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All About Karl Dönitz

Karl Dönitz

Karl Dönitz


Großadmiral Karl Dönitz, later Reichspräsident ofGermany

President of Germany
In office
30 April 1945 – 23 May 1945
Chancellor Joseph Goebbels
Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk (Leading Minister)
Preceded by Adolf Hitler
(as Führer)
Succeeded by Theodor Heuss
(as Bundespräsident)

Born 16 September 1891
Berlin, German Empire
Died 24 December 1980(aged 89)
Aumühle, West Germany
Nationality German
Political party None
Spouse(s) Ingeborg Weber
Military service
Nickname(s) Der Löwe (The Lion)
Allegiance German Empire German Empire(1910–1918)
Germany Weimar Republic(1920–1933)
Nazi Germany Nazi Germany (1933–1945)
Service/branch  Kaiserliche Marine
 Reichsmarine
 Kriegsmarine
Years of service 1910–1945
Rank Großadmiral
Commands UC-25 (February–September 1918)
UB-68 (September–October 1918)
Torpedo Boats (1920s)
Emden (1934–1935)
1. Unterseebootsflotille(1935–1936)
FdU (1936–1939)
BdU (1939–1943)
OBdM (1943–1945)
Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht (April–May 1945)
Battles/wars World War I

  • Black Sea Campaign
  • Mediterranean U-boat Campaign

World War II
Battle of the Atlantic

  • Convoy SC 7
  • OperationPaukenschlag
Awards U-boat War Badge with Diamonds
World War I U-Boat War Badge
1939 Clasp to the 1914Iron Cross 1st Class
Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves
Karl Dönitz (German pronunciation: [ˈdøːnɪts]  ( listen); 16 September 1891 – 24 December 1980) was a German naval commander duringWorld War II. He started his career in the German Navy (Kaiserliche Marine, or „Imperial Navy”) during World War I. In 1918, while in command of UB-68, the submarine was sunk by British forces and Dönitz was taken prisoner. While in a prisoner of war camp, he formulated what he later called Rudeltaktik[2] („pack tactic”, commonly called „wolfpack”). At the start of World War II, he was the senior submarine officer in the German Navy. In January 1943, Dönitz achieved the rank of Großadmiral (Grand Admiral) and replaced Grand Admiral Erich Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine). On 30 April 1945, after the death of Adolf Hitler and in accordance with Hitler’s last will and testament, Dönitz was named Hitler’s successor as Staatsoberhaupt (Head of State), with the title of Reichspräsident (President) and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He was the last President of the Third Reich. On 7 May 1945, he ordered Alfred Jodl to sign the instruments of unconditional surrender in Rheims, France.

Early life and career


Oberleutnant zur See Karl Dönitz as Watch Officer of U-39

Dönitz was born in Grünau in Berlin, Germany to Anna Beyer and Emil Dönitz, an engineer. Karl had an older brother, Friedrich. In 1910, Dönitz enlisted in the Imperial German Navy (Kaiserliche Marine). He became a sea-cadet (Seekadett) on 4 April. On 15 April 1911, he became a midshipman (Fähnrich zur See), the rank given to those who had served for one year as officer’s apprentice and had passed their first examination.

On 27 September 1913, Dönitz was commissioned as a Acting Sub-Lieutenant (Leutnant zur See). WhenWorld War I began, he served in the light cruiser SMS Breslau in the Mediterranean Sea. In August 1914,Breslau and the battlecruiser SMS Goeben were sold to the Ottoman navy; the ships were renamed theMidilli and the Yavuz Sultan Selim, respectively. They began operating out of Constantinople (nowIstanbul), under Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, engaging Russian forces in the Black Sea. On 22 March 1916, Dönitz was promoted to Navy First Lieutenant (Oberleutnant zur See). When Midilli put into dock for repairs, he was temporarily assigned as airfield commander at the Dardanelles. From there, he requested a transfer to the submarine forces, which became effective in October 1916. He served as watch officer on U-39, and from February 1918 onward as commander of UC-25. On 5 September 1918, he became commander of UB-68, operating in the Mediterranean. On 4 October, this boat was sunk by British forces and Dönitz was taken prisoner on the island of Malta.

Inter-war period

The war ended in 1918, but Dönitz remained in a British camp near Sheffield as a prisoner of war until his release in July 1919. He returned to Germany in 1920.

During the interwar period, Dönitz continued his naval career in the naval arm of the Weimar Republic’s Armed Forces (Reichswehr). On 10 January 1921, he became a Lieutenant (Kapitänleutnant) in the new German Navy (Vorläufige Reichsmarine). Dönitz commanded torpedo boats by 1928, becoming a Lieutenant-Commander (Korvettenkapitän) on 1 November of that same year.

On 1 September 1933, Dönitz became a full Commander (Fregattenkapitän) and, in 1934, was put in command of the cruiser Emden.Emden was the ship on which cadets and midshipmen took a year-long world cruise in preparation for a future officer’s commission.

On 1 September 1935, Dönitz was promoted to Captain (Kapitän zur See). He was placed in command of the 1st U-boat Flotilla Weddigen, which included U-7U-8, and U-9.

During 1935, the Weimar Republic’s Navy, theReichsmarine, was replaced by the Navy of Nazi Germany, the Kriegsmarine.

Throughout 1935 and 1936, Dönitz had misgivings regarding submarines due to German overestimation of the capabilities of British ASDIC. In reality, ASDIC could detect only one submarine in ten during exercises. In the words of Alan Hotham, British Director of Naval Intelligence, ASDIC was a „huge bluff”.

German doctrine at the time, based on the work of American Naval Captain Alfred Mahan and shared by all major navies, called for submarines to be integrated with surface fleets and employed against enemy warships. By November 1937, Dönitz became convinced that a major campaign against merchant shipping was practical and began pressing for the conversion of the German fleet almost entirely to U-boats. He advocated a strategy of attacking only merchant ships, targets relatively safe to attack. He pointed out that destroying Britain’s fleet of oil tankers would starve the Royal Navy of supplies needed to run its ships, which would be just as effective as sinking them. He thought a German fleet of 300 of the newer Type VII U-boats could knock Britain out of the war.

Dönitz revived the World War I idea of grouping several submarines together into a „wolf pack” to overwhelm a merchant convoy’s defensive escorts. Implementation of wolf packs had been difficult in World War I owing to the limitations of available radios. In the interwar years, Germany had developed ultra-high frequency transmitters which it was hoped would make their radio communication unjammable, while theEnigma cipher machine was believed to have made communications secure. Dönitz also adopted and claimed credit for Wilhelm Marschall’s 1922 idea of attacking convoys using surface or very near surface night attacks. This tactic had the added advantage of making a submarine undetectable by sonar.

At the time, many — including Erich Raeder — felt such talk marked Dönitz as a weakling. Dönitz was alone among senior naval officers, including some former submariners, in believing in a new submarine war on trade. He and Raeder constantly argued over funding priorities within the Navy, while at the same time competing with Hitler’s friends, such as Hermann Göring, who received greater attention at this time.

Since the surface strength of the Kriegsmarine was much less than that of the British Royal Navy, Raeder believed any war with Britain in the near future would doom it to uselessness, once remarking all the Germans could hope to do was die valiantly. Raeder based his hopes on war being delayed until the German Navy’s extensive „Z Plan”, which would have expanded Germany’s surface fleet to where it could effectively contend with the Royal Navy, was implemented. The „Z Plan”, however, was not scheduled to be completed until 1945.

Dönitz, in contrast, had no such fatalism and set about intensely training his crews in the new tactics. The marked inferiority of the German surface fleet left submarine warfare as Germany’s only naval option once war broke out.

On 28 January 1939, Dönitz was promoted to Commodore (Kommodore) and Commander of Submarines (Führer der Unterseeboote).

World War II

In September 1939, Germany invaded Poland, Britain and France declared war on Germany, and World War II began. The Kriegsmarine was caught unprepared for war, having anticipated that the war’s outbreak would be in 1945, not 1939. The Z Plan was tailored for this assumption, calling for a balanced fleet with a greatly increased number of surface capital ships, including several aircraft carriers. At the time the war began, Dönitz’s force included only 57 U-boats, many of them short-range, and only 22 oceangoing Type VIIs. He made do with what he had, while being harassed by Raeder and with Hitler calling on him to dedicate boats to military actions against the British fleet directly. These operations had mixed success; theaircraft carrier HMS Courageous and battleship Royal Oak were sunk, and battleships HMS Nelson damaged and Barham sunk, at a cost of some U-boats, diminishing the small quantity available even further. Together with surface raiders, merchant shipping lines were also attacked by U-boats.

Commander of the submarine fleet

On 1 October 1939, Dönitz became a Rear Admiral (Konteradmiral) and „Commander of the Submarines” (Befehlshaber der UnterseebooteBdU, the German equivalent of ComSubPacor ComSubLant); on 1 September the following year, he was made a Vice Admiral (Vizeadmiral).

Karl Dönitz in 1943

By 1941, the delivery of new Type VIIs had improved to the point where operations were having a real effect on the British wartime economy. Although production of merchant ships shot up in response, improved torpedoes, better U-boats, and much better operational planning led to increasing numbers of „kills”. On 11 December 1941, following Adolf Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States, Dönitz immediately planned for implementation of Operation Drumbeat (Unternehmen Paukenschlag). This targeted shipping along the East Coast of the United States. Carried out the next month, with only nine U-boats (all the larger Type IX), it had dramatic and far-reaching results. The U.S. Navy was entirely unprepared for antisubmarine warfare, despite having had two years of British experience to draw from, and committed every imaginable mistake. Shipping losses, which had appeared to be coming under control as the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy gradually adapted to the new challenge, skyrocketed.

On at least two occasions, Allied success against U-boat operations led Dönitz to investigate possible reasons. Among those considered were espionage and Allied interception and decoding of German Navy communications (the naval version of the Enigma cipher machine). Both investigations into communications security came to the conclusion espionage was more likely, or else the Allied successes had been accidental. Nevertheless, Dönitz ordered his U-boat fleet to use an improved version of the Enigma machine (one with four or five rotors, which was even more secure), the M4, for communications within the fleet, on 1 February 1942. The German Navy (Kriegsmarine) was the only branch to use the improved version; the rest of the German armed forces (Wehrmacht) continued to use their then-current three-rotor versions of the Enigma machine. The new system was termed „Triton” („Shark” to the Allies). For a time, this change in encryption between submarines caused considerable difficulty for Allied codebreakers; it took ten months before Shark traffic could be read (see also Ultra codebreaking andCryptanalysis of the Enigma).

By the end of 1942, the production of Type VII U-boats had increased to the point where Dönitz was finally able to conduct mass attacks by groups of submarines, a tactic he called „Rudel” (group or pack) and became known as „wolfpack” in English. Allied shipping losses shot up tremendously, and there was serious concern for a while about the state of British fuel supplies.

During 1943, the war in the Atlantic turned against the Germans, but Dönitz continued to push for increased U-boat construction and entertained the notion that further technological developments would tip the war once more in Germany’s favour while briefing the Führer. At the end of the war, the German submarine fleet was by far the most advanced in the world, and late-war examples, such as the Type XXI U-boat, served as models for Soviet and American construction after the war. These, the Schnorchel (snorkel) and Type XXI boats, appeared late in the war because of Dönitz’s personal indifference, at times even hostility, to new technology he perceived as disruptive.[10] His opposition to the larger Type IX was not unique; Admiral Thomas C. Hart, who commanded the United States Asiatic Fleet in thePhilippines at the outbreak of the Pacific War, opposed fleet boats as „too luxurious”.

Dönitz was deeply involved in the daily operations of his boats, often contacting them up to seventy times a day with questions such as their position, fuel supply, and other „minutiae„. This incessant questioning hastened the compromise of his ciphers, by giving the Allies more messages to work with. Furthermore, replies from the boats enabled the Allies to usedirection finding (HF/DF, called „Huff-Duff”) to locate a U-boat using its radio, track it, and attack it (often with aircraft able to sink it with impunity).

Dönitz wore on his uniform both the special grade of the U-Boat War Badge with diamonds, and his U-Boat War badge from World War I, along with his World War I Iron Cross 1st Class with World War II clasp.

Commander-in-chief and Grand Admiral

Hitler meets Admiral Dönitz in the Führerbunker (1945)

On 30 January 1943, Dönitz replaced Erich Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine) and Grand Admiral (Großadmiral) of the Naval High Command (Oberkommando der Marine). His deputy, Eberhard Godt, took over the operational command of the U-boat force[12] It was Dönitz who was able to convince Hitler not to scrap the remaining ships of the surface fleet. Despite hoping to continue to use them as a fleet in being, the Kriegsmarine continued losing what few capital ships it had. In September, thebattleship Tirpitz was put out of action for months by a British midget submarine. In December, he ordered the battleship Scharnhorst (underKonteradmiral Erich Bey) to attack Soviet-bound convoys, but she was sunk in the resulting encounter with superior British forces led by the battleship HMS Duke of York.

Hitler’s successor

Scan of Hitler’s original testament showing that Dönitz was chosen to succeed Hitler as Germany’s president.

In the final days of the war, after Hitler had installed himself in the Führerbunker beneath the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, Hermann Göring was considered the obvious successor to Hitler, followed by Heinrich Himmler. Göring, however, had infuriated Hitler by radioing Hitler in Berlin asking for permission to assume leadership of the Reich. Himmler also tried to seize power himself by entering into negotiations with Count Bernadotte. On 28 April, the BBC reported that Himmler had offered surrender to the western Allies and that the offer had been declined.

In his last will and testament, dated 29 April, Hitler surprisingly named Dönitz his successor asStaatsoberhaupt (Head of State), with the title of Reichspräsident (President) and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The same document named Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels as Head of Government with the title of Reichskanzler(Chancellor). Further, Hitler expelled both Göring and Himmler from the party.

Rather than designate one person to succeed him as Führer, Hitler reverted to the old arrangement in the Weimar Constitution. Hitler believed the leaders of the German Army (Heer), Air Force (Luftwaffe), and SS (Schutzstaffel) had betrayed him. Since the German Navy had been too small to affect the war in a major way, its commander, Dönitz, became the only possible successor more or less by default.

However, on 1 May—the day after Hitler’s death—Goebbels committed suicide. Dönitz thus became the sole representative of the crumbling German Reich. He appointed Finance Minister Count Ludwig Schwerin von Krosigk as „Leading Minister” (Krosigk had declined to accept the title of Chancellor) and they attempted to form a government.

That night, Dönitz made a nationwide radio address in which he spoke of Hitler’s „hero’s death” and announced that the war would continue „to save Germany from destruction by the advancing Bolshevik enemy.” However, Dönitz knew even then that Germany’s position was untenable and that the Wehrmacht was no longer capable of offering meaningful resistance. During his brief period in office, Dönitz devoted most of his efforts to ensuring the loyalty of the German armed forces and trying to ensure German troops would surrender to the British or Americans and not the Soviets. He feared vengeful Soviet reprisals against Nazi party members and high-ranking officers like himself, and hoped to strike a deal with the western Allies.

Flensburg government

The rapidly advancing Allied forces limited the Dönitz government’s jurisdiction to an area around Flensburg near the Danish border, where Dönitz’s headquarters were located, along withMürwik. Accordingly his administration was referred to as the Flensburg government. The following is Dönitz’s description of his new government:

These considerations (the bare survival of the German people) which all pointed to the need for the creation of some sort of central government, took shape and form when I was joined by Graf Schwerin-Krosigk. In addition to discharging his duties as Foreign Minister and Minister of Finance, he formed the temporary government we needed and presided over the activities of its cabinet. Although he was restricted in his choice to those men who were in northern Germany, he nevertheless succeeded in forming a workmanlike cabinet of experts.The picture of the military situation as a whole showed clearly that the war was lost. As there was also no possibility of effecting any improvement in Germany’s overall position by political means, the only conclusion to which I, as Head of the State, could come was that the war must be brought to an end as quickly as possible, in order to prevent further bloodshed.
—Karl Dönitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days

Late on 1 May, Himmler attempted to make a place for himself in the Flensburg government. The following is Dönitz’s description of his showdown with Himmler:

At about midnight he arrived, accompanied by six armed SS officers, and was received by my aide-de-camp, Walter Luedde-Neurath. I offered Himmler a chair and I myself sat down behind my writing desk, upon which lay, hidden by some papers, a pistol with the safety catch off. I had never done anything of this sort in my life before, but I did not know what the outcome of this meeting might be.I handed Himmler the telegram containing my appointment. „Please read this,” I said. I watched him closely. As he read, an expression of astonishment, indeed of consternation, spread over his face. All hope seemed to collapse within him. He went very pale. Finally he stood up and bowed. „Allow me,” he said, „to become the second man in your state.” I replied that that was out of the question and that there was no way in which I could make any use of his services.

Thus advised, he left me at about one o’clock in the morning. The showdown had taken place without force, and I felt relieved.

—Karl Dönitz, as quoted in The Decline and Fall of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan

On 4 May, German forces in the Netherlands, Denmark, and northwestern Germany under Dönitz’s command surrendered to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery at the Lüneburg Heath, just southeast of Hamburg, signalling the end of World War II in northwestern Europe.

Dönitz detention report and mugshot from 1945.

