V) | |
| Type | Tank destroyer |
| Place of origin | Germany |
| Specifications | |
| Weight | 25.8 tonnes |
| Length | 8.5 m |
| Width | 3.17 m |
| Height | 1.85 m |
| Crew | 4 |
|
|
|
| Armor | 10 – 80 mm |
| Primary weapon | 1x 7.5 cm Pak 42 L/70 55 rounds |
| Secondary weapon |
1x 7.92 mm Maschinengewehr 34 600 rounds |
| Engine | Maybach HL 120 TRM 300 hp |
| Power/weight | 11.63 hp/tonne |
| Suspension | Leaf springs |
| Operational range |
210 km |
- Jagdpanzer IV with 7.5 cm PaK 39 L/43: a small number of these were built as the preproduction (0) series.
- Jagdpanzer IV with 7.5 cm PaK 39 L/48, official name Sturmgeschütz neuer Art mit 7.5 cm PaK L/48 auf Fahrgestell PzKpfw IV. Some 780 or so were produced in 1944.
- Jagdpanzer IV/70 (V) (Sd.Kfz.162/1) was one of two variants armed with the PaK 42 L/70 gun. Some 940 were built in 1944 and 1945. The (V) stands for the builder, Vomag.
- Jagdpanzer IV/70 (A) (Sd.Kfz.162/1) was the other PaK 42 L/70 armed Jagdpanzer IV. In order to send Pak 42 L/70 armed vehicles to the front as soon as possible, Hitler ordered an interim solution in July 1944. Alkett, a manufacturer of the StuG III, Alkett, was to immediately produce Jagdpanzer IV to its own design. This differed in that its superstructure was mounted directly on the original Panzer IV chassis and as such lacked the sharp edged nose of the Vomag variant. It was also taller. Only 278 were built in the period from August 1944 to March 1945. The (A) in the designation came from Alkett. This variant is also known as the Zwischenlosung – in translation, the „intermediate solution”.
Minor modifications and improvements were made throughout the production runs of all variants, as well as several field improvements, the most common being the addition of armor sideskirts.
Originally the Jagdpanzer IV/48’s gun had a muzzle brake installed, but because the gun was so close to the ground, each time it was fired, huge dust clouds would rise up and betray the vehicle’s position, leading many crews to remove the muzzle brake in the field. Later variants dispensed with the muzzle brake.
Early L/48 and L/70-armed vehicles had zimmerit applied to the hull to protect against anti-tank grenades, but this was discontinued after about September 1944. Later vehicles had three return rollers rather than the original four, and adopted the twin vertical exhausts typical of the late Panzer IV series. Some late vehicles also had all-steel road wheels on the first couple of bogies on each side.
Combat history…
The Jagdpanzer IV served in the anti-tank sections of Panzer and SS Panzer divisions. They fought in Normandy, the Battle of the Bulge and on the Eastern Front (WWII). They were very successful tank destroyers but performed badly when used out of role as substitutes for tanks or assault guns, as most tank destroyers were.
In the later stages of the war however, they were increasingly used as tank substitutes, because there was often nothing else available.
Romania received several Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers from the Red Army after the war ended. They were officially known as TAs T4 in the army inventory and were used until 1950. All German armour was scrapped in 1954.
One of the more notable Jagdpanzer IV aces was SS-Oberscharführer Roy from the 12th SS Panzerjäger Abteilung of 12th SS Panzer Division. He was killed by an American sniper while looking out of the hatch of his Jagdpanzer IV on December 17, 1944 during the Ardennes Offensive in Belgium.
After the war, West Germany continued the Jagdpanzer concept with the Kanonenjagdpanzer, but few other fixed-casemate self-propelled guns were built postwar.