A day later, Dönitz sent Admiral Hans-Georg von Friedeburg, his successor as the commander in chief of the German Navy, to U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s headquarters in Rheims, France, to negotiate a surrender to the Allies. The Chief of Staff of OKW, Colonel-General (Generaloberst) Alfred Jodl, arrived a day later. Dönitz had instructed them to draw out the negotiations for as long as possible so that German troops and refugees could surrender to the Western Powers. However, when Eisenhower let it be known he would not tolerate the Germans’ stalling, Dönitz authorised Jodl to sign the instrument of unconditional surrender at 1:30 a.m. on the morning of May 7. Just over an hour later, Jodl signed the documents. The surrender documents included the phrase, „All forces under German control to cease active operations at 23:01 hours Central European Time on 8 May 1945.” At Stalin’s insistence, on 8 May, shortly before midnight, General Field Marshal (Generalfeldmarschall) Wilhelm Keitelrepeated the signing in Berlin at Marshal Georgiy Zhukov’s headquarters, with General Carl Spaatz of the USAAF as Eisenhower’s representative. At the time specified, World War II in Europe ended.

On 23 May, the Dönitz government was dissolved when its members were arrested by the Allied Control Commission at Flensburg.

Dönitz’s relationship to Jews and Nazism

Despite his postwar claims, Dönitz was seen as supportive of Nazism during the war. Several naval officers described him as „closely tied to Hitler and Nazi ideology.” On one occasion, he went as far as to boast about Hitler’s humanity. Another event, in which he spoke to Hitler Youth in what was defined as an „inappropriate way”, earned him the nickname of „Hitler Youth Dönitz.” He refused to assist Albert Speer in stopping a scorched earth policy dictated by Hitler and is also noted as saying, „in comparison to Hitler we are all pip-squeaks. Anyone who believes he can do better than the Führer is stupid.”

There are several antisemitic statements on the part of Dönitz known to historians.[17] When Sweden closed its international waters to Germany, he blamed this action on their fear and dependence on „international Jewish capital.” In August 1944, he declared, „I would rather eat dirt than see my grandchildren grow up in the filthy, poisonous atmosphere of Jewry.”

On German Heroes’ Day (12 March) 1944, Dönitz declared, without Adolf Hitler, Germany would be beset by „poison of Jewry,” the country destroyed for lack of National Socialismwhich, as Dönitz declared, gave defiance of an uncompromising ideology. At the Nuremberg Trials, Dönitz claimed the statement about „poison of Jewry” was regarding „the endurance, the power to endure, of the people, as it was composed, could be better preserved than if there were Jewish elements in the nation.” Initially he claimed, „I could imagine that it would be very difficult for the population in the towns to hold out under the strain of heavy bombing attacks if such an influence was allowed to work.”

Author Eric Zillmer argues that from an ideological standpoint, Dönitz was anti-Marxist and anti-Semitic. Later, during the Nuremberg Trials, Dönitz claimed to know nothing about theextermination of Jews and declared nobody among „his men” thought about violence against Jews.

Dönitz told Leon Goldensohn, an American psychiatrist at Nuremberg, „I never had any idea of the goings-on as far as Jews were concerned. Hitler said each man should take care of his business, and mine was U-boats and the navy”.[20] To Goldensohn, Dönitz also spoke of his support for Admiral Bernhard Rogge, who was of Jewish descent, when the Nazi Party began to persecute the admiral.

Nuremberg war crimes trials

1946-10-08 21 Nazi Chiefs Guilty.ogv
October 17, 1946 newsreel ofNuremberg Trials sentencing

Following the war, Dönitz was held as a prisoner of war by the Allies. He was indicted as a major war criminal at the Nuremberg Trials on three counts: (1) conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; (2) Planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression; and (3) crimes against the laws of war. Dönitz was found not guilty on count (1) of the indictment, but guilty on counts (2), and (3).

During the trial, Gustave Gilbert, an American Army psychologist, was allowed to examine the Nazi leaders who were tried at Nuremberg for war crimes. Among other tests, a German version of the Wechsler-Bellevue IQ test was administered. Dönitz scored 138, the third highest among the Nazi leaders tested.

Dönitz disputed the propriety of his trial at Nuremberg, commenting on count (2) that „One of the ‘accusations’ that made me guilty during this trial was that I met and planned the course of the war with Hitler; now I ask them in heaven’s name, how could an admiral do otherwise with his country’s head of state in a time of war?” Numerous (over 100) Senior Allied officers also sent letters to Dönitz conveying their disappointment over the fairness and verdict of his trial.

At the trial Dönitz was charged with :

  • Waging unrestricted submarine warfare against neutral shipping (see below).
  • Permitting Hitler’s Commando Order of 18 October 1942 to remain in full force when he became commander-in-chief of the Navy, and to that extent responsibility for that crime. His defence was that the Order excluded men captured in naval warfare, and that the order had not been acted upon by any men under his command.
  • That knowing that 12,000 involuntary foreign workers were working in the shipyards, he did nothing to stop it.
  • Advice in 1945 when Hitler asked Dönitz whether the Geneva Convention should be denounced. Hitler’s motives were twofold. The first was that reprisals could be taken against Western Allied prisoners of war and second it would deter German forces from surrendering to the Western Allies (as was happening on the Eastern front where the Geneva Convention was in abeyance). Instead of arguing that the conventions should never be denounced, Dönitz suggested that it was not currently expedient to do so, so the court found against him on this issue; but as the Convention was not denounced by Germany, and British prisoners in camps under Dönitz’s jurisdiction were treated strictly according to the Convention, the Court considered these mitigating circumstances.

Among the war-crimes charges, Dönitz was accused of waging unrestricted submarine warfare for issuing War Order No. 154 in 1939, and another similar order after the Laconia incidentin 1942, not to rescue survivors from ships attacked by submarine. By issuing these two orders, he was found guilty of causing Germany to be in breach of the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936.[21] However, as evidence of similar conduct by the Allies was presented at his trial, and with the help of his lawyer Otto Kranzbühler, his sentence was not assessed on the grounds of this breach of international law.

On the specific war crimes charge of ordering unrestricted submarine warfare Dönitz was found „[not] guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British armed merchant ships”, because they were often armed and equipped with radios which they used to notify the Admiralty of attack but the judges found that „Dönitz is charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936 to which Germany acceded, and which reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare laid down in the London Naval Agreement of 1930… The order of Dönitz to sink neutral ships without warning when found within these zones was, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, violation of the Protocol… The orders, then, prove Dönitz is guilty of a violation of the Protocol… the sentence of Dönitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare.”

His sentence on unrestricted submarine warfare was not assessed, because of similar actions by the Allies: in particular, the British Admiralty on 8 May 1940 had ordered that all vessels in the Skagerrak should be sunk on sight; and Admiral Chester Nimitz, wartime commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, stated that the U.S. Navy had waged unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific from the day the U.S. entered the war. Thus although Dönitz’s was found guilty of waging unrestricted submarine warfare against unarmed neutral shipping by ordering all ships in designated areas in international waters to be sunk without warning, no additional prison time was added to his sentence for this crime.

Dönitz was imprisoned for 10 years in Spandau Prison in what was then West Berlin.

Later years

Cover of the rare first edition of Dönitz’smemoirs in English, Ten Years and Twenty Days (1958).

Dönitz was released on 1 October 1956, and he retired to the small village of Aumühle in Schleswig-Holstein in northern West Germany. There he worked on two books. His memoirs, Zehn Jahre, Zwanzig Tage (Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days), appeared in Germany in 1958 and became available in an English translation the following year. This book recounted Dönitz’s experiences as U-boat commander (10 years) and President of Germany (20 days). In it, Dönitz explains the Nazi regime as a product of its time, but argues he was not a politician and thus not morally responsible for much of the regime’s crimes. He likewise criticizes dictatorship as a fundamentally flawed form of government and blames it for much of the Nazi era’s failings.

Admiral Dönitz’s second book, Mein wechselvolles Leben (My Ever-Changing Life) is less known, perhaps because it deals with the events of his life before 1934. This book was first published in 1968, and a new edition was released in 1998 with the revised title Mein soldatisches Leben (My Life as a Soldier).

Late in his life, Dönitz made every attempt to answer correspondence and autograph postcards for others. Dönitz was unrepentant regarding his role in World War II since he firmly believed that no one will respect anyone who compromises with his belief or duty towards his nation in any way, whether his betrayal was small or big. Of this conviction, Dönitz writes (commenting on Himmler’s peace negotiations):

The betrayer of military secrets is a pariah, despised by every man and every nation. Even the enemy whom he serves has no respect for him, but merely uses him. Any nation which is not uncompromisingly unanimous in its condemnation of this type of treachery is undermining the very foundations of its own state, whatever its form of government may be.

Dönitz lived out the rest of his life in relative obscurity in Aumühle, occasionally corresponding with American collectors of German Naval history, and died there of a heart attack on 24 December 1980. As the last German officer with the rank of Grand Admiral, he was honoured by many former servicemen and foreign naval officers who came to pay their respects at his funeral on 6 January 1981. However, he had received only the pension pay of a captain because the West German government ruled all of his advances in rank after that had been because of Hitler. He was buried in Waldfriedhof Cemetery in Aumühle without military honors, and soldiers were not allowed to wear uniforms to the funeral.However a number of German naval officers disobeyed this order and were joined by members of the Royal Navy, such as the senior chaplain the Rev Dr John Cameron, in full dress uniform. Also in attendance were over one hundred holders of the Knight’s Cross.

Wife and children

On 27 May 1916 Dönitz married a nurse named Ingeborg Weber, the daughter of a German general. They had three children whom they raised as Protestant (Evangelical) Christians, viz., daughter Ursula (b. 1917) and sons Klaus (b. 1920) and Peter (b. 1922). Both sons were killed during the Second World War.[33] The younger son, Peter, was a watch officer on U-954and was killed on 19 May 1943, when his boat was sunk in the North Atlantic with all hands. After this loss, the older brother, Klaus, was allowed to leave combat duty and began studying to be a naval doctor. Klaus was killed on 13 May 1944 while taking part in an action against his orders. Klaus convinced his friends to let him go on the torpedo boat S-141 for a raid on HMS Selsey off the coast of England on his twenty-fourth birthday. The boat was destroyed and Klaus died, though six others were rescued. In 1937 Karl Dönitz’s daughter Ursula married the U-boat commander and Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross recipient Günther Hessler.

In popular culture

Karl Dönitz has been portrayed by the following actors in film, television and theater productions.[34]

  • Gert Hänsch in the 1976 Czechoslovakian film Osvobození Prahy
  • Richard Bebb in the 1973 British television production The Death of Adolf Hitler.[35]
  • Raymond Cloutier in the 2000 Canadian/U.S. T.V. production Nuremberg
  • Peter Rühring in the 2005 German T.V. miniseries Speer und Er
  • David Mitchell in the 2006 British T.V. sketch comedy That Mitchell and Webb Look.
  • Simeon Victorov in the 2006 British television docudrama Nuremberg: Nazis on Trial.
  • Thomas Kretschmann in the 2011 British/German T.V. production, The Sinking of the Laconia.

Summary of career

Dates of rank

  • Fähnrich zur See (Midshipman): 15 April 1911
  • Leutnant zur See (Acting Sub-Lieutenant): 27 September 1913
  • Oberleutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant): 22 March 1916
  • Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant): 1 January 1921
  • Korvettenkapitän (Lieutenant Commander): 1 November 1928
  • Fregattenkapitän (Commander): 1 October 1933
  • Kapitän zur See (Captain): 1 October 1935
  • Kommodore (Commodore): 28 January 1939
  • Konteradmiral (Rear Admiral): 1 October 1939
  • Vizeadmiral (Vice Admiral): 1 September 1940
  • Admiral (Admiral): 14 March 1942
  • Großadmiral (Grand Admiral): 30 January 1943

Service history

  • Cadet training on board the Hertha: April 1910–March 1911
  • Naval school: April 1911–September 1912
  • Serving on board the Breslau: October 1912–September 1916
  • Airfield commander, San Stefano and Dardanelles: September–December 1916
  • U-boat training: December 1916-January 1917
  • Watch Officer, U-39: January 1917–February 1918
  • Commander, UC-25: March–September 1918
  • Commander, UB-68: September–October 1918
  • In British captivity on Malta: October 1918–July 1919
  • Staff of the Naval Station of the Baltic Sea: July 1919–March 1920
  • Commander, Torpedo Boat V 5: March–April 1920
  • Commander, Torpedo Boats T 157 and G 8: April 1920–March 1923
  • Adviser and Adjutant, Inspection of Torpedo and Mine Affairs: March 1923–November 1924
  • Adviser, Naval Defense Department of the Naval Command: November 1924–October 1927
  • Course and Information, SMS Nymphe: October–December 1927
  • Navigations Officer, SMS Nymphe: December 1927–September 1928
  • Commander, 4th Torpedo Boat Half Flotilla: September 1928–September 1930
  • 1st Admiral Staff Officer, Staff of the Naval Station of the North Sea: September 1930–September 1934
  • Commander, Emden: September 1934–September 1935
  • Commander, 1. Unterseebootsflottille: September 1935–October 1936
  • Führer der U-Boote: January 1936–October 1939
  • Befehlshaber der U-Boote: October 1939–January 1943
  • Oberbefehlshaber der Marine: January 1943–April 1945
  • Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief North: April 1945
  • Reichspräsident and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht: May 1945

All About Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus…

Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus…

Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus (23 September 1890 – 1 February 1957) was an officer in the German military from 1910 to 1945. He attained the rank of Generalfeldmarschall (field marshal) during World War II, and is best known for having commanded the Sixth Army’s assault on Stalingrad during Operation Blue in 1942. The battle ended in disaster for Nazi Germany when approximately 270,000 soldiers of the Wehrmacht, Axis allies, and Hilfswillige were encircled and defeated in a massive Soviet counterattack in November 1942, with casualties reaching as high as 740,000.

Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus
23 September 1890 – 1 February 1957 (aged 66)
Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B24575, Friedrich Paulus.jpg
Generalfeldmarschall Friedrich Paulus (shown in General’s uniform)
Place of birth Breitenau, Hesse, Hesse-Nassau
Place of death Dresden, East Germany
Allegiance  German Empire (to 1918)
 Weimar Republic (to 1933)
 Nazi Germany (to 1943)
 East Germany
Years of service 1910 – 1943
Rank Generalfeldmarschall
Commands held Tenth Army
Sixth Army
Battles/wars World War I
World War II

  • Invasion of Poland (1939)
  • Fall of France (1940)
  • Operation Barbarossa (1941)
  • Operation Blue (1942)
  • Operation Fridericus (1942)
  • Battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943)
Awards Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves

Paulus surrendered to Soviet forces in Stalingrad on 31 January 1943, a day after he was promoted to the rank ofGeneralfeldmarschall by Adolf Hitler. Hitler expected Paulus to commit suicide, citing the fact that there was no record of a German field marshal ever surrendering to enemy forces. While in Soviet captivity during the war Paulus became a vocal critic of the Nazi regime and joined the Russian-sponsored National Committee for a Free Germany. He was not released until 1953.

Early life…

Paulus was born in Breitenau, Hesse-Nassau, the son of a school teacher.

He tried, unsuccessfully, to secure a cadetship in the Kaiserliche Marine, and briefly studied law at Marburg University.

Military career…

After leaving the university without a degree, he joined the 111th Infantry Regiment as an officer cadet in February 1910. He married Elena Rosetti-Solescu on 4 July 1912.

When World War I began, Paulus’s regiment was part of the thrust into France, and he saw action in the Vosges and aroundArras in the autumn of 1914. After a leave of absence due to illness, he joined the Alpenkorps as a staff officer, serving inMacedonia, France, and Serbia. By the end of the war, he was a captain.

After the Armistice Paulus fought with the Freikorps in the east as a brigade adjutant. He remained in the scaled-downReichswehr that came into being after the Treaty of Versailles and was assigned to the 13th Infantry Regiment at Stuttgart as a company commander. He served in various staff positions for over a decade (1921–1933) and then briefly commanded a motorized battalion (1934–1935) before being named chief of staff for the Panzer headquarters in October 1935, a new formation under Lutz that directed the training and development of the army’s three panzer divisions.

In February 1938 Paulus was appointed Chef des Generalstabes to Guderian’s new XVI Armeekorps (Motorisiert), which replaced Lutz’s command. Guderian described him as ‘brilliantly clever, conscientious, hard working, original and talented’ but already had doubts about his decisiveness, toughness and lack of command experience. He remained in that post until May 1939, when he was promoted to Major General and became Chief of Staff for the German Tenth Army, with which he saw service in Poland, theNetherlands, and Belgium (by the latter two campaigns, the army had been renumbered as the Sixth Army).

Paulus was promoted to Lieutenant General in August 1940 and the following month he was named deputy chief of the German General Staff (OQu I). In that role he helped draft the plans for the invasion of the Soviet Union.

Stalingrad…

Paulus in Southern Russia, January 1942.