Survivors…
- Jagdpanzer IV L/48 (0-serie) is on display at the Deutsches Panzermuseum in Munster, Germany. The vehicle is a pre-production model with rounded front plates. It was previously part of the Musée des Blindés in Saumur, France
- Jagdpanzer IV L/48 is on display at the Deutsches Panzermuseum in Munster, Germany. It is an early version with 60mm armor. This vehicle is on loan from the WTS in Koblenz, Germany, and previously belonged to the United States Army Ordnance Museum in Aberdeen, Maryland. It was returned to Germany the 1960s.
- Jadgpanzer IV L/48 is on display at the Musée des Blindés in Saumur, France. It is an early model with 60mm armor.
- Jadgpanzer IV L/48 is on display at the Thun Tank Museum in Switzerland. It is a late model with 80mm front armor.
- Jagdpanzer IV L/48 is currently in storage in a military area in Bulgaria. This is a very early L/48 model, and the only surviving example with the driver’s machine gun slot welded over. It was previously part of a defensive line on the Bulgarian border. In February 2008 it was ordered recovered by the Bulgarian Defense Minister to be either preserved in a museum in Bulgaria, or sold to a private collector.
- Jagdpanzer IV L/70 (Vomag) is on display at the National Museum of Military History in Sofia, Bulgaria.
- Jagdpanzer IV L/70 (Vomag) is on display at the Kubinka Tank Museum in Russia.
- Jagdpanzer IV L/70 (Vomag) is on display at the United States Army Ordnance Museum located in Aberdeen, Maryland.
- Jagdpanzer IV L/70 (Vomag) is on display at the Patton Museum located at Fort Knox, Kentucky. This vehicle was previously part of the Shrivenham Study Collection in the UK.
- Jagdpanzer IV L/70 (Vomag) is on display at the Canadian War Museum located in Ottawa, Canada. This vehicle was previously at the Canadian Forces Base/Area Support Unit Shilo in Canada.
- Jagdpanzer IV L/70 late (Alkett) is on display at the Musée des Blindés in Saumur, France. The vehicle was used in 1944-45 by Free French forces. The vehicle is displayed with damage resulting from a direct hit by an armor piercing shell.
509th Heavy Tank Battalion (Germany)…
509th Heavy Tank Battalion (Germany)
s.H.Pz.Abt. 509 |
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| Active | 9. September 1943- 8. May 1945 |
| Country | Nazi Germany |
| Branch | Wehrmacht Heer |
| Type | Armoured |
| Size | Battalion |
| Equipment | Tiger I (1943–1945) Tiger II (1944–1945) |
| Insignia | |
| Identification symbol |
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The schwere-Panzer-Abteilung 509 (abbreviated s.Pz.Abt. 509) was a German heavy panzer abteilung equipped with Tiger Iand later Tiger II Königstiger tanks. The 509th saw action on the Eastern Front during the Second World War. As with otherGerman heavy tank battalions, it was never assigned to a single corps; but shuffled around as needed.
History…
The 509th was ordered formed on 9 September 1943, taking most of its personnel from Panzer-Regiment 204 of the disbanded22. Panzer-Division, although some sources claim March 1943. The battalion was initially issued with forty-five Tiger Is. It was committed to action in Ukraine as a part of Army Group South. Reaching the Front in October 1943, the 509th saw action near Kirovograd and Krivoi Rog, falling back as a part of the overall withdrawal of the front. In early November, the third company was detached and attached to the 2. SS-Panzer-Division Das Reich.
In early 1944, the 509th was involved in the Second Battle of Kiev and was heavily engaged in fighting for the city. After the defeat at Kiev, the detachment saw action at Pavlova during the withdrawal. In late May, the exhausted and severely depleted 509th was pulled back for refitting. After receiving a full complement of Tiger 1s, the detachment was sent back to the front on 1 June 1944.
On 22 June 1944, the Soviets launched Operation Bagration, and the 509th, attached to Army Group Centre, was in their line of advance. The 509th saw heavy fighting at Novosselki, Shitomir and Chelmik. On 8 September 1944, the detachment lost sixteen Tigers in under 24 hours near Kielce, Poland.
In late September the remnants of the detachment were pulled back to Senneläger to be rebuilt and equipped with the new model Tiger IIs. Due to severe disruption in production,Henschel was unable to deliver the new panzers until December 1944. After it had received forty-five new Tiger IIs, the detachment was sent to join SS-Obergruppenführer Herbert Otto Gille’s IV. SS-Panzerkorps, which was preparing an attempt to relieve the encircled garrison of Budapest. The operation, codenamed Konrad III, was launched on 18 January 1945. The 509th had to change its attack plans once the assault was in progress after a major bridge over the Vali River collapsed.
The horrible conditions coupled with a ferocious Soviet defence and a solid Pakfront resulted in the failure of Konrad III. During the operation, the 509th had lost forty of its forty-five Tiger IIs, however many were able to be repaired and put back into action relatively quickly, with only ten being total losses. On 15 February 1945, the battalion was mentioned in an army report as having destroyed 203 Soviet tanks, 145 Soviet guns and 5 Soviet aircraft with the total loss of 10 Tiger IIs in the period from 18 January 1945 to 8 February 1945.
The 509th was transferred to III. Panzerkorps, where it took part in the fighting supporting Operation Frühlingserwachen in March, and falling back towards Vienna. It took part in theBattle of Vienna in April, before making a breakout towards the American lines. On 8 May 1945, the 509th destroyed its remaining nine Tiger IIs and the next day surrendered to the Americans near Linz.
Commanders…
- Hauptmann von Lüttichau (? Aug 1943 – ? Nov 1943)
- Major Gierka (? Nov 1943 – ? Feb 1944)
- Hauptmann Radtke (? Feb 1944 – ? Mar 1944)
- Hauptmann Burmester (? Mar 1944 – ? Feb 1945)
- Hauptmann Dr.König (? Feb 1945 – ? May 1945)
Orders of battle..
October 1943 – Ukraine…
December 1943, Ukraine (Army Group South)
- Abteilung Stab Zug (3x Tiger I, 6x SdKfz 250)
- 1./sPzAbt 509 (14x Tiger I)
- 2./sPzAbt 509 (14x Tiger I)
- 3./sPzAbt 509 (14x Tiger I) – subordinated to 2. SS-Panzer-Division
January 1945 – Konrad III…
- Abteilung Stab Zug (3x Tiger II, 6x SdKfz 250)
- 1./sPzAbt 509 (14x Tiger II)
- 2./sPzAbt 509 (14x Tiger II)
- 3./sPzAbt 509 (14x Tiger II)
All about Heinz Guderian…
All about Heinz Guderian…
Heinz Wilhelm Guderian |
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17 June 1888 – 14 May 1954 (aged 65)
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| Nickname | Schneller Heinz (Hurrying Heinz) |
| Place of birth | Kulm, West Prussia |
| Place of death | Schwangau, Allgäu |
| Allegiance |  German Empire (to 1918) Weimar Republic (to 1933) Nazi Germany |
| Years of service | 1907 – 1945 |
| Rank | Generaloberst |
| Commands held | 2. Panzer Division, XVI. Army-Corps,XIX. Army-Corps, PanzergruppeGuderian and Panzergruppe 2 |
| Battles/wars | World War I, World War II |
| Awards | Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Eichenlaub |
| Relations | Heinz-Günther Guderian |
Heinz Wilhelm Guderian (17 June 1888 – 14 May 1954) was a German general during World War II. He was a pioneer in the development of armored warfare, and was the leading proponent of tanks and mechanization in the Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces). Germany’s panzer (armored) forces were raised and organized under his direction as Chief of Mobile Forces. During the war, he was a highly successful commander of panzer forces in several campaigns, became Inspector-General of Armored Troops, rose to the rank of Generaloberst, and was Chief of the General Staff in the last year of the war.