Paulus was promoted to General of the Armoured Troops and became commander of the German Sixth Army in January 1942 and led the drive on Stalingrad during that summer. Paulus’ troops fought the defending Soviet troops holding Stalingrad over three months in increasingly brutal urban warfare. In November 1942, when the Soviet Red Army launched a massive counter-offensive, code named Operation Uranus, Paulus found himself surrounded by an entire Soviet Army Group.

Paulus followed Adolf Hitler’s orders to hold the Army’s position in Stalingrad under all circumstances, despite the fact that he was completely surrounded by strong Russian formations. A relief effort by Army Group Don under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein failed in December, inevitably: insufficient force was available to challenge the Soviet forces encircling the German 6th Army, and Hitler refused to allow Paulus to break out of Stalingrad despite Manstein telling him it was the only way the effort would succeed. By this time, Paulus’ remaining armour had only sufficient fuel for a 12-mile advance anyway. In any event, Paulus was refused permission to break out of the encirclement. Kurt Zeitzler, the newly appointed chief of the Army General Staff, eventually got Hitler to allow Paulus to break out—provided they held onto Stalingrad, an impossible task.

For the next two months, Paulus and his men fought on. However, the lack of ammunition, equipment attrition and deteriorating physical condition of the German troops prevented them from defending effectively against the Red Army. The battle was fought with terrible losses on both sides and great suffering.

Paulus (left), with his chief of staff, Generalleutnant Arthur Schmidt (middle) and his aide, Wilhelm Adam (right), after their surrender.

On 8 January 1943, General Konstantin Rokossovsky, commander of the Red Army on the Don front, called a cease fire and offered Paulus’ men generous surrender terms—normal rations, medical treatment for the ill and wounded, permission to retain their badges, decorations, uniforms, and personal effects, and repatriation to any country they wished after the war. Rokossovsky also noted that Paulus was in a nearly impossible situation. By this time, there was no hope for Paulus to be relieved or supplied by air, and most of his men had no winter clothing. However, when Paulus asked Hitler for permission to surrender, Hitler rejected this request almost out of hand and ordered him to hold Stalingrad to the last man.

After a heavy Soviet offensive overran the last emergency airstrip in Stalingrad on 25 January, the Russians again offered Paulus a chance to surrender. Once again, Hitler ordered Paulus to hold Stalingrad to the death. On 30 January, Paulus informed Hitler that his men were hours from collapse. Hitler responded by showering a raft of field promotions by radio on Paulus’ officers to build up their spirits and steel their will to hold their ground. Most significantly, he promoted Paulus to field marshal. In deciding to promote Paulus, Hitler noted that there was no known record of a Prussian or German field marshal having surrendered. The implication was clear: Paulus was to commit suicide. If Paulus surrendered, he would shame Germany’s military history.

Paulus’ interrogation at Don Front HQ: General Rokossovsky, MarshalVoronov, translator Nikolay Dyatlenkoand Paulus (left to right)

Despite this, and to the disgust of Hitler, Paulus and his staff surrendered the next day, 31 January. On the 2 February 1943 the remainder of the Sixth Army capitulated. Upon finding out about Paulus’ surrender, Hitler flew into a rage, and vowed never to appoint another field marshal again, though he would in fact go on to appoint another seven field marshals in his lifetime. Speaking about the surrender of Paulus, Hitler told his staff:

In peacetime Germany, about 18,000 or 20,000 people a year chose to commit suicide, even without being in such a position. Here is a man who sees 50,000 or 60,000 of his soldiers die defending themselves bravely to the end. How can he surrender himself to the Bolshevists?!

Paulus, a Roman Catholic, was opposed to suicide. During his captivity, according to General Pfeffer, Paulus said of Hitler’s expectation: „I have no intention of shooting myself for this Bohemian corporal”. Another general told the NKVD that Paulus had told him about his promotion to field marshal and said: „It looks like an invitation to commit suicide, but I will not do this favour for him.” Paulus also forbade his soldiers from standing on top of their trenches in order to be shot by the enemy.

Paulus speaking at a press conference in East Berlin in 1954

Although he at first refused to collaborate with the Soviets, after the attempted assassination of Hitler on 20 July 1944, Paulus became a vocal critic of the Nazi regime while in Soviet captivity, joining the Russian-sponsored National Committee for a Free Germany and appealing to Germans to surrender. He later acted as a witness for the prosecution at the Nuremberg trials. He was released in 1953, two years before the repatriation of the remaining German POWs (mostly other Stalingrad veterans) who had been designated war criminals by the Soviets. Paulus settled in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

During the Nuremberg trials, Paulus was asked about the Stalingrad prisoners by a journalist. Paulus told the journalist to tell the wives and mothers that their husbands and sons were well. Of the 91,000 German prisoners taken at Stalingrad, half had died on the march to Siberian prison camps, nearly as many died in captivity; only about 6,000 returned home.

From 1953 to 1956, he lived in Dresden, East Germany, where he worked as the civilian chief of the East German Military History Research Institute and not, as often wrongly described, as an inspector of police. In late 1956, he developed motor neuron disease and was eventually left paralyzed. He died in Dresden on 1 February 1957, exactly 14 years after he surrendered at Stalingrad. His body was brought for burial in Baden next to that of his wife, who had died in 1949 having not seen her husband since his surrender.


Big Trouble…


In captivity …


All About Panzer Corps Feldherrnhalle (Germany)

Panzer Corps Feldherrnhalle (Germany)

Panzer Corps Feldherrnhalle
Panzer Corps Feldherrnhalle insignia.svg
Divisional insignia of Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle
Active 1934 – 1945
Country  Nazi Germany
Allegiance Adolf Hitler
Branch SA-Logo.svg SA
Type Panzer
Panzergrenadier
Infantry
Size 2 division, 4 regiments and 8 battalions (peak c.1944)
Part of Third Reich
Garrison/HQ HQ Berlin
Engagements Battle of Debrecen
Siege of Budapest
Operation Spring Awakening
Commanders
June 1943 – April 3, 1944 Generalleutnant Otto Kohlermann
April 3, 1944 – July 8, 1944 Generalmajor Friedrich-Carl von Steinkeller
July 8, 1944 – November 1944
November 27, 1944 – May 8, 1945
Generalmajor Günther PapeGeneral der PanzertruppenUlrich Kleemann

The Panzerkorps Feldherrnhalle was a German panzer corps formed in October 1944 from the remaining troops of the IV. Armeekorps, the Storm Division Rhodos and Panzer-Grenadier-Brigade 17 formed mostly of SA recruits.

The Panzerkorps Feldherrnhalle fought on the Eastern Front during the Second World War.

Concept

The Feldherrnhalle units were the combat formations which drew manpower from the SA. A Nazi organization that traced its history back to the days of the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. The corps was named after the Feldherrnhalle in Munich where the attempted coup was crushed by the German state.

The initial unit, the SA-Standarte Feldherrnhalle (a Standarte was an organization of regimental size) was formed after the death of Ernst Röhm on Night of the Long Knives, when the SA’s position as the major paramilitary formation of the NSDAP was taken over by the SS. It was made up of the most promising SA men drawn from SA units all over Germany. The Standarte was a not a combat unit. Its role was to provide guard units for SA government offices around Nazi Germany.

In March 1938, men from the Standarte were among the first units which marched into Austria during the Anschluss. In September 1938, the Feldherrnhalle was placed under the control of the Wehrmacht, and the cadre of the unit was transferred to the Luftwaffe, forming the Luftlande-Regiment (glider infantry regiment) Feldherrnhalle, a part of the 7. Flieger-Division. The remainder of the regiment was transferred to the Heer, forming the 120. Infanterie-Regiment (mot) of the 60. Infanterie-Division (mot) and 271. Infanterie-Regiment of the 93. Infanterie-Division.

Early campaigns

60. Infanterie-Division

The cadre for the 60. Infanterie-Division came from Gruppe Eberhardt (also known as Sonderverband Danzig). The Gruppe was a unit of Ordnungspolizei and SA men, commanded by Major General Friedrich-Georg Eberhardt. During the Invasion of Poland, Gruppe Eberhardt was responsible for the capture of the Danzig Post Office, defended by the Polish postal workers commanded by a reserve officer. After fierce fighting, the Polish militia retreated to the cellar, however the Gruppe Eberhardt could not capture the building. The Gruppe finally defeated the Poles and secured the building by forcing the Danzig Fire Brigade to flood the cellar of the building with gasoline. When the militia surrendered, they were subjected to several days of continuous torture and humiliation and then executed.

After the Polish campaign, Gruppe Eberhardt was dissolved and the members were used to form the 60. Infanterie-Division (mot), the majority of SA men joining the 120. Infanterie-Regiment (mot). The division was not ready for the campaign in the West, and formed a part of the OKH Reserve during this period, being based in Lorraine (Lothringen).

In January 1941, the division was moved to Romania. In April, the 60th took part in Operation Marita, the invasion of the Balkans and Greece. The formation acquitted itself well in the fighting in Serbia, and at the end of the campaign was moved back into Romania to join Army Group South, which was preparing for Operation Barbarossa. On June 1941, the division crossed the Soviet border and began the advance towards Crimea and eventually Rostov on Don. During the blitzkrieg campaign, the division again performed superbly, advancing as a part of Panzergruppe 1. By the end of the campaign, the division had taken part in the capture of Rostov-on-Don before the Army Group was ordered to abandon the city and form defensive lines for the winter. Over the winter of 1941–1942 the division managed to hold its position despite terrible conditions and ceaseless Soviet counterattacks.

In 1942, the division took part in Fall Blau, the advance through the Don Basin towards Stalingrad. As a part of Generaloberst Paulus’ 6. Armee, the division was involved in heavy fighting during the Battle of Stalingrad. When Soviet offensives encircled Paulus’ Army, the division continued resisting the Soviets until the final collapse of the German defense in February 1943.

The remnants of the division which had been on leave or convalescing were ordered to the south of France to begin reforming the division, to be upgraded as a Panzergrenadier division and redesignated 60. Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle.

271. Infanterie-Regiment

The 271st Regiment fought with distinction during the Battle of France, taking part in the assaults on the Maginot Line and advancing south, crossing the rivers Seille and Meurthe inAlsace-Lorraine. The regiment ended the campaign on the Moselle between Nancy and Epinal, advancing south where it ended near the region of the River Moselle between Nancy and Epinal on June 25, 1940. The 93. Infanterie-Division was stationed on the French Coast after the capitulation of France.

In March 1941, the regiment, along with the rest of the 93. Infanterie-Division, was ordered to the east to take part in Operation Barbarossa. The division was to form a part of Army Group North, tasked with advancing on Leningrad. After the launch of the offensive on June 22, 1941, the regiment distinguished itself in heavy fighting during the advance. At the end of the campaign, the division was stationed near Leningrad, and over the winter of 1941–1942 saw heavy fighting against fierce Soviet counterattacks.

The division remained in combat near Leningrad throughout 1942. In August, the regiment was granted the title Feldherrnhalle in honour of the outstanding performance it had shown during the battles in France and Russia. The regiment was redesignated 271. Grenadier-Regiment Feldherrnhalle. The regiment remained in action on the Northern front, fighting at the siege of Cholm and the Battle of Velikiye Luki. In the summer of 1943, the Feldherrnhalle regiment was withdrawn from the division and sent back to Southern France to form join the remnants of the 120. Infanterie-Regiment (mot) which were in the process of reforming the 60. Infanterie-Division (mot) as the 60. Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle.

Eastern Front

The new division spent the rest of the year forming and training in Southern France. In November, all the divisional units had their numbers removed and were granted the titleFeldherrnhalle. The 271. Grenadier-Regiment Feldherrnhalle formed the Grenadier-Regiment Feldherrnhalle and the reformed 120. Grenadier-Regiment Feldherrnhalle became Füsilier-Regiment Feldherrnhalle. In December, the division was ordered back to the eastern front, to join the Third Panzer Army which was involved in heavy fighting near Vitebsk in Belorussia. Arriving in early January 1944, the division fought exceptionally during the fierce battles around the city.

After executing a fighting withdrawal through Belorussia, the division was air-lifted via Tartu airport to the Narva front, where the III. SS Panzerkorps was involved in heavy fighting for the bridgehead over the Narva river. The division remained in combat on the Narva front, distinguishing itself in what would be known as the Battle of Narva (1944).

In May, the division was ordered south to bolster the forces of Army Group Centre, engaged near Mogilev and Orsha. With the launch of the Soviet Operation Bagration in June 1944, the division was pushed back towards Minsk, where it was encircled. In late July, after heavy resistance and several failed breakout attempts, the division was annihilated near the city.

Reformed

The remnants of the division, along with other units such as the 26th Infantry Division, were refitted near Warthelager near Poznań in September 1944. The formation of several newFeldherrnhalle formations began at the same time.

106. Panzer-Brigade Feldherrnhalle

The 106. Panzer-Brigade Feldherrnhalle was formed from a cadre of SA men. The 106th boasted a strong consignment of the latest Panther ausf. G tanks, a fully mechanized Panzergrenadier battalion and a company of the brand new Jagdpanzer IV/70s. The brigade was sent into action in Alsace-Lorraine against the American forces of General Patton’s US Third Army. The 106th fought well during the withdrawal into Germany. On April 6, 1945, the remnants of the brigade were assigned to the ad-hoc Panzer-Division Clausewitz. The brigade’s survivors surrendered to the Americans on May 8, 1945.

110. Panzer-Brigade Feldherrnhalle

The 110. Panzer-Brigade Feldherrnhalle was the second Feldherrnhalle panzer brigade. Formed from a cadre of SA men, the 110th was strongly equipped with a battalion of Panthers and a battalion of mechanized infantry. The 110th was sent to Romania, where it supported the forces of Army Group South Ukraine during the withdrawal into Hungary. The brigade, along with the reformed Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle took part in the Battle of Debrecen in October 1944, acquitting itself well. During these battles, the 110th fought alongside the13. Panzer-Division. In November 1944, the brigade was disbanded and absorbed into the 13. Panzer-Division. As a result, the 13. Panzer-Division was renamed 13.Panzer-Division Feldherrnhalle.

Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle

The Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle was only partially formed by September 1944, when it was ordered to the front in Hungary to strengthen Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico, which was threatening to collapse in the face of a major soviet offensive near Oradea and Debrecen. The division, in truth only the size of a brigade, was committed to battle in mid-October, and ordered to hold a major crossing point on the Tisza River. When the Soviet spearhead threatened to encircle several panzer divisions near Debrecen, the division was thrown into battle in an ultimately successful attempt to cut off and annihilate the Soviet units. During the following battle, the division fought alongside both the 13. Panzer-Division Feldherrnhalle andschwere-Panzer-Abteilung 503 (sPzAbt 503) for the first time.

After enjoying major success of the Battle of Debrecen, the division fought in co-operation with sPzAbt 503 and was soon involved in the withdrawal towards Budapest. The Panzergrenadier Division, sPzAbt 503 and the 13. Panzer-Division Feldherrnhalle, by now exhausted and dangerously understrength, were pushed back into the city. On December 21, 1944, sPzAbt 503 was renamed schwere-Panzer-Abteilung Feldherrnhalle.

On December 31, the three formations were encircled along with IX. SS-Gebirgskorps. For the next month, the Feldherrnhalle units desperately held out for rescue. After the failure ofOperation Konrad, Armeegruppe Balck’s rescue attempts, the pocket collapsed and the divisions were destroyed on February 12, 1945. Among those to escape the pocket was a group of several hundred Feldherrnhalle men.

Panzerkorps Feldherrnhalle

After the annihilation of three Feldherrnhalle units in Budapest, plans were made to not only reform the three units, but also for the creation of a Panzer Corps, along the lines of thePanzerkorps Großdeutschland or the Fallschirm-Panzerkorps Hermann Göring.

The survivors of the encirclement, along with large numbers of new SA recruits, were formed into three new units. The remnants of the Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle becamePanzer-Division Feldherrnhalle 1. Although not a full strength division, the unit was equipped with the latest equipment and well trained.

The 13. Panzer-Division Feldherrnhalle became Panzer-Division Feldherrnhalle 2. This division was virtually identical to the Feldherrnhalle 1. It was commanded by the ace panzer commander Generalmajor Dr. Franz Bäke.

The remnants of the sPzAbt Feldherrnhalle were reformed, although the detachment never reached its former strength.

The corps was activated at the end of February, with most of the combat units being sent into action at the end of March 1945. The corps executed a fighting withdrawal towards Viennaand then into southern Austria. Over the last months of the war, the corps saw heavy fighting and acquitted itself well. By the beginning of May 1945, the shattered remnants of the corps broke up and attempted to reach the American lines, where they surrendered on May 9, 1945.