Early career…
Guderian was born in Kulm, West Prussia, (now Chełmno, Poland`),. From 1901 to 1907 Guderian attended various military schools. He entered the Army in 1907 as an ensign-cadet in the (Hanoverian) Jäger Bataillon No. 10, commanded at that point by his father, Friedrich Guderian. After attending the war academy in Metz he was made a Leutnant (full Lieutenant) in 1908. In 1911 Guderian joined the 3rd Telegraphen-Battalion of the Prussian Army Signal Corps. In October 1913 he married Margarete Goerne with whom he had two sons, Heinz (1914–2004) and Kurt (born 1918). Both sons became highly decorated Wehrmacht officers during World War II; Heinz Günter became a Panzer general in the Bundeswehr after the war.
During World War I he served as a Signals and General Staff officer. This allowed him to get an overall view of battlefield conditions. He often disagreed with his superiors and was transferred to the army intelligence department, where he remained until the end of the war. This second assignment, while removed from the battlefield, sharpened his strategic skills.
After the war, Guderian stayed in the reduced 100,000-man German Army (Reichswehr) as a company commander in the 10th Jäger-Battalion. Later he joined the Truppenamt („Troop Office”), which was actually the Army’s „General-Staff-in-waiting” (an official General Staff was forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles). In 1927 Guderian was promoted to major and transferred to the Truppenamt group for Army transport and motorized tactics in Berlin. This put him at the center of German development of armored forces. Guderian, who was fluent in both English and French studied the works of British maneuver warfare theorists J. F. C. Fuller and, debatably,[2] B. H. Liddell Hart; also the writings, interestingly enough, of the then-obscure Charles de Gaulle. He translated these works into German.
In 1931 he was promoted to Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant-Colonel) and became chief of staff to the Inspectorate of Motorized Troops under Generalleutnant (Major-General) Oswald Lutz. In 1933 he was promoted to Oberst (Colonel).
During this period, he wrote many papers on mechanized warfare, which were seen in the German Army as authoritative. These papers were based on extensive wargaming without troops, with paper tanks and finally with armored vehicles.
In October 1935 he was made commander of the newly created 2nd Panzer Division (one of three). On 1 August 1936 he was promoted to Generalleutnant, and on 4 February 1938 he was promoted to General and given command of the XVI Army Corps.
During this period (1936–1937), Guderian produced his most important written work, his book Achtung – Panzer! It was a highly persuasive compilation of Guderian’s own theories and the armored warfare and combined-arms warfare ideas of other General Staff officers, expounding the use of airpower as well as tanks in future ground combat.
The German panzer forces were created largely on the lines laid down by Guderian in Achtung – Panzer!
Guderian’s theory…
The British Army was the first to conceive and attempt armored warfare, and though British theorists were the first to propose the concept of „blitzkrieg” (lightning warfare), the British did not fully develop it. During World War I, the German army had developed the idea of breaking through a static front by concentration of combined arms, which they applied in their 1918 Spring Offensive. But they failed to gain decisive results because the breakthrough elements were on foot and could not sustain the impetus of the initial attack.
Motorized infantry was the key to sustaining a breakthrough, and until the 1930s that wasn’t possible. Soviet marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky got the idea, but his doctrine was repudiated as contrary to Communist principles, and Tukhachevsky was executed in 1937.
Guderian was the first who fully developed and advocated the strategy of blitzkrieg and put it into its final shape. He summarized the tactics of blitzkrieg as the way to get the mobile and motorized armored divisions to work together and support each other in order to achieve decisive success. In his book Panzer Leader he wrote:
In this year (1929) I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance. My historical studies; the exercises carried out in England and our own experience with mock-ups had persuaded me that the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-country performance. In such formation of all arms, the tanks must play primary role, the other weapons being subordinated to the requirements of the armor. It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions: what was needed were armored divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to fight with full effect.
Guderian believed that certain developments in technology needed to take place in conjunction with blitzkrieg in order to support the entire theory, especially in communication and special visual equipment with which the armored divisions in general, and tanks specifically, should be equipped. Guderian insisted in 1933, within the high command, that every tank in the German armored force must be equipped with radio and visual equipment in order to enable the tank commander to communicate and perform a decisive role in blitzkrieg.
Guderian’s claim to be the ‘Father of Blitzkrieg’ has, however, been challenged (Corum 92 pp 137–141) as gross self-exaggeration. His publications before 1936 were few, relatively mundane and did not address questions of fundamental doctrine. The famous Guderian book, Achtung Panzer, while an early military publications advocating tank warfare and while forcefully written, it was not particularly original. The true mainspring of German armored doctrine was the unsung Ernst Volckheim, who receives only passing mention in Guderian’s memoirs. Moreover, Guderian’s claim that the Panzer advocates, of whom he claims to have been foremost, were met with resistance from within the army, especially from Ludwig Beck, has been exposed as deceitful. All Reichswehr leaders from Seeckt onwards enthusiastically endorsed armor. The Reichswehr’s basic doctrine emphasized speed and maneuver. The famed Panzer doctrine was little but its application to armor with its improvement in mobility.
World War II…
In the Second World War, Guderian first served as the commander of the XIX Corps in the invasion of Poland. He personally led the German forces during the Battle of Wizna and Battle of Kobryn testing his theory against the reality of war for the first time. After the invasion he took property in the Warthegau area of occupied Poland, evicting the Polish estate owners. In the Invasion of France, he personally led the attack that traversed the Ardennes Forest, crossed the Meuse River and broke through the French lines at Sedan. During the French campaign, he led his panzer forces in rapid blitzkrieg-style advances and earned the nickname „Der schnelle Heinz” (Hurrying Heinz) among his troops.Guderian’s panzer group led the „race to the sea” that split the Allied armies in two, depriving the French armies and the BEF in Northern France and Belgium of their fuel, food, spare parts and ammunition. Faced with orders from nervous superiors to halt on one occasion, he managed to continue his advance by stating he was performing a ‘reconnaissance in force’. Guderian’s column was famously denied the chance to destroy the Allied beachhead at Dunkirk by Hitler’s personal order.
In 1941 he commanded Panzergruppe 2, also known as Panzergruppe Guderian, in Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, receiving the 24th award of the Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross on 17 July of that year. From 5 October 1941 he led the redesignated Second Panzer Army. His armored spearhead captured Smolensk in a remarkably short time and was poised to launch the final assault on Moscow when he was ordered to turn south towards Kiev (see Lötzen decision).
He protested against Hitler’s decision and as a result lost the Führer’s confidence. He was relieved of his command on 25 December 1941 after Fieldmarshal Günther von Kluge, not noted for his ability to face up to Hitler, claimed that Guderian had ordered a withdrawal in contradiction of Hitler’s „stand fast” order. Guderian was transferred to the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) reserve pool, his chances of being promoted to fieldmarshal, which depended on Hitler’s personal decision, possibly ruined forever. Guderian would deny that he ordered any kind of withdrawal. Ironically this act of apparent insubordination is cited by his admirers as further proof of his independence of spirit when dealing with Hitler. Guderian’s own view on the matter was that he had been victimized by von Kluge who was the commanding officer when German troops came to a standstill at the Moscow front in late autumn/winter 1941. At some point he so provoked von Kluge with accusations related to his dismissal that the field marshal challenged him to a duel, which Hitler forbade.
After his dismissal Guderian and his wife retired to a 2,000 acres (8.1 km2) sequestered country estate at Deipenhof in the Reichsgau Wartheland.
In September 1942, when Erwin Rommel was recuperating in Germany from health problems, he suggested Guderian to OKW as the only one who could replace him temporarily in Africa, the response came in the same night: „Guderian is not accepted”. Only after the German defeat at Stalingrad was Guderian given a new position. On 1 March 1943 he was appointed Inspector-General of the Armoured Troops. Here his responsibilities were to determine armoured strategy and to oversee tank design and production and the training of Germany’s panzer forces. He reported to Hitler directly. In Panzer Leader, he conceded that he was fully aware of the brutal occupation policies of the German administration of Ukraine, claiming that this was wholly the responsibility of civilians, about whom he could do nothing.