Commanders

  • Generalleutnant Otto Kohlermann (June 1943 – 13 February 1944)
  • Oberst Albert Henze (13 February 1944 – April 3, 1944)
  • Generalmajor Friedrich-Carl von Steinkeller (April 3, 1944 – July 8, 1944)
  • Generalmajor Günther Pape (July 8, 1944 – November 1944)
  • General der Panzertruppen Ulrich Kleemann (November 27, 1944 – May 8, 1945)

Orders of Battle

Battle of Debrecen, Hungary, October 1944

60. Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle

  • Division Stab
  • Füsilier-Regiment Feldherrnhalle
  • Grenadier-Regiment Feldherrnhalle
  • Panzer-Abteilung Feldherrnhalle
  • Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung Feldherrnhalle
  • Artillerie Regiment Feldherrnhalle
  • FlaK-Bataillon Feldherrnhalle
  • Pionier-Bataillon Feldherrnhalle
  • Nachrichten-Kompanie Feldherrnhalle

Budapest, Hungary, February 1945,

Panzer-Division Feldherrnhalle 1

  • Division Stab
  • Panzer-Regiment Feldherrnhalle
  • Panzer-Battalion
  • Panzergrenadier-Battalion (half-track)
  • schwere Panzer-Abteilung Feldherrnhalle
  • Panzergrenadier-Regiment Feldherrnhalle
  • Panzerjäger-Abteilung Feldherrnhalle
  • Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung Feldherrnhalle
  • Pionier-Bataillon Feldherrnhalle
  • Artillerie-Regiment Feldherrnhalle
  • Nachrichten-Kompanie Feldherrnhalle

Operation Spring Awakening, Hungary, March 1945

Panzerkorps Feldherrnhalle

  • Korps Stab
    • Korps-Füsilier-Regiment Feldherrnhalle
    • Schwere-Panzer-Abteilung Feldherrnhalle
    • 404. Artillerie-Regiment
    • 404. Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon
    • 44. Panzer-Nachrichten-Bataillon
    • Panzer-Feldersatz-Regiment Feldherrnhalle
  • Panzer-Division Feldherrnhalle 1
  • Panzer-Division Feldherrnhalle 2

US Army – M1/M1A1 Carbine…


US Army – Winchester Model 12 trench gun…


All About Albert Speer…

All About Albert Speer…

Albert Speer


Albert Speer at the Nuremberg trials, 1946

Minister of Armaments and War Production
In office
February 8, 1942 – May 23, 1945
President Adolf Hitler (Führer)
Karl Dönitz
Chancellor Adolf Hitler
Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk (Leading Minister)
Preceded by Fritz Todt (as Minister of Armaments and Munitions)
Succeeded by None

Born March 19, 1905
Mannheim, Baden, Germany
Died September 1, 1981(aged 76)
London, United Kingdom
Nationality German
Political party National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nazi)
Spouse(s) Margarete Weber (1928–1981, survived as widow)
Children Albert Speer, Hilde Schramm, Fritz Speer,Margret Nissen, Arnold Speer, Ernst Speer
Alma mater Technical University of Berlin
Technical University of Munich
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Profession Architect, author
Signature

Albert Speer, born Berthold Konrad Hermann Albert Speer, ; March 19, 1905 – September 1, 1981) was a German architect who was, for a part of World War II, Minister of Armaments and War Production for the Third Reich. Speer was Adolf Hitler’s chief architect before assuming ministerial office. As „the Nazi who said sorry”, he accepted responsibility at the Nuremberg trialsand in his memoirs for crimes of the Nazi regime. His level of involvement in the persecution of the Jews and his level of knowledge of the Holocaust remain matters of dispute.

Speer joined the Nazi Party in 1931. His architectural skills made him increasingly prominent within the Party and he became a member of Hitler’s inner circle. Hitler commissioned him to design and construct a number of structures, including the Reich Chancellery and theZeppelinfeld stadium in Nuremberg where Party rallies were held. Speer also made plans to reconstruct Berlin on a grand scale, with huge buildings, wide boulevards, and a reorganized transportation system.

As Hitler’s Minister of Armaments and War Production, Speer was so successful that Germany’s war production continued to increase despite massive and devastating Allied bombing. After the war, he was tried at Nuremberg and sentenced to 20 years in prison for his role in the Nazi regime, principally for the use of forced labor. He served his full sentence, most of it at Spandau Prison in West Berlin.

Following his release from Spandau in 1966, Speer published two bestselling autobiographical works, Inside the Third Reich and Spandau: The Secret Diaries, detailing his often close personal relationship with Hitler, and providing readers and historians with a unique perspective on the workings of the Nazi regime. He later wrote a third book, Infiltration, about the SS. Speer died of natural causes in 1981 while on a visit to London, England.

Early years

Speer was born in Mannheim, into a wealthy middle class family. He was the second of three sons of Albert and Luise Speer. In 1918, the family moved permanently to their summer home, Schloss-Wolfsbrunnenweg, in Heidelberg.According to Henry T. King, deputy prosecutor at Nuremberg who later wrote a book about Speer, „Love and warmth were lacking in the household of Speer’s youth.” Speer was active in sports, taking up skiing and mountaineering. Speer’s Heidelberg school offered rugby football, unusually for Germany, and Speer was a participant. He wanted to become a mathematician, but his father said if Speer chose this occupation he would „lead a life without money, without a position, and without a future”. Instead, Speer followed in the footsteps of his father and grandfather and studied architecture.

Early years

Speer began his architectural studies at the University of Karlsruhe instead of a more highly acclaimed institution because the hyperinflationcrisis of 1923 limited his parents’ income. In 1924 when the crisis had abated, he transferred to the „much more reputable” Technical University of Munich. In 1925 he transferred again, this time to the Technical University of Berlin where he studied under Heinrich Tessenow, whom Speer greatly admired. After passing his exams in 1927, Speer became Tessenow’s assistant, a high honor for a man of 22. As such, Speer taught some of Tessenow’s classes while continuing his own postgraduate studies. In Munich, and continuing in Berlin, Speer began a close friendship, ultimately spanning over 50 years, with Rudolf Wolters, who also studied under Tessenow.

In mid-1922, Speer began to date Margarete (Margret) Weber (1905–1987). The relationship was frowned upon by Speer’s class-conscious mother, who felt that the Webers were socially inferior (Weber’s father was a successful craftsman who employed 50 workers). Despite this opposition, the two married in Berlin on August 28, 1928; seven years were to elapse before Margarete Speer was invited to stay at her in-laws’ home.

Nazi architect

Joining the Nazis (1930–1934)

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Speer in 1933.

Speer stated he was apolitical when he was a young man, and that he attended a Berlin Nazi rally in December 1930 at the urging of some of his students.[16] He was surprised to find Hitler dressed in a neat blue suit, rather than the brown uniform seen on Nazi Party posters, and was greatly impressed, not only with Hitler’s proposals, but also with the man himself. Several weeks later he attended another rally, this one was presided over by Joseph Goebbels. Speer was disturbed by the way Goebbels whipped the crowd into a frenzy. Despite this unease, Speer could not shake the impression Hitler had made on him. On March 1, 1931, he applied to join the Nazi Party and became member number 474,481.

Speer’s first Nazi Party position was as head of the Party’s motorist association for the Berlin suburb of Wannsee; he was the only Nazi in the town with a car. Speer reported to the Party’s leader for the West End of Berlin, Karl Hanke, who hired Speer — without fee — to redecorate a villa he had just rented. Hanke was enthusiastic about the resulting work.

In 1931, Speer surrendered his position as Tessenow’s assistant because of pay cuts and moved to Mannheim, hoping to use his father’s connections to get commissions. He had little success, and his father gave him a job as manager of the elder Speer’s properties. In July 1932, the Speers visited Berlin to help out the Party prior to the Reichstag elections. While they were there, Hanke recommended the young architect to Goebbels to help renovate the Party’s Berlin headquarters. Speer, who had been about to leave with his wife for a vacation in East Prussia, agreed to do the work. When the commission was completed, Speer returned to Mannheim and remained there as Hitler took office in January 1933.

After the Nazis took control, Hanke recalled Speer to Berlin. Goebbels, the new Propaganda Minister, commissioned Speer to renovate his Ministry’s building on Wilhelmplatz. Speer also designed the 1933 May Day commemoration in Berlin. In Inside the Third Reich, he wrote that, on seeing the original design for the Berlin rally on Hanke’s desk, he remarked that the site would resemble a Schützenfest — a rifle club meet. Hanke, now Goebbels’ State Secretary,challenged him to create a better design. As Speer learned later, Hitler was enthusiastic about Speer’s design (which used giant flags), though Goebbels took credit for it. Tessenow was dismissive: „Do you think you have created something? It’s showy, that’s all.”

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Speer and Hitler examine an architectural drawing

The organizers of the 1933 Nuremberg Nazi Party rally asked Speer to submit designs for the rally, bringing him into contact with Hitler for the first time. Neither the organizers nor Rudolf Hess were willing to decide whether to approve the plans, and Hess sent Speer to Hitler’s Munich apartment to seek his approval. When Speer entered, the new Chancellor was busy cleaning a pistol, which he briefly laid aside to cast a short, interested glance at the plans, approving them without even looking at the young architect. This work won Speer his first national post, as Nazi Party „Commissioner for the Artistic and Technical Presentation of Party Rallies and Demonstrations”.

Speer’s next major assignment was as liaison to the Berlin building trades for Paul Troost’s renovation of the Chancellery. As Chancellor, Hitler had a residence in the building and came by every day to be briefed by Speer and the building supervisor on the progress of the renovations. After one of these briefings, Hitler invited Speer to lunch, to the architect’s great excitement. Hitler evinced considerable interest in Speer during the luncheon, and later told Speer that he had been looking for a young architect capable of carrying out his architectural dreams for the new Germany. Speer quickly became part of Hitler’s inner circle; he was expected to call on Hitler in the morning for a walk or chat, to provide consultation on architectural matters, and to discuss Hitler’s ideas. Most days he was invited to dinner.

The two men found much in common: Hitler spoke of Speer as a „kindred spirit” for whom he had always maintained „the warmest human feelings”. The young, ambitious architect was dazzled by his rapid rise and close proximity to Hitler, which guaranteed him a flood of commissions from the government and from the highest ranks of the Party.Speer testified at Nuremberg, „I belonged to a circle which consisted of other artists and his personal staff. If Hitler had had any friends at all, I certainly would have been one of his close friends.”

First Architect of the Third Reich (1934–1939)

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The Cathedral of light above theZeppelintribune

When Troost died on January 21, 1934, Speer effectively replaced him as the Party’s chief architect. Hitler appointed Speer as head of the Chief Office for Construction, which placed him nominally on Hess’s staff.

One of Speer’s first commissions after Troost’s death was the Zeppelinfeld stadium—the Nuremberg parade grounds seen in Leni Riefenstahl’s propaganda masterpiece Triumph of the Will. This huge work was capable of holding 340,000 people. The tribune was influenced by thePergamon Altar in Anatolia, but was magnified to an enormous scale.[36] Speer insisted that as many events as possible be held at night, both to give greater prominence to his lighting effects and to hide the individual Nazis, many of whom were overweight. Speer surrounded the site with 130 anti-aircraft searchlights. This created the effect of a „cathedral of light” or, as it was called by British Ambassador Sir Neville Henderson, a „cathedral of ice”. Speer described this as his most beautiful work, and as the only one that stood the test of time.

Nuremberg was to be the site of many more official Nazi buildings, most of which were never built; for example, the German Stadium would have accommodated 400,000 spectators, while an even larger rally ground would have held half a million Nazis. While planning these structures, Speer invented the concept of „ruin value”: that major buildings should be constructed in such a way that they would leave aesthetically pleasing ruins for thousands of years into the future. Such ruins would be a testament to the greatness of the Third Reich, just as ancient Greek or Roman ruins were symbols of the greatness of those civilizations. Hitler enthusiastically embraced this concept, and ordered that all the Reich’s important buildings be constructed in accord with it.

 

Speer’s German pavilion (left) facing the Soviet pavilion (right).

Speer could not avoid seeing the brutal excesses of the Nazi regime. Shortly after the Night of the Long Knives, Hitler ordered Speer to take workmen and go to the building housing the offices of Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen to begin its conversion into a security headquarters, even though it was still occupied by von Papen’s officials. Speer and his group entered the building, to be confronted with a pool of blood, apparently from the body of Herbert von Bose, von Papen’s secretary, who had been killed there. Speer related that the sight had no effect on him, other than to cause him to avoid that room.

When Hitler deprecated Werner March’s design for the Olympic Stadium for the 1936 Summer Olympics as too modern, Speer modified the plans by adding a stone exterior. Speer designed the German Pavilion for the 1937 international exposition in Paris. The German and Sovietpavilion sites were opposite each other. On learning (through a clandestine look at the Soviet plans) that the Soviet design included two colossal figures seemingly about to overrun the German site, Speer modified his design to include a cubic mass which would check their advance, with a huge eagle on top looking down on the Soviet figures. Both pavilions were awarded gold medals for their designs. Speer would also receive, from Hitler Youth Leader and later fellow Spandau prisoner Baldur von Schirach, the Golden Hitler Youth Honor Badge with oak leaves.

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The proposed huge Volkshalle for the new Berlin, as seen through the massive triumphal arch Speer envisioned.

In 1937, Hitler appointed Speer as General Building Inspector for the Reich Capital with the rank of undersecretary of state in the Reich government. The position carried with it extraordinary powers over the Berlin city government and made Speer answerable to Hitler alone. It also made Speer a member of the Reichstag, though the body by then had little effective power. Hitler ordered Speer to make plans to rebuild Berlin. The plans centered on a three-mile long grand boulevard running from north to south, which Speer called the Prachtstrasse, or Street of Magnificence; he also referred to it as the „North-South Axis”. At the north end of the boulevard, Speer planned to build theVolkshalle, a huge assembly hall with a dome which would have been over 700 feet (210 m) high, with floor space for 180,000 people. At the southern end of the avenue would be a huge triumphal arch; it would be almost 400 feet (120 m) high, and able to fit the Arc de Triomphe inside its opening. The outbreak of World War II in 1939 led to the postponement, and eventual abandonment, of these plans. Part of the land for the boulevard was to be obtained by consolidating Berlin’s railway system. Speer hired Wolters as part of his design team, with special responsibility for the Prachtstrasse. When Speer’s father saw the model for the new Berlin, he said to his son, „You’ve all gone completely insane.”

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Marble Gallery of the New Reich Chancellery

In January 1938, Hitler asked Speer to build a new Reich Chancellery on the same site as the existing structure, and said he needed it for urgent foreign policy reasons no later than his next New Year’s reception for diplomats on January 10, 1939. This was a huge undertaking, especially since the existing Chancellery was in full operation. After consultation with his assistants, Speer agreed. Although the site could not be cleared until April, Speer was successful in building the large, impressive structure in nine months. The structure included the „Marble Gallery”: at 146 metres long, almost twice as long as the Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles. Speer employed thousands of workers in two shifts. Hitler, who had remained away from the project, was overwhelmed when Speer turned it over, fully furnished, two days early. In appreciation for the architect’s work on the Chancellery, Hitler awarded Speer the Nazi Golden Party Badge. Tessenow was less impressed, suggesting to Speer that he should have taken nine years over the project. The second Chancellery was damaged by the Battle of Berlin in 1945 and was eventually dismantled by the Soviets, its stone used for a war memorial.

During the Chancellery project, the pogrom of Kristallnacht took place. Speer would make no mention of it in the first draft of Inside the Third Reich, and it was only on the urgent advice of his publisher that he added a mention of seeing the ruins of the Central Synagogue in Berlin from his car.

Speer was under significant psychological pressure during this period of his life. He would later remember:

Soon after Hitler had given me the first large architectural commissions, I began to suffer from anxiety in long tunnels, in airplanes, or in small rooms. My heart would begin to race, I would become breathless, the diaphragm would seem to grow heavy, and I would get the impression that my blood pressure was rising tremendously… Anxiety amidst all my freedom and power!

Wartime architect (1939–1942)

 

Hitler visits Paris in 1940 with Speer (left) and sculptor Arno Breker.

Speer supported the German invasion of Poland and subsequent war, though he recognized that it would lead to the postponement, at the least, of his architectural dreams. In his later years, Speer, talking with his biographer-to-be Gitta Sereny, explained how he felt in 1939: „Of course I was perfectly aware that [Hitler] sought world domination … [A]t that time I asked for nothing better. That was the whole point of my buildings. They would have looked grotesque if Hitler had sat still in Germany. All I wanted was for this great man to dominate the globe.”

Speer placed his department at the disposal of the Wehrmacht. When Hitler remonstrated, and said it was not for Speer to decide how his workers should be used, Speer simply ignored him. Among Speer’s innovations were quick-reaction squads to construct roads or clear away debris; before long, these units would be used to clear bomb sites. As the war progressed, initially to great German success, Speer continued preliminary work on the Berlin and Nuremberg plans, at Hitler’s insistence, but failed to convince him of the need to suspend peacetime construction projects. Speer also oversaw the construction of buildings for the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, and developed a considerable organization to deal with this work.

In 1940, Joseph Stalin proposed that Speer pay a visit to Moscow. Stalin had been particularly impressed by Speer’s work in Paris, and wished to meet the „Architect of the Reich”. Hitler, alternating between amusement and anger, did not allow Speer to go, fearing that Stalin would put Speer in a „rat hole” until a new Moscow arose. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, Speer came to doubt, despite Hitler’s reassurances, that his projects for Berlin would ever be completed.

Minister of Armaments

Appointment and increasing power

On February 8, 1942, Minister of Armaments Fritz Todt died in a plane crash shortly after taking off from Hitler’s eastern headquarters atRastenburg. Speer, who had arrived in Rastenburg the previous evening, had accepted Todt’s offer to fly with him to Berlin, but had canceled some hours before takeoff (Speer stated in his memoirs that the cancellation was because of exhaustion from travel and a late-night meeting with Hitler). Later that day, Hitler appointed Speer as Todt’s successor to all of his posts. In Inside the Third Reich, Speer recounts his meeting with Hitler and his reluctance to take ministerial office, only doing so because Hitler commanded it. Speer also states thatHermann Göring raced to Hitler’s headquarters on hearing of Todt’s death, hoping to claim Todt’s powers. Hitler instead presented Göring with the fait accompli of Speer’s appointment, causing Göring to leave without even attending Todt’s funeral.

At the time of Speer’s accession to the office, the German economy, unlike the British one, was not fully geared for war production. Consumer goods were still being produced at nearly as high a level as during peacetime. No fewer than five „Supreme Authorities” had jurisdiction over armament production — one of which, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, had declared in November 1941 that conditions did not permit an increase in armament production. Few women were employed in the factories, which were running only one shift. One evening soon after his appointment, Speer went to visit a Berlin armament factory; he found no one on the premises.

 

Speer travels by plane

Speer overcame these difficulties by centralizing power over the war economy in himself. Factories were given autonomy, or as Speer put it, „self-responsibility”, and each factory concentrated on a single product. Backed by Hitler’s strong support (the dictator stated, „Speer, I’ll sign anything that comes from you”), he divided the armament field according to weapon system, with experts rather than civil servants overseeing each department. No department head could be older than 55 — anyone older being susceptible to „routine and arrogance” — and no deputy older than 40. Over these departments was a central planning committee headed by Speer, which took increasing responsibility for war production, and as time went by, for the German economy itself. According to the minutes of a conference at Wehrmacht High Command in March 1942, „It is only Speer’s word that counts nowadays. He can interfere in all departments. Already he overrides all departments … On the whole, Speer’s attitude is to the point.” Goebbels would note in his diary in June 1943, „Speer is still tops with the Führer. He is truly a genius with organization.” Speer was so successful in his position that by late 1943, he was widely regarded among the Nazi elite as a possible successor to Hitler.

While Speer had tremendous power, he was of course subordinate to Hitler. Nazi officials sometimes went around Speer by seeking direct orders from the dictator. When Speer ordered peacetime building work suspended, the Gauleiters (Nazi Party district leaders) obtained an exemption for their pet projects. When Speer sought the appointment of Hanke as a labor czar to optimize the use of German labor, Hitler, under the influence ofMartin Bormann, instead appointed Fritz Sauckel. Rather than increasing female labor and taking other steps to better organize German labor, as Speer favored, Sauckel advocated importing labor from the occupied nations — and did so, obtaining workers for (among other things) Speer’s armament factories, using the most brutal methods.

On December 10, 1943, Speer visited the underground Mittelwerk V-2 rocket factory that used concentration camp labor. Shocked by the conditions there (5.7 percent of the work force died that month), and to ensure the workers were in good enough shape to perform the labor,Speer ordered improved conditions for the workers and the construction of the above-ground Dora camp. In spite of these changes, half of the workers at Mittelwerk eventually died. Speer later commented, „[t]he conditions for these prisoners were in fact barbarous, and a sense of profound involvement and personal guilt seizes me whenever I think of them.”

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Speer (right) with Hitler (center) andWehrmacht Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel(left), June 1943.

By 1943, the Allies had gained air superiority over Germany, and bombings of German cities and industry had become commonplace. However, the Allies in their strategic bombing campaign did not concentrate on industry, and Speer, with his improvisational skill, was able to overcome bombing losses. In spite of these losses, German production of tanks more than doubled in 1943, production of planes increased by 80 percent, and production time for Kriegsmarine’s submarines was reduced from one year to two months. Production would continue to increase until the second half of 1944, by which time enough equipment to supply 270 army divisions was being produced—although the Wehrmacht had only 150 divisions in the field.

In January 1944, Speer fell ill with complications from an inflamed knee, and was away from the office for three months. During his absence, his political rivals (mainly Göring, and Martin Bormann), attempted to have some of his powers permanently transferred to them. According to Speer, SS chief Heinrich Himmler tried to have him physically isolated by having Himmler’s personal physician Karl Gebhardt treat him, though his „care” did not improve his health. His wife and friends managed to have his case transferred to his friend Dr. Karl Brandt, and Speer slowly recovered.In April, Speer’s rivals for power succeeded in having him deprived of responsibility for construction, and Speer promptly sent Hitler a bitter letter, concluding with an offer of his resignation. Judging Speer indispensable to the war effort, Field Marshal Erhard Milch persuaded Hitler to try to get his minister to reconsider. Hitler sent Milch to Speer with a message not addressing the dispute but instead stating that he still regarded Speer as highly as ever. According to Milch, upon hearing the message, Speer burst out, „The Führer can kiss my ass!” After a lengthy argument, Milch persuaded Speer to withdraw his offer of resignation, on the condition his powers were restored. On April 23, 1944, Speer went to see Hitler who agreed that „everything [will] stay as it was, [Speer will] remain the head of all German construction”.According to Speer, while he was successful in this debate, Hitler had also won, „because he wanted and needed me back in his corner, and he got me”.

Fall of the Reich

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Reichsminister Speer rests on a doorstep.

Speer’s name was included on the list of members of a post-Hitler government drawn up by the conspirators behind the July 1944 assassination plot to kill Hitler. The list had a question mark and the annotation „to be won over” by his name, which likely saved him from the extensive purges that followed the scheme’s failure.

By February 1945, Speer, who had long concluded that the war was lost, was working to supply areas about to be occupied with food and materials to get them through the hard times ahead. On March 19, 1945, Hitler issued his Nero Decree, ordering a scorched earth policy in both Germany and the occupied territories. Hitler’s order, by its terms, deprived Speer of any power to interfere with the decree, and Speer went to confront Hitler, telling him the war was lost. Hitler gave Speer 24 hours to reconsider his position, and when the two met the following day, Speer answered, „I stand unconditionally behind you.” However, he demanded the exclusive power to implement the Nero Decree, and Hitler signed an order to that effect. Using this order, Speer worked to persuade generals and Gauleiters to evade the Nero Decree and avoid needless sacrifice of personnel and destruction of industry that would be needed after the war.

Speer managed to reach a relatively safe area near Hamburg as the Nazi regime finally collapsed, but decided on a final, risky visit to Berlin to see Hitler one more time. Speer stated at Nuremberg, „I felt that it was my duty not to run away like a coward, but to stand up to him again.” Speer visited the Führerbunker on April 22. Hitler seemed calm and somewhat distracted, and the two had a long, disjointed conversation in which the dictator defended his actions and informed Speer of his intent to commit suicide and have his body burned. In the published edition of Inside the Third Reich, Speer relates that he confessed to Hitler that he had defied the Nero Decree, but then assured Hitler of his personal loyalty, bringing tears to the dictator’s eyes. Speer biographer Gitta Sereny notes, „Psychologically, it is possible that this is the way he remembered the occasion, because it was how he would have liked to behave, and the way he would have liked Hitler to react. But the fact is that none of it happened; our witness to this is Speer himself.”Sereny goes on to note that Speer’s original draft of his memoirs lacks the confession and Hitler’s tearful reaction, and contains an explicit denial that any confession or emotional exchange took place, as had been alleged in a French magazine article.

The following morning, Speer left the Führerbunker, with Hitler curtly bidding him farewell. Speer toured the damaged Chancellery one last time before leaving Berlin to return to Hamburg .  On April 29, the day before his suicide, Hitler prepared his final political testament. That document excluded Speer from the Cabinet and specified that Speer was to be replaced by his subordinate, Karl-Otto Saur.

Nuremberg trial

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Leading members of the Flensburg Government after their arrest. Speer (on the right) walks alongside Alfred Jodl with Karl Dönitz ahead.

After Hitler’s death, Speer offered his services to the so-called Flensburg Government, headed by Hitler’s successor, Karl Dönitz, and took a significant role in that short-lived regime. On May 15, the Americans arrived and asked Speer if he would be willing to provide information on the effects of the air war. Speer agreed, and over the next several days, provided information on a broad range of subjects. On May 23, two weeks after the surrender of German troops, the Allies arrested the members of the Flensburg Government and brought Nazi Germany to a formal end.

Speer was taken to several internment centers for Nazi officials and interrogated. In September 1945, he was told that he would be tried for war crimes, and several days later, he was taken to Nuremberg and incarcerated there. Speer was indicted on all four possible counts: first, participating in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of crime against peace, second, planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression and other crimes against peace, third, war crimes, and lastly, crimes against humanity.

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The Nuremberg defendants listen to the proceedings (Speer, top seated row, fifth from right).

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the chief U.S. prosecutor at Nuremberg, alleged, „Speer joined in planning and executing the program to dragoon prisoners of war and foreign workersinto German war industries, which waxed in output while the workers waned in starvation.”Speer’s attorney, Dr. Hans Flächsner, presented Speer as an artist thrust into political life, who had always remained a non-ideologue and who had been promised by Hitler that he could return to architecture after the war. During his testimony, Speer accepted responsibility for the Nazi regime’s actions:

In political life, there is a responsibility for a man’s own sector. For that he is of course fully responsible. But beyond that there is a collective responsibility when he has been one of the leaders. Who else is to be held responsible for the course of events, if not the closest associates around the Chief of State?

An observer at the trial, journalist and author William L. Shirer, wrote that, compared to his codefendants, Speer “made the most straightforward impression of all and … during the long trial spoke honestly and with no attempt to shirk his responsibility and his guilt”.Speer also testified that he had planned to kill Hitler in early 1945 by dropping a canister of poison gas into the bunker’s air intake. He said his efforts were frustrated by a high wall that had been built around the air intake. Speer stated his motive was despair at realizing that Hitler intended to take the German people down with him. Speer’s supposed assassination plan subsequently met with some skepticism, with Speer’s architectural rival Hermann Giesler sneering, „the second most powerful man in the state did not have a ladder.”

Speer was found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, though he was acquitted on the other two counts. On October 1, 1946, he was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. While three of the eight judges (two Soviet and one American) initially advocated the death penalty for Speer, the other judges did not, and a compromise sentence was reached „after two days’ discussion and some rather bitter horse-trading”.

The court’s judgment stated that:

… in the closing stages of the war [Speer] was one of the few men who had the courage to tell Hitler that the war was lost and to take steps to prevent the senseless destruction of production facilities, both in occupied territories and in Germany. He carried out his opposition to Hitler’s scorched earth program … by deliberately sabotaging it at considerable personal risk.

Twelve of the defendants were sentenced to death (including Bormann, in absentia) and three acquitted; only seven of the defendants were sentenced to imprisonment. They remained in the cells at Nuremberg as the Allies debated where, and under what conditions, they should be incarcerated.

Imprisonment

On July 18, 1947, Speer and his six fellow prisoners, all former high officials of the Nazi regime, were flown from Nuremberg to Berlin under heavy guard. The prisoners were taken to Spandau Prison in the British Sector of what would become West Berlin, where they would be designated by number, with Speer given Number Five. Initially, the prisoners were kept in solitary confinement for all but half an hour a day, and were not permitted to address each other or their guards. As time passed, the strict regimen was relaxed, especially during the three months in four that the three Western powers were in control; the four occupying powers took overall control on a monthly rotation. Speer considered himself an outcast among his fellow prisoners for his acceptance of responsibility at Nuremberg.

Speer made a deliberate effort to make as productive a use of his time as possible. He wrote, „I am obsessed with the idea of using this time of confinement for writing a book of major importance … That could mean transforming prison cell into scholar’s den.” The prisoners were forbidden to write memoirs, and mail was severely limited and censored. However, as a result of an offer from a sympathetic orderly, Speer was able to have his writings, which eventually amounted to 20,000 sheets, sent to Wolters. By 1954, Speer had completed his memoirs, which became the basis of Inside the Third Reich, and which Wolters arranged to have transcribed onto 1,100 typewritten pages. He was also able to send letters and financial instructions, and to obtain writing paper and letters from the outside.His many letters to his children, all secretly transmitted, eventually formed the basis for Spandau: The Secret Diaries.

With the draft memoir complete and clandestinely transmitted, Speer sought a new project. He found one while taking his daily exercise, walking in circles around the prison yard. Measuring the path’s distance carefully, Speer set out to walk the distance from Berlin to Heidelberg. He then expanded his idea into a worldwide journey, visualizing the places he was „traveling” through while walking the path around the prison yard. Speer ordered guidebooks and other materials about the nations through which he imagined he was passing, so as to envision as accurate a picture as possible. Meticulously calculating every meter traveled, and mapping distances to the real-world geography, he began in northern Germany, passed through Asia by a southern route before entering Siberia, then crossed the Bering Strait and continued southwards, finally ending his sentence 35 kilometers south of Guadalajara, Mexico.

Speer devoted much of his time and energy to reading. Though the prisoners brought some books with them in their personal property, Spandau Prison had no library so books were sent from Spandau’s municipal library. From 1952 the prisoners were also able to order books from the Berlin central library in Wilmersdorf. Speer was a voracious reader and he completed well over 500 books in the first three years at Spandau alone. He read classic novels, travelogues, books on ancient Egypt, and biographies of such figures as Lucas Cranach, Friedrich Preller, and Genghis Khan. Speer took to the prison garden for enjoyment and work, at first to do something constructive while afflicted with writer’s block.[124] He was allowed to build an ambitious garden, transforming what he initially described as a „wilderness” into what the American commander at Spandau described as „Speer’s Garden of Eden”.

Speer’s supporters maintained a continual call for his release. Among those who pledged support for Speer’s sentence to be commuted were Charles de Gaulle, U.S. diplomatGeorge Ball, former U.S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy, and former Nuremberg prosecutor Hartley Shawcross. Willy Brandt was a strong advocate of Speer’s, supporting his release,[ sending flowers to his daughter on the day of his release, and putting an end to the de-Nazification proceedings against Speer, which could have caused his property to be confiscated. A reduced sentence required the consent of all four of the occupying powers, and the Soviets adamantly opposed any such proposal.Speer served his full sentence, and was released on the stroke of midnight as October 1, 1966 began.

Release and later life

 

Entrance to the Speer property on Wolfsbrunnenweg, Heidelberg, as seen in 2010.

Speer’s release from prison was a worldwide media event, as reporters and photographers crowded both the street outside Spandau and the lobby of the Berlin hotel where Speer spent his first hours of freedom in over 20 years. However, Speer said little, reserving most comments for a major interview published in Der Spiegel in November 1966, in which he again took personal responsibility for crimes of the Nazi regime. Abandoning plans to return to architecture (two proposed partners died shortly before his release), he revised his Spandau writings into two autobiographical books, and later researched and published a third work, about Himmler and the SS. His books, most notablyInside the Third Reich (in German, Erinnerungen, or Reminiscences) and Spandau: The Secret Diaries, provide a unique and personal look into the personalities of the Nazi era, and have become much valued by historians. Speer was aided in shaping the works by Joachim Fest andWolf Jobst Siedler from the publishing house Ullstein. However, Speer found himself unable to re-establish his relationship with his children, even with his son Albert, who had also become an architect. According to Speer’s daughter Hilde, „One by one my sister and brothers gave up. There was no communication.”

Following the publication of his bestselling books, Speer donated a considerable amount of money to Jewish charities. According to Siedler, these donations were as high as 80% of his royalties. Speer kept the donations anonymous, both for fear of rejection, and for fear of being called a hypocrite.

As early as 1953, when Wolters strongly objected to Speer referring to Hitler in the memoirs draft as a criminal, Speer had predicted that were the writings to be published, he would lose a „good many friends”. This came to pass, as following the publication of Inside the Third Reich, close friends, such as Wolters and sculptor Arno Breker, distanced themselves from him. Hans Baur, Hitler’s personal pilot, suggested, „Speer must have taken leave of his senses.” Wolters wondered that Speer did not now „walk through life in a hair shirt, distributing his fortune among the victims of National Socialism, forswear all the vanities and pleasures of life and live on locusts and wild honey”.

Speer made himself widely available to historians and other enquirers. He did an extensive, in-depth interview for the June 1971 issue ofPlayboy magazine, in which he stated, „If I didn’t see it, then it was because I didn’t want to see it.” In October 1973, Speer made his first trip to Britain, flying to London under an assumed name to be interviewed on the BBC Midweek programme by Ludovic Kennedy. Upon arrival, he was detained for almost 8 hours at Heathrow Airport when British immigration authorities discovered his true identity. The Home Secretary, Robert Carr, allowed Speer into the country for 48 hours. While in London eight years later to participate in the BBC Newsnight programme, Speer suffered a stroke and died on September 1, 1981. Speer had formed a relationship with a German woman living in England, and was with her at the time of his death.

Even to the end of his life, Speer continued to question his actions under Hitler. In his final book, Infiltration, he asks, „What would have happened if Hitler had asked me to make decisions that required the utmost hardness? … How far would I have gone? … If I had occupied a different position, to what extent would I have ordered atrocities if Hitler had told me to do so?” Speer leaves the questions unanswered.