According to Guderian, Hitler was easily persuaded to field too many new tank designs, and this resulted in supply, logistical, and repair problems for German forces in Russia.Guderian preferred large numbers of Panzer IIIs and IVs over smaller numbers of heavier tanks like the Tiger, which had limited range and could rarely go off-road without getting stuck in the Russian mud.
On 21 July 1944, after the failure of the July 20 Plot in which Guderian had no involvement, Guderian was appointed chief of staff of the army (Chef des Generalstabs des Heeres) as a successor to Kurt Zeitzler, who had departed July 1 after a nervous breakdown. During his tenure as chief of staff, he let it be known that any General Staff officer who wasn’t prepared to be „a National Socialist officer” wasn’t welcome on that body. He also served on the „Court of Military Honour,” a drumhead court-martial that expelled many of the officers involved in the July 20 Plot from the Army before handing them over to the People’s Court.
However, he had a long series of violent rows with Hitler over the way in which Germany should handle the war on both fronts. Hitler finally dismissed Guderian on 28 March 1945 after a shouting-match over the failed counterattack of General Theodor Busse’s 9th Army to break through to units encircled at Küstrin; he stated to Guderian that „your physical health requires that you immediately take six weeks convalescent leave,” („Health problems” were commonly used as a facade in the Third Reich to remove executives who for some reason could not simply be sacked, but from episodes Guderian describes in his memoirs it is evident that he actually did suffer from congestive heart failure.) He was replaced by GeneralHans Krebs. The Enigma Machine belonging to Guderian is on display at the Intelligence Corps museum in Chicksands, Bedfordshire.
Life after the war…
Together with his Panzer staff, Guderian surrendered to American troops on 10 May 1945 and remained in U.S. custody as a prisoner of war until his release on 17 June 1948. Despite Soviet and Polish government protests, he was not charged with any war crimes during the Nuremberg Trials, as his actions and behavior were ruled to be consistent with those of a professional soldier.
After the war he was often invited to attend meetings of British veterans’ groups, where he analyzed past battles with his old foes. During the early 1950s he was active in advising on the redevelopment of the German army: Bundeswehr (see Searle’s Wehrmacht Generals).
Guderian died on 14 May 1954 at the age of 65, in Schwangau near Füssen (Southern Bavaria) and is buried at the Friedhof Hildesheimer Strasse in Goslar.
In 2000, a documentary titled Guderian, directed by Anton Vassil, was aired on French television. It featured Heinz Günther Guderian (Guderian’s surviving son – the other one died in the Second World War – who became a prominent General in the post-war German Bundeswehr and NATO) along with other notables such as Field Marshal Lord Carver (129th British Field Marshal), expert historians Kenneth Macksey and Heinz Wilhelm. Using rarely seen photographs from Guderian’s private collection, the documentary provides an inside view into the life and career of Guderian and draws a profile of Guderian’s character and the moral responsibility of the German general staff under Hitler.
Awards and decorations…
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Books by Heinz Guderian…
- Guderian, Heinz (1937). Achtung – Panzer! (reissue ed.). Sterling Press. ISBN 0-304-35285-3. Guderian describes what he would do if he were in charge of German tank forces.
- Guderian, Heinz (1942). Mit Den Panzern in Ost und West. Volk & Reich Verlag.
- Guderian, Heinz (1950). Kann Westeuropa verteidigt werden?. Plesse-Verlag.
- Guderian, Heinz (1952). Panzer Leader. Da Capo Press Reissue edition, 2001. New York: Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-81101-4. Guderian describes what he did when he was in charge of German tank forces. It was originally published with the German title Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Memories of a Soldier) (Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, Heidelberg 1950; 10th edition 1977).
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