Legacy and controversy

Architectural legacy

File:Berlin Treptow Ehrenmal 11.jpg

The Soviet War Memorial, constructed using marble from Speer’s Chancellery

Little remains of Speer’s personal architectural works, other than the plans and photographs. No buildings designed by Speer in the Nazi era remain in Berlin; a double row of lampposts along the Strasse des 17. Juni designed by Speer still stands. The tribune of the Zeppelinfeldstadium in Nuremberg, though partly demolished, may also be seen.Speer’s work may also be seen in London, where he redesigned the interior of the German Embassy to the United Kingdom, then located at 7–9 Carlton House Terrace. Since 1967, it has served as the offices of the Royal Society. His work there, stripped of its Nazi fixtures and partially covered by carpets, survives in part.

A perhaps more important legacy was the Arbeitsstab Wiederaufbau zerstörter Städte (Working group on Reconstruction of destroyed cities), authorized by Speer in 1943 to rebuild bombed German cities to make them more livable in the age of the automobile. Headed by Wolters, the working group took a possible military defeat into their calculations. The Arbeitsstab’s recommendations served as the basis of the postwar redevelopment plans in many cities, and Arbeitsstab members became prominent in the rebuilding.

Actions regarding the Jews

As General Building Inspector, Speer was responsible for the Central Department for Resettlement. From 1939 onwards, the Department used the Nuremberg Laws to evict Jewish tenants of non-Jewish landlords in Berlin, to make way for non-Jewish tenants displaced by redevelopment or bombing. Eventually, 75,000 Jews were displaced by these measures. Speer was aware of these activities, and inquired as to their progress. At least one original memo from Speer so inquiring still exists, as does the Chronicle of the Department’s activities, kept by Wolters.

Following his release from Spandau, Speer presented to the German Federal Archives an edited version of the Chronicle, stripped by Wolters of any mention of the Jews. When David Irving discovered discrepancies between the edited Chronicle and other documents, Wolters explained the situation to Speer, who responded by suggesting to Wolters that the relevant pages of the original Chronicle should „cease to exist”. Wolters did not destroy the Chronicle, and, as his friendship with Speer deteriorated, allowed access to the original Chronicleto doctoral student Matthias Schmidt (who, after obtaining his doctorate, developed his thesis into a book, Albert Speer: The End of a Myth). Speer considered Wolters’ actions to be a „betrayal” and a „stab in the back”. The original Chronicle reached the Archives in 1983, after both Speer and Wolters had died.

Knowledge of the Holocaust

Speer maintained at Nuremberg and in his memoirs that he had no knowledge of the Holocaust. In Inside the Third Reich, he wrote that in mid-1944, he was told by Hanke (by thenGauleiter of Lower Silesia) that the minister should never accept an invitation to inspect a concentration camp in neighboring Upper Silesia, as „he had seen something there which he was not permitted to describe and moreover could not describe”. Speer later concluded that Hanke must have been speaking of Auschwitz, and blamed himself for not inquiring further of Hanke or seeking information from Himmler or Hitler:

These seconds [when Hanke told Speer this, and Speer did not inquire] were uppermost in my mind when I stated to the international court at the Nuremberg Trial that, as an important member of the leadership of the Reich, I had to share the total responsibility for all that had happened. For from that moment on I was inescapably contaminated morally; from fear of discovering something which might have made me turn from my course, I had closed my eyes … Because I failed at that time, I still feel, to this day, responsible for Auschwitz in a wholly personal sense.

Much of the controversy over Speer’s knowledge of the Holocaust has centered on his presence at the Posen Conference on October 6, 1943, at which Himmler gave a speech detailing the ongoing Holocaust to Nazi leaders. Himmler said, „The grave decision had to be taken to cause this people to vanish from the earth … In the lands we occupy, the Jewish question will be dealt with by the end of the year.” Speer is mentioned several times in the speech, and Himmler seems to address him directly. In Inside the Third Reich, Speer mentions his own address to the officials (which took place earlier in the day) but does not mention Himmler’s speech.

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Bronze eagle from Speer’s Chancellery, now in the Imperial War Museum.

In 1971, American historian Erich Goldhagen published an article arguing that Speer was present for Himmler’s speech. According to Fest in his biography of Speer, „Goldhagen’s accusation certainly would have been more convincing”had he not placed supposed incriminating statements linking Speer with the Holocaust in quotation marks, attributed to Himmler, which were in fact invented by Goldhagen. In response, after considerable research in the German Federal Archives in Koblenz, Speer said he had left Posen around noon (long before Himmler’s speech) in order to journey to Hitler’s headquarters at Rastenburg. In Inside the Third Reich, published before the Goldhagen article, Speer recalled that on the evening after the conference, many Nazi officials were so drunk that they needed help boarding the special train which was to take them to a meeting with Hitler. One of his biographers, Dan van der Vat, suggests this necessarily implies he must have still been present at Posen then, and must have heard Himmler’s speech. In response to Goldhagen’s article, Speer had alleged that in writing Inside the Third Reich, he erred in reporting an incident that happened at another conference at Posen a year later, as happening in 1943.

In 2005, British newspaper The Daily Telegraph reported that documents had surfaced indicating that Speer had approved the allocation of materials for the expansion of Auschwitz after two of his assistants toured the facility on a day when almost a thousand Jews were murdered. The documents supposedly bore annotations in Speer’s own handwriting. Speer biographer Gitta Sereny stated that, due to his workload, Speer would not have been personally aware of such activities.

The debate over Speer’s knowledge of, or complicity in, the Holocaust made him a symbol for people who were involved with the Nazi regime yet did not have (or claimed not to have had) an active part in the regime’s atrocities. As film director Heinrich Breloer remarked, „[Speer created] a market for people who said, ‘Believe me, I didn’t know anything about [the Holocaust]. Just look at the Führer’s friend, he didn’t know about it either.'”

In 2007, however, correspondence between Speer and a Belgian resistance widow Hélène Jeanty, indicated that Speer had indeed been present for Himmler’s presentation. In the letter to Jeanty, written on December 23, 1971, Speer wrote: „There is no doubt – I was present as Himmler announced on October 6 1943 that all Jews would be killed…Who would believe me that I suppressed this, that it would have been easier to have written all of this in my memoirs?”

 


Loneliness Long Distance Runner …


Observe surroundings…


With great attention…

 


All about Wilhelm Franz CANARIS…

Wilhelm Franz CANARIS

Wilhelm Franz CANARIS
1 January 1887 – 9 April 1945 (aged 58)
Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1979-013-43, Wilhelm Canaris.jpg
Wilhelm Franz Canaris
Place of birth Aplerbeck (a part of Dortmund) inWestphalia
Place of death Flossenbürg concentration camp
Allegiance German Empire
Weimar Republic
Nazi Germany
Service/branch Kaiserliche Marine
Reichsmarine
Nazi Germany Abwehr
Years of service 1905 – 1944
Rank General-Admiral
Battles/wars World War I 

  • Battle of Coronel
  • Battle of the Falkland Islands
  • Battle of Más a Tierra

World War II

Awards Iron Cross First and Second Class
German Cross in Silver
Cross of Honor
Wehrmacht’s Twelve and Twenty-Five Year Long-Service Ribbons.

Wilhelm Franz Canaris (1 January 1887 – 9 April 1945) was a German admiral, head of the Abwehr, the German military intelligence service, from 1935 to 1944 and member of the German Resistance.

Early life and World War I

Canaris was born in Aplerbeck (now a part of Dortmund) in Westphalia, the son of wealthy industrialist Carl Canaris and his wife Auguste (née Popp). Until 1938 Canaris believed that his family was related to the Greek admiral, freedom fighter and politicianConstantine Kanaris, which influenced his decision to join the navy. While on a visit to Corfu he was given a portrait of the Greek hero, which he always kept in his office. In 1938, however, research showed that his family was of North Italian descent, originally called Canarisi, and had lived in Germany since the 17th century. His grandfather had converted from Catholicism toLutheranism.

In 1905, aged seventeen, Canaris joined the German Imperial Navy and by the outbreak of World War I was serving on board theSMS Dresden as intelligence officer. This cruiser was the only ship that managed to evade the British Fleet for a prolonged period during the Battle of the Falkland Islands in December 1914, largely due to his excellent deception tactics. Whilst anchored in Cumberland Bay, Robinson Crusoe Island, the Dresden was trapped and forced to scuttle after fighting a battle there with the British. Most of the crew became prisoners in Chile in March 1915, but Canaris escaped in August 1915, using his fluency inSpanish; with the aid of some German merchants he returned to Germany in October 1917 via, among other countries, Great Britain.

He was then given intelligence work and sent to Spain, where he survived a British assassination attempt. Returning to active service, he ended the war as a celebrated U-boat commander from late 1917 in the Mediterranean, credited with eighteen sinkings. By that time he was an enemy on the top of the list of the MI6 secret service in the UK. He spoke English fluently (as well as four other foreign languages) and as a naval officer of the old school, he respected Great Britain’s Royal Navy despite the rivalry between the two nations.

During the German Revolution of 1918–19, Canaris helped organize the formation of vigilant forces in order to suppress the revolutionary movements. He was also a member of the military court that tried (and mostly acquitted) those involved in the assassination of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. He was appointed to the adjutancy of defence minister Gustav Noske.

In 1919, Canaris married Erika Waag, also the child of an industrialist. They had two daughters, Eva and Brigitte.

Interwar years

Canaris remained in the military after the war, first as a member of the Freikorps and then as part of the Reichsmarine. He was promoted rapidly, becoming a Captain in 1931, the Executive Officer of the cruiser Berlin and then the Commanding Officer of thebattleship Schlesien. At this time, he became involved in intelligence work again. He made a series of contacts with high-ranking German officers, politicians and industrialists for the purpose of creating order in German politics. During his Freikorps period, he was on intimate terms with the people such as Horst von Pflugk-Hartung who were accused of political assassinations of leaders of the left, and was even accused himself, although later acquitted, of being involved in the assassinations and other crimes (such as his alleged involvement in Rosa Luxembourg’s „trial”). During the 1930–33 period, Canaris was following a course quite parallel to the one followed by the future Nazi party leaders although never a party member himself. Indirectly, though, he promoted the forces that later became part of the Nazi power structure.

After Adolf Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, Canaris was made head of the Abwehr, Germany’s official military intelligence agency, on 1 January 1935. Later that year, he was promoted to Rear Admiral. During the period 1935–36, he made contacts in Spain to organize a German spy network there, due to his excellent Spanish. He was the moving force behind the decision that sided Germany with Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War, despite Hitler’s initial hesitation to get involved in such an adventure.

In 1937 he was still a supporter of Hitler, considering him to be the only solution against communism and a hope for the national revival of Germany. By 1938, however, he had realised that Hitler’s policies and plans would lead Germany to disaster and secretly began to work against the régime. His personal style as a gentleman was incompatible with the thuggish behaviour of most of the Nazi party members. A letter from a Spanish contact of his has been preserved and unambiguously confirms his opposition to the Nazi regime.

He tried to hinder Hitler’s attempts to absorb Czechoslovakia and he also advised Franco not to permit German passage through Spain for the purposes of capturing Gibraltar. Arguments used by Franco to counter Hitler’s demands for German access to Spanish territory were influenced directly by Canaris, who met with a number of his top advisors.[3] Additionally, a significant sum of money had been deposited by the British in Swiss accounts for Franco and his generals to maintain their neutrality.

Munich Agreement

He also became involved in two abortive plots to assassinate Hitler, first in 1938 and again in 1939.[citation needed] During the 1938 crisis over Czechoslovakia that culminated in the Munich Agreement, Canaris was together with the Army Chief of Staff, General Ludwig Beck and the Foreign Office’s State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker, Canaris was a leader of the „anti-war” group in the German government, which was determined to avoid a war in 1938 that it felt Germany would lose.

This group was not necessarily committed to the overthrow of the regime, but was loosely allied to another, more radical group, the „anti-Nazi” fraction centered around Colonel Hans Oster and Hans Bernd Gisevius, which wanted to use the crisis as an excuse for executing a putsch to overthrow the Nazi regime.

His most audacious attempt was in planning, with Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, to capture and eliminate Hitler and the entire Nazi party before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At this particular moment, von Kleist visited Britain secretly and discussed the situation with British MI6 and some high ranking politicians. There, the name of Canaris became widely known as the executive hand of von Kleist in the event of an anti-Nazi plot. The high ranking German military leaders believed that if Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia, or any other country, then Britain would declare war on Germany. MI6 was of the same opinion. The British declaration of war would have given the General Staff, in their belief, both the pretext and support for an overthrow of Hitler.

The British reaction, however, to Hitler’s demands on the Sudetenland was more cautious. At a meeting with Hitler in Munich, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, (1869 – November 1940), and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier chose diplomacy over war. Munich was a severe disappointment for Kleist and Canaris. It gave Hitler’s international reputation an important boost for two reasons: one, he was able to play the part of a man of reason and compromise; and two, he could boast that his predictions that Great Britain and France would not respond with war had proven to be correct. There are claims that Canaris, who was extremely shocked by this ‘dishonest and stupid decision’ (his own words), decided to be cautious and wait for a better time to act against Hitler.

In January 1939, Canaris manufactured the „Dutch War Scare”, which gripped the British government. By 23 January 1939 the British government received information to the effect that Germany intended to invade the Netherlands in February 1939 with the aim of using Dutch air-fields to launch strategic bombing offensive intended to achieve a „knock-out” blow against Britain by razing British cities to the ground. All this information was false, and it was intended by Canaris to achieve a change in British foreign policy. In this, Canaris was successful, and the „Dutch War Scare” played a major role in causing Chamberlain to make the „continental commitment” (i.e. sending a large British ground force to the defence of France) in February 1939.

Nevertheless, it appears likely[vague] that MI6 maintained contact with Canaris even after the Munich Agreement signed on 30 September 1938. When Winston Churchill came to power after the resignation of Chamberlain in May 1940, Canaris’ hopes were renewed, given the new Prime Minister’s strong position against Hitler.

World War II

In the meantime, Reinhard Heydrich, previously a naval cadet who had served under Canaris and was at the time the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) leader, despite being his protégé, friend and neighbour, became his rival. Presumably, the Canaris posting in Abwehr had the secret approval of the dynamic Heydrich, who preferred him to his predecessor, Commander Pfatz, who was not in line with the Nazi party members. Heydrich wanted a controllable Abwehr and was keeping a close eye on Canaris. Canaris appeared outwardly to side with his friend Heydrich, but only in order to give Abwehr a chance to grow and become a considerable force. In Bassett’s account, Canaris was deeply frustrated by a briefing from Hitler before the attack on Poland. During the briefing, he was informed about a series of exterminations that had been ordered and which Canaris was required to take notes on. These notes, the book confirms, were sent to MI6. After the outbreak of war between Germany and Poland, in September 1939, Canaris visited the front and witnessed examples of the war crimes committed by the SS Einsatzgruppen. Among these were the burning of the synagogue in Będzin, where the town’s Jewish residents were burned to death. He also received reports from Abwehragents about many other incidents of mass murder throughout Poland. Canaris kept detailed records of these atrocities in his personal diary which he entrusted to Werner Schrader, one of his subordinates and fellow resistance member.

After hearing reports of and witnessing massacres in Poland, Canaris on 12 September 1940 travelled to Hitler’s headquarters train, at the time in Upper Silesia, to register his objection to the atrocities; prior to reaching Hitler he encountered General Wilhelm Keitel whom he informed: „I have information that mass executions are being planned in Poland, and that members of the Polish nobility and the Roman Catholic bishops and priests have been singled out for extermination.” Keitel admonished Canaris to go no further with his protest as the detailed plan of atrocities came directly from Hitler, himself.

Shocked by these incidents, Canaris began working more actively, at increasing risk, to overthrow Hitler’s régime, although he cooperated with the SD to create a decoy. This made it possible for him to pose as a trusted man for some time. He was promoted to full Admiral in January 1940. With his subordinate Erwin Lahousen, he formed a circle of like-mindedWehrmacht officers, many of whom would be executed or forced to commit suicide after the failure of the 20 July Plot.

It has been speculated that there was contact with British intelligence during this time, despite the war between the two countries. It is thought that during the invasion of Russia, Canaris received a detailed report of all the enemy positions that was known only to the British. The head of MI6, Stewart Menzies, who shared Canaris’s strong anti-communist beliefs, praised Canaris’s courage and bravery at the end of the war. Reinhard Heydrich and Heinrich Himmler, however, investigated in detail the sources of Canaris’s information on Operation Barbarossa, arriving at the conclusion that there had indeed been contact between him and the British.

After 1942, Canaris visited Spain frequently and was probably in contact with British agents from Gibraltar. In 1943, while in occupied France, Canaris is said to have made contact with British agents: he was conducted blindfolded to the Convent of the Nuns of the Passion of our Blessed Lord, 127 Rue de la Santé, where he met the local head of the British Intelligence Services, code name „Jade Amicol”, in reality Colonel Claude Olivier. Canaris wanted to know the terms for peace if Germany got rid of Hitler. Churchill’s reply, sent to him two weeks later, was simple: „Unconditional surrender”.

During Heydrich’s posting in Prague, a serious incident put him and Canaris in open conflict. A Czech agent — Paul Thümmel — was arrested by Heydrich, but Canaris intervened to save him, claiming he was a double agent actually working for Abwehr. Heydrich suspected that Thümmel was actually Canaris’s MI6 contact. Heydrich requested that Canaris put the Abwehr under SD and SS control. Canaris appeared to retreat and handled the situation diplomatically, but there was no immediate effect on the Abwehr for the time being. In fact, Canaris had established another two links with MI6 — one via Zurich, and the other via Spain and Gibraltar. It is also possible that Vatican contacts provided a third route to his British counterparts.

Canaris also intervened to save a number of victims of Nazi persecution, including saving Jews, some by getting them to Spain.[14] Many such people were given token training as Abwehr„agents” and then issued papers allowing them to leave Germany. One notable person he is said to have assisted was the then Lubavitcher Rebbe in Warsaw, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchok Schneersohn.[15] This has led Chabad Lubavitch to campaign for his recognition as a Righteous Gentile by the Yad VaShem holocaust memorial.

The assassination of Reinhard Heydrich in Prague, organized by MI6, was done in part to preserve Canaris in his important position.

Foiling Hitler’s plot to kidnap Pope Pius XII

Colonel Wessel von Freytag-Loringhoven’s son Niki, testifying in Munich in 1972 and in recent revelations, reports that Canaris was involved in the foiling of Hitler’s plot to kidnap Pope Pius XII. Colonel Freytag-Loringhoven was a subordinate of Canaris, and his son, Niki von Freytag-Loringhoven, reported that within days of the arrest of Benito Mussolini as ordered by King Victor Emmanuel III, the Führer commanded the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (the Third Reich’s Security Headquarters) to retaliate against the Italians via the kidnapping or murder of Pius XII and King Victor Emmanuel.

The colonel’s son, Niki Freytag Loringhoven, now 72, recently came forward to reveal new details about the plan, reporting that on 29 and 30 July 1943 his father and Erwin von Lahousen, who were employed in the section of German intelligence dealing mainly with sabotage, attended a meeting in Venice where Canaris informed the Italian General, Cesare Amè, of the plot. General Amè relayed the news which allowed the plot to be foiled. The Italian paper, Avvenire, maintains that the younger Freytag von Loringhoven’s accounts comport with the Von Lahousen’s Nuremberg war crimes trials deposition.

Downfall and execution

 

Flossenburg concentration camp, Arrestblock-Hof: Memorial to members of German resistance executed on 9 April 1945

The evidence that he was playing a double game grew, and at the insistence of Heinrich Himmler, who had suspected him for a long time, Hitler dismissed Canaris from the Abwehr in February 1944, replacing him with Walter Schellenberg and merging most of the Abwehr with theSicherheitsdienst (SD). Some weeks later, Canaris was put under house arrest, preventing him from taking part directly in the 20 July Plot, 1944, to assassinate Hitler.

However, just after the Stalingrad disaster, Canaris had already planned a ‘coup’ against the entire Nazi regime in which many Nazi officials would be accused for known crimes, while Hitler would be arrested as an insane person based on his exposure to poison gas in World War I, then imprisoned for life. After the 20 July Plot, Canaris’s long-time rival, SS leader Heinrich Himmler discovered that one of the officers involved in the plot, a friend of Canaris who had committed suicide, had kept the plot details in a metal box. The investigations also revealed that a number of other assassination plots (possibly another 10 or 15) had been activated but had failed and were covered up at the last minute. Most people who participated in these plots were people Canaris knew well. In the aftermath of the attempt on Hitler’s life, the Gestapo found no direct evidence tying Canaris to the plot, but his close association to many of the conspirators that were arrested was enough to seal his fate.

Himmler kept Canaris alive for some time because he planned to use him secretly as a future contact with the British in order to come to an agreement to end the war with himself as the leader of Germany. Hitler also wanted to keep him alive in order to get the names of additional conspirators. When Himmler’s plan failed to materialize, he received the approval of Hitler to send Canaris to an SS drumhead court-martialpresided over by Otto Thorbeck with Walter Huppenkothen as prosecutor that sentenced him to death.

Together with his deputy General Hans Oster, military jurist General Karl Sack, theologian Rev. Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Ludwig Gehre, Canaris was humiliated before witnesses and then executed on 9 April 1945, in the Flossenbürg concentration camp, just weeks before the end of the war. He was led to the gallows barefoot and naked. Just before his execution he tapped out a message in morse code, which was heard by another prisoner, claiming he acted for the good of Germany and denying he was a traitor. At the time of his execution, Canaris had been decorated with the Iron Cross First and Second Class, the Silver German Cross, the Cross of Honour and the Wehrmacht Twelve and Twenty-Five Year Long-Service Ribbons.

Erwin von Lahousen and Hans Bernd Gisevius, two of Canaris’ main subordinates, survived the war and testified during the Nuremberg Trials about Canaris’ courage in opposing Hitler. Lahousen recalled a conversation between Canaris and General Wilhelm Keitel in which Canaris warned Keitel that the German military would be held responsible for the atrocities inPoland. Keitel responded that they had been ordered by Hitler. Keitel, who also survived the war, was found guilty of war crimes at Nuremberg and hanged.

Popular culture

  • The 1954 movie Canaris is based on his biography.
  • In the 1961 novel, ‘Es muss nicht immer Kaviar sein’ by German author Johannes Mario Simmel Canaris is the primary benefactor of agent Thomas Lieven during his time as German Agent in World War II. The novel is claimed by the author to be authentic.
  • In the 1970 Colin Forbes novel The Heights of Zervos, Canaris is mentioned along with the Abwehr.
  • In the 1976 film The Eagle Has Landed, Canaris was played by actor Anthony Quayle.
  • In the Frederick Forsyth novel The Odessa File, set in the mid-1960s, the hero infiltrates the organisation of former SS members by claiming to have commanded, as a 19-year-old sergeant, the firing squad which executed Canaris. This is not in fact how Canaris was executed, which was by hanging.
  • In the 1980 Brian Garfield novel The Paladin, Canaris is visited by an agent acting for Churchill. It is apparent that in this book, Canaris is acting as a knowing conduit for Britishmisinformation.
  • In the 1996 Daniel Silva novel The Unlikely Spy, Canaris is the head of the Abwehr who initiated the infiltration of SHAEF to discover its invasion plans of Normandy.

Warning !!… This could be the enemy …


Warning !!… This could be the enemy …


Before leaving on a new mission…


AMT-WWII_10 – M4A1 Medium TANK…

AMT-WWII_09 – M4A1 Medium TANK…

The M4 Sherman, formally Medium Tank, M4, was the primary tank used by the United States during World War II. Thousands were also distributed to the Allies, including the British Commonwealth and Soviet armies, via lend-lease. In theUnited Kingdom, the M4 was named after Union General William Tecumseh Sherman, following the British practice of naming their American-built tanks after famous American Civil War generals. Subsequently the British name found its way into common use in the U.S.

File:M4A4 cutaway.svg

The Sherman evolved from the Grant and Lee medium tanks, which had an unusual side-sponson mounted 75 mm gun. It retained much of the previous mechanical design, but added the first American main 75 mm gun mounted on a fully traversing turret, with a gyrostabilizer enabling the crew to fire with reasonable accuracy while the tank was on the move. The designers stressed mechanical reliability, ease of production and maintenance, durability, standardization of parts and ammunition in a limited number of variants, and moderate size and weight. These factors made the Sherman superior in some regards, to the German light and medium tanks that had swept across Europe in the blitzkrieg campaigns of 1939-41, and which still made up the majority of German panzer –albeit usually in up-gunned and up-armored variants—forces in the later stages of the war. The Sherman ended up being produced in large numbers and formed the backbone of most Allied offensives, starting in late 1942. The original Shermans were able to defeat the relatively small German tanks such as the Panzer II and III they faced when first deployed in North Africa. Later, they found themselves seriously outmatched against newer up-gunned and up- armoredPz.Kpfw. IV and Panther medium tanks and wholly inadequate against the armor and range of the Tiger I and later Tiger II heavy tanks, suffering high casualties against their heavier armor and more powerful 88 mm and 75 mm cannons. Mobility, mechanical reliability and sheer numbers, supported by growing superiority in supporting fighter-bombers and artillery, offset these disadvantages to an extent. Later versions of the Sherman introduced 76 mm guns, giving them better armor penetration than the original 75 mm gun, though still insufficient at range against late war German heavy tanks. Producing more Shermans was favored over rushing adoption of the heavier M26 Pershing, which was developed too late to play a significant role in the war. In the Pacific Theater, the Sherman was used chiefly against Japanese infantry and fortifications; in their rare encounters with lighter Japanese tanks with weaker armor and guns, the Sherman’s superiority was overwhelming.

Production of the M4 exceeded 50,000 units, and its chassis served as the basis for numerous other armored vehicles such astank destroyers, tank retrievers, and self-propelled artillery. Only Mikhail Koshkin’s design of the Soviet T-34 tank was ultimately produced in larger numbers during World War II. Many German generals and many historians considered the T-34 the best tank of the war, but even so the Russians recognized the Sherman’s particular advantages when they used them in certain niche situations.

The Sherman would finally give way to post-war tanks developed from the M26. Various original and updated versions of the Sherman would continue to see combat effectively in many later conflicts, including the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli Wars, andIndo-Pakistani Wars into the late 20th century, against the T-34 and sometimes much more contemporary Soviet tanks.

Medium Tank M4
TankshermanM4.jpg
An M4A3E8 76 mm armed Sherman tank made during theSecond World War
Type Medium tank
Place of origin United States
Service history
In service 1942–1955 (USA)
Used by United States, and many others (see Foreign variants and use)
Wars World War II, Greek Civil War, Arab-Israeli War, Korean War, Suez Crisis,Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, Six-Day War, Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Yom Kippur War, 1958 Lebanon crisis,Lebanese Civil War, Cuban Revolution, Nicaraguan Revolution
Production history
Designed 1940
Produced 1941–
Number built 49,234
Specifications
Weight 66,800 pounds (30.3 tonnes; 29.8 long tons; 33.4 short tons)
Length 19 ft 2 in (5.84 m)
Width 8 ft 7 in (2.62 m)
Height 9 ft (2.74 m)
Crew 5 (Commander, gunner, loader, driver, co-driver)

Armor 63 mm
Primary
armament
75 mm M3 L/40 gun90 rounds
Secondary
armament
.50 cal Browning M2HB machine gun (300 rounds),
2 × .30-06 Browning M1919A4machine guns (4,750 rounds)
Engine Continental R975 C1, air-cooled,radial, gasoline
400 hp (298 kW) gross @ 2,400 rpm
350 hp (253 kW) net at 2,400 rpm.M4A4 Model – Chrysler A57 Multibank L-Head 30 Cylinder (5 bank x 6 cyl), 21 litre engine. 6.2:1 compression. 470hp @ 2700rpm.
Power/weight 15.8 hp/tonne
Transmission Spicer manual, synchromesh, 4 forward (plus 1 overdrive) and 1 reverse gear
Suspension Vertical Volute Spring Suspension (VVSS)
Operational
range
120 miles at 175 U.S. ga (193 km at 660 l; 80 octane)
Speed 25 to 30 mph (40 to 48 km/h) 

 

U.S. design prototype

 

Cutaway Sherman showing transmission and driver seat

The U.S. Army Ordnance Department designed the Medium Tank M4 as a replacement for the M3 Lee and Grant Medium Tanks. The M3 was an up-gunned development of the M2 Medium Tank of 1939, itself derived from the M2 Light Tank of 1935. The M3 was developed as a stopgap measure until a new turret mounting a 75 mm gun could be devised. While it was a big improvement when tried by the British in Africa against early German panzers, the placement of a 37 mm gun turret on top gave it a very high profile, and the unusual inflexible side-sponson mounted main gun could not be aimed across the other side of the tank.

Detailed design characteristics for the M4 were submitted by the Ordnance Department on 31 August 1940, but development of a prototype had to be delayed while the final production designs of the M3 were finished and the M3 entered full-scale production. On 18 April 1941, the U.S. Armored Force Board chose the simplest of five designs. Known as the T6, the design was a modified M3 hull and chassis, carrying a newly designed turret mounting the Lee’s main gun. This became the Sherman.

The Sherman’s reliability benefited from many features first developed in U.S. light tanks during the 1930s, including vertical volute spring suspension, rubber-bushed tracks, and rear-mounted radial engine with drive sprockets in front. The designated goals were to produce a fast, dependable medium tank able to support infantry, provide breakthrough striking capacity, and defeat any tank then in use by the Axis nations, though it would later fall short against the much larger tanks eventually deployed by Germany.

The T6 prototype was completed 2 September 1941. Unlike later M4s, the hull was cast and had a side hatch, which was eliminated from production models. The T6 was standardized as the M4 and production began in October.

Doctrine

As the US approached entry in WWII, armored employment was doctrinally governed by FM 100-5 Operations (published May 1941, the month following selection of the M4 tank’s final design). That FM stated that: The armored division is organized primarily to perform missions that require great mobility and firepower. It is given decisive missions. It is capable of engaging in all forms of combat, but its primary role is in offensive operations against hostile rear areas.In other words, the M4 was envisioned to primarily fill the role of a cruiser tank — although the US Army did not use that doctrinal term. The M4 was not primarily intended as an infantry support tank; in fact, FM 100-5 specifically stated the opposite. It placed tanks in the „striking echelon” of the armored division, and placed the infantry in the „support echelon”. Neither was the M4 primarily intended for tank versus tank action. Doctrinally, anti-tank engagements were the primary role of tank destroyers. The field manual covering the use of the Sherman (FM 17-33, „The Tank Battalion, Light and Medium” of September 1942) devoted one page of text and four diagrams to tank versus tank action (out of 142 pages). This early armored doctrine was heavily influenced by the sweeping initial successes of the German blitzkrieg tactics. Unfortunately, by the time M4s reached combat in significant numbers, battlefield demands for infantry support and tank versus tank action far outnumbered the occasional opportunities for cruiser tanks.

Although envisioned primarily as a cruiser-type tank, US doctrine did also contemplate the M4’s use in other roles. Unlike some other nations, which had separate medium tank designs tailored specifically for anti-tank roles (e.g., the German PzKw III) and support roles (the PzKw IV), the US intended the M4 to fulfill all roles. Although not optimized for tank versus tank engagements or infantry support, the M4 was capable of performing these missions to varying degrees. In the Pacific Theater, the Sherman was used chiefly against Japanese infantry and fortifications; in their rare encounters with lighter Japanese tanks with weaker armor and guns, the Shermans were superior.

U.S. production history

 

M4A1 with cast hull
 

M4 and M4A1 (shown), the first Shermans, share the inverted U backplate and inherited their engine and exhaust system from the earlier M3 Lee.
 

This M4A4 has extra armor plates in front of crew hatches.

The first production began with the Lima Locomotive Works on the assembly line set for tanks for British use. The first production Sherman was given over to the US Army for evaluation and it was the second tank of the British order that went to London. Named Michael probably after Michael Dewar, head of the British Tank mission in the US, it was displayed in London and is now an exhibit at Bovington tank Museum

In World War II, the U.S. Army ultimately fielded 16 armored divisions, along with 70 independent tank battalions. A third of all U.S. Army tank battalions, and all six U.S. Marine Corps tank battalions, were deployed to the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO). However, prior to September 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had announced a production program calling for 120,000 tanks for the Allied war effort, which would have created 61 armored divisions. Although the American industrial complex was not affected by enemy aerial bombing nor submarine warfare as was Japan, Germany and, to a lesser degree, Great Britain, the enormous drain of steel for tank production had been diverted to warships and other naval vessels. The use of steel for naval construction amounted to the equivalent of approximately 67,000 tanks; and consequently only about 53,500 tanks were produced during 1942 and 1943.

The U.S. Army had seven main sub-designations for M4 variants during production: M4, M4A1, M4A2, M4A3, M4A4, M4A5, and M4A6. These designations did not necessarily indicate linear improvement: for example, A4 was not meant to indicate it was better than the A3. These sub-types indicated standardized production variations, which were in fact often manufactured concurrently at different locations. The sub-types differed mainly in engines, although the M4A1 differed from the M4 by its fully-cast upper hull; the M4A4 had a longer engine system that required a longer hull, a longer suspension system, and more track blocks; M4A5 was an administrative placeholder for Canadian production; and the M4A6 had an elongated chassis, but fewer than 100 of these were produced.

While most Shermans ran on gasoline, the M4A2 and M4A6 had diesel engines: the M4A2 with a pair of GMC 6-71 straight six engines, the M4A6 a Caterpillar RD1820 radial. These, plus the M4A4, which used the Chrysler A57 multibank engine, were mostly supplied to Allied countries under Lend-Lease. „M4” can refer specifically to the initial sub-type with its Continental radial engine, or generically, to the entire family of seven Sherman sub-types, depending on context. Many details of production, shape, strength and performance improved throughout production, without a change to the tank’s basic model number: more durable suspension units, safer „wet” (W) ammunition stowage, and stronger armor arrangements, such as the M4 Composite, which had a cast front hull section mated to a welded rear hull. British nomenclature differed from that employed by the U.S.

A 24-volt electrical system was used in the M4.

M4 Sherman: comparison of key production features of selected models
Designation Main Armament Hull Engine
M4(105) 105 mm howitzer welded gasoline Continental R975 radial
M4 Composite 75 mm cast front welded sides gasoline Continental R975 radial
M4A1(76)W cast gasoline Continental R975 radial
M4A2 75 mm welded diesel GM 6046 (2×6-71 inline)
M4A3W 75 mm welded gasoline Ford GAA V8
M4A3E2 „Jumbo” 75 mm (some 76 mm) welded gasoline Ford GAA V8
M4A3E8(76)W „Easy Eight” 76 mm welded gasoline Ford GAA V8
M4A4 75 mm welded lengthened gasoline Chrysler A57 5×6-cyl inline
M4A6 75 mm cast front welded sides lengthened diesel Caterpillar D200A radial

Early Shermans mounted a 75 mm medium-velocity general-purpose gun. Although Ordnance began work on the Medium Tank T20 as a Sherman replacement, ultimately the Army decided to minimize production disruption by incorporating elements of other tank designs into the Sherman. Later M4A1, M4A2, and M4A3 models received the larger T23 turret with a high-velocity 76 mm M1 gun, which reduced the number of HE and smoke rounds carried and increased the number of anti-tank rounds. Later, the M4 and M4A3 were factory-produced with a 105 mm howitzer and a new distinctive mantlet in the original turret. The first standard-production 76 mm gun Sherman was an M4A1, accepted in January 1944, and the first standard-production 105 mm howitzer Sherman was an M4 accepted in February 1944.

In June–July 1944, the Army accepted a limited run of 254 M4A3E2 Jumbo Shermans, which had very thick armor, and the 75 mm gun in a new, heavier T23-style turret, in order to assault fortifications. The M4A3 was the first to be factory-produced with the HVSS (horizontal volute spring suspension) suspension with wider tracks to distribute weight, and the smooth ride of the HVSS with its experimental E8 designation led to the nickname Easy Eight for Shermans so equipped. Both the Americans and the British developed a wide array of special attachments for the Sherman; few saw combat, and most remained experimental. Those that saw action included the bulldozer blade for the Sherman dozer tanks, Duplex Drivefor „swimming” Sherman tanks, R3 flamethrower for Zippo flame tanks, and the T34 60-tube Calliope 4.5″ rocket launcher for the Sherman turret. The British variants (DDs and mine flails) were among „Hobart’s Funnies”, named after their commander, Percy Hobart of the 79th Armoured Division.

The M4 Sherman’s basic chassis was used for all the sundry roles of a modern mechanized force: roughly 50,000 Sherman tanks, plus thousands more derivative vehicles under different model numbers. These included M32 and M74 „tow truck”-style recovery tanks with winches, booms, and an 81 mm mortar for smoke screens; M34 (from M32B1) and M35 (from M10A1) artillery prime movers; M7B1, M12, M40, and M43 self-propelled artillery; and the M10 Wolverine and M36 Jackson tank destroyers.

M4A4 Cutaway

1 – Lifting ring
2 – Ventilator
3 – Turret hatch
4 – Periscope
5 – Turret hatch race
6 – Turret seat
7 – Gunner’s seat
8 – Turret seat
9 – Turret
10 – Air cleaner
11 – Radiator filler cover
12 – Air cleaner manifold
13 – Power unit
14 – Exhaust pipe
15 – Track idler
16 – Single water pump
17 – Radiator
18 – Generator
19 – Rear propeller shaft
20 – Turret basket
21 – slip ring
22 – Front propeller shaft
23 – Suspension bogie
24 – Transmission
25 – Main drive sprocket
26 – Driver’s seat
27 – Machine gunner’s seat
28 – 75 mm gun
29 – Drivers hatch
30 – M 1919A4 machine gun

AMT-WWII_09 – M24 Chaffee Light Tank…

AMT-WWII_09 – M24 Chaffee Light Tank…

The Light Tank M24 was an American light tank used during World War II and in postwar conflicts including the Korean War and with the French in the First Indochina War and war in Algeria. In British service it was given the service name Chaffee, after theUnited States Army General Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., who helped develop the use of tanks in the United States armed forces.

Light Tank M24
M24 Chaffee in Detroit.jpg
Type Light tank
Place of origin United States
Service history
Used by See Operators
Wars World War II, Korean War, First Indochina War, War in Algeria, Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
Production history
Produced 1944–August 1945
Specifications
Weight 18.4 tonnes (40,500 lb)
Length 5.56 m (18.24 ft) (w/ gun)
5.03 m (16.5 ft) (w/o gun)
Width 3 m (9.84 ft)
Height 2.77 m (9.08 ft)
Crew 5 (Commander, gunner, loader, driver, co-driver)

Armor 9.5–25 mm (0.37–1.49 in)
Primary
armament
1 × 75 mm Gun M6 L / 39
48 rounds
Secondary
armament
1 × .50 calBrowning M2HB machine gun
440 rounds
2 × .30-06Browning M1919A4machine gun
3,750 rounds
Engine 2 × Cadillac Series 44T24, 8 Cylinder
300/220 hp (220/164 kW) total
Power/weight 16.09 hp/tonne
Suspension Torsion Bar
Operational
range
161 km (100 mi)
Speed

56 km/h (35 mi/h) (road)
40 km/h (25 mi/h) (off-road)

Development and production history

Combat experience indicated several shortcomings of the Light Tank M3/M5, the most important of them being weak armament. The T7 design, which was initially seen as a replacement, evolved into a mediocre Medium Tank M7 and was eventually rejected in March 1943, which prompted the Ordnance Committee to issue a specification for a new light tank, with the same powertrain as the M5A1 but armed with a 75 mm gun.

In April 1943 the Ordnance Corps together with Cadillac division of General Motors started work on the new project, designatedLight Tank T24. Every effort was made to keep the weight of the vehicle under 20 tons. The armor was kept light, with the glacis plate only 25 mm thick (but sloped at 60 degrees from the vertical). A new lightweight 75 mm gun was developed, a derivative of the gun used in the B-25H Mitchell bomber. The gun had the same ballistics as the M3, but used a thinly walled barrel and different recoil mechanism. The design also featured wider (16 inch) tracks and torsion bar suspension. It had relatively low silhouette and a three-man turret.

On October 15, 1943 the first pilot vehicle was delivered and production began in 1944 under the designation Light Tank M24. It was produced at two sites; from April at Cadillac and from July at Massey-Harris. By the time production was stopped in August 1945, 4,731 M24s had left the assembly lines. Some of them were supplied to the British forces.

Combat history

The M24 Chaffee was intended to replace the aging and obsolete Light Tank M5 which was used in supplementary roles. The first thirty-four M24s reached Europe in November 1944 and were issued to the U.S. 2nd Cavalry Group (Mechanized) in France. These were then issued to F Company, 2nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion and F Company, 42nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion which each received seventeen M24s. During the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, these units and their new tanks were rushed to the southern sector; two of the M24s were detached to serve with the 740th Tank Battalion of the U.S. First Army.

The M24 started to enter widespread issue in December 1944 but they were slow in reaching the front-line combat units. By the end of the war many armored divisions were still mainly equipped with the M5. Some armored divisions did not receive their first M24s until the war was over.

Reports from the armored divisions that received them prior to the end of hostilities were generally positive. Crews liked the improved off-road performance and reliability, but were most appreciative of the 75 mm main gun, as a vast improvement over the 37 mm. The M24 was not up to the challenge of fighting German tanks, but the bigger gun at least gave its crews a chance to fight back when it was required. The M24’s light armor made it vulnerable to virtually all German tanks, anti-tank guns, and hand-held anti-tank weapons. The contribution of the M24 to winning the war in Europe was insignificant, as too few arrived too late to replace the worn-out M5s of the armored divisions.

In the Korean War M24s were the first U.S. tanks to fight the North Korean T-34-85s. The M24 fared poorly against these much better-armed and armored medium tanks. M24s were more successful later in the war in their reconnaissance role, supported by heavier tanks such as the M4, M26, and M46.

 

The French deployed several M24 tanks during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Like other successful World War II designs, the M24 was supplied to many armies around the globe and was used in local conflicts long after it had been replaced in the U.S. Army by the M41 Walker Bulldog. France employed its M24s in Indo-China in infantry support missions, with good results. They employed ten M24s in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. In December 1953 ten disassembled Chaffees were transported by air to provide fire support to the garrison. They fired about 15,000 shells in the long siege that followed before the Viet Minh forces conquered the camp in May 1954. France also deployed the M24 in Algeria. The last time the M24 is known to have been in action was in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, where some 66 Pakistani Chaffees stationed in Bangladesh were easy prey for Indian Army T-55s, PT-76s, and anti-tank teams. Although both Iran and Iraq had M24s prior to the Iran–Iraq War, there is no report of their use in that conflict.

In 1972 the Norwegian Army decided to retain 54 of their 123 M24 light tanks as reconnaissance vehicles after they were substantially rebuilt under the designation NM-116. It was calculated that the NM-116 rebuilding program cost only about a third as much as contemporary light tanks.

This program was managed by the firm Thune-Eureka. The American firm NAPCO developed an improved power-pack based around the 6V53T diesel engine used in the M113 armored personnel carrier mated to an Allison MT-653 transmission. The original 75 mm Gun M6 L / 39 was replaced with a French D-925 90 mm low pressure gun, with a co-axil M2 .50-caliber heavy machine gun. The bow gunner position was eliminated in favor of ammunition stowage. A newfire control system was installed, complete with a Simrad LV3 laser rangefinder. Norwegian firms also converted eight M24 light tanks into light armored recovery vehicles to support the NM-116. The NM-116 were retired from service in 1993.

The Chilean Army up-gunned their M24s in the mid-80s to the IMI-OTO 60 mm Hyper Velocity Medium Support (HVMS) gun, with comparable performance to a standard 90 mm gun.Chile operated this version until 1999.

Uruguay continues to use the M24, modernized with new engines and 76mm guns which can fire armour-piercing, fin stabilised, discarding sabot (or APFSDS) rounds.

 


AMT-WWII_08 – M5A1 Light Tank…

AMT-WWII_08 – M5A1 Light Tank…

The M3 Stuart, formally Light Tank M3, was an American light tank of World War II and supplied to British and Commonwealthforces under lend-lease prior to the entry of the U.S. into the war—and used thereafter by U.S. and Allied forces until the end of the war.

The name General Stuart or Stuart given by the British comes from the American Civil War Confederate General J.E.B. Stuartand was used for both the M3 and the derivative M5 Light Tank. In British service, it also had the unofficial nickname of Honeyafter a tank driver remarked „She’s a honey”. To the United States Army, the tanks were officially known only as „Light Tank M3” and „Light Tank M5”.

The M3 Stuarts were the first American-manned (U.S.) tanks in World War II to engage the enemy in tank versus tank combat.

Light Tank M3A3 (Stuart V)
Stuart m5a1 cfb borden.jpg
M5A1 at Worthington Tank Museum
Type Light tank
Place of origin United States
Production history
Produced 1941–1945
Specifications
Weight 32,400 lb (14,700 kg)
Length 14 ft 2.4 in (4.33 m)
Width 8 ft 1.2 in (2.47 m)
Height 7 ft 6 in (2.29 m)
Crew 4 (Commander, gunner, driver, co-driver)

Primary
armament
37 mm M6 in M44 mount
174 rounds
Secondary
armament
3 × .30-06 Browning M1919A4 MG
7,500 rounds
Engine Continental W-670-9A, 7 Cylinder air-cooled radial
250 hp (190 kW)
Power/weight 17.82 hp/tonne
Suspension Vertical volute spring
Operational
range
74 mi (119 km)
Speed 36 mph (58 km/h) (road)
18 mph (29 km/h) (off-road)

Development

Observing events in Europe, American tank designers realized that the Light Tank M2 was becoming obsolete and set about improving it. The upgraded design, with thicker armor, modified suspension and new gun recoil system was called „Light Tank M3”. Production of the vehicle started in March 1941 and continued until October 1943. Like its direct predecessor, the M2A4, the M3 was armed with a 37 mm M5 gun and five .30-06 Browning M1919A4 machine guns: coaxial with the gun, on top of theturret in an M20 anti-aircraft mount, in a ball mount in right bow, in the right and left hull sponsons.

Internally, the radial engine was at the rear and the transmission to the driving sprockets at the front. The prop shaft connecting the two ran through the middle of the fighting compartment. The radial engine compounded the problem having its crankshaft high off the hull bottom. When a turret floor was introduced the crew had less room.

To relieve the demand for the radial aero-engines used in the M3, a new version was developed using twin Cadillac V-8 automobile engines and twin Hydra-Matic transmissions operating through a transfer case. Such installation produced a quieter, cooler and roomier variant and was easier to train on the automatic version. The new model (initially called M4 but redesignated M5 to avoid confusion with the M4 Sherman) also featured a redesigned hull with sloped glacis plate and driver’s hatches moved to the top. Although the main criticism from the units using it was that the Stuarts lacked firepower, the improved M5 series kept the same 37 mm gun. The M5 gradually replaced the M3 in production from 1942 and was in turn succeeded by the Light Tank M24 in 1944.

Combat history

 

Light Tank M5A1 passes through the wrecked streets of Coutances.
 

An Australian Stuart I during the final assault on Buna.
 

A British M3 (Stuart I) knocked out during fighting in North Africa.
 

Republic of China army operating the M3 Stuart on Ledo Road

War in North Africa and Europe

The British Army was the first to use the Light Tank M3 as the „General Stuart” in combat. From mid-November 1941 to the end of the year, about 170 Stuarts (in a total force of over 700 tanks) took part in Operation Crusader during the North Africa Campaign, with poor results. Although the high losses suffered by Stuart-equipped units during the operation had more to do with better tactics and training of the Afrika Korps than the apparent superiority of German armoured fighting vehicles used in the North African campaign, the operation revealed that the M3 had several technical faults. Mentioned in the British complaints were the 37 mm M5 gun and poor internal layout. The two-man turret crew was a significant weakness, and some British units tried to fight with three-man turret crews. The Stuart also had a limited range, which was a severe problem in the highly mobile desert warfare as units often outpaced their supplies and were stranded when they ran out of fuel. On the positive side, crews liked its relatively high speed and mechanical reliability. The high reliability distinguished the Stuart from cruiser tanksof the period, in particular the Crusader, which composed a large portion of the British tank force in Africa up until 1942.

In the summer of 1942, when enough U.S. medium tanks had been received, the British usually kept Stuarts out of tank-to-tank combat, using them primarily for reconnaissance. The turret was removed from some examples to save weight and improve speed and range. These became known as „Stuart Recce”. Some others were converted to armored personnel carriers and were known as „Stuart Kangaroo”, and some were converted command vehicles and known as „Stuart Command”. M3s, M3A3s, and M5s continued in British service until the end of the war, but British units had a smaller proportion of these light tanks than U.S. units.

The other major Lend-Lease recipient of the M3, the Soviet Union, was even less happy with the tank, considering it undergunned, underarmored, likely to catch fire, and too sensitive to fuel quality. The narrow tracks were highly unsuited to operation in winter conditions, as they resulted in high ground pressures under which the tank sank into the snow. Further, the M3’s radial aircraft engine required high-octane fuel, which complicated Soviet logistics as most of their tanks used diesel. However, the M3 was superior to early-war Soviet light tanks such as the T-60, which were often underpowered and possessed even lighter armament than the Stuart. In 1943, the Red Army tried out the M5 and decided that the upgraded design was not much better than the M3. Being less desperate than in 1941, the Soviets turned down an American offer to supply the M5. M3s continued in Red Army service at least until 1944.

War in the Far East – CBI and Pacific

The U.S. Army initially deployed 108 Stuart light tanks to the Philippines in September 1941, equipping the U.S. Army’s 194th and 192nd Tank Battalions. The first U.S. tank versus tank combat to occur in World War II, began on 22 December 1941, when a platoon of five M3s led by Lieutenant Ben R. Morin engaged Type 95 Ha-Go north of Damaris. Lt. Morin maneuvered his M3 off the road, but took a direct hit while doing so, and his tank began to burn. The other four M3s were also hit, but managed to leave the field under their own power. Lt. Morin was wounded, and he and his crew were captured by the enemy. M3s of the 194th and 192nd Tank Battalions continued to skirmish with the 4th Tank Regiment’s Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks as they continued their retreat down the Bataan Peninsula, with the last tank verses tank combat occurring on 7 April 1942.

Due to the naval nature of the Pacific campaign, steel for warship production took precedence over tanks for the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), creating by default an IJA light tank which performed admirably in the jungle terrain of the South Pacific. By the same measure, although the US was not hampered by industrial restrictions, the U.S. M3 light tank proved to be an effective armored vehicle for fighting in jungle environments.

With the IJA’s drive toward India within the China-Burma-India Theater of Operations (CBI), the United Kingdom hastily withdrew their 2nd Royal Tank Regiment and 7th Hussars Stuart tank units (which also contained some M2A4 light tanks) from North Africa, and deployed them against the Japanese 14th Tank Regiment. By the time the Japanese had been stopped at Imphal, only one British Stuart remained operational. Upon U.S entry into the war in 1941, it had began to supply China with AFVs including the M3 Stuarts, and later M4 Shermans, and M18 Hellcats which trickled in through Burma and formed part of the several well-equipped, well-trained armies that the Chinese Nationalists could deploy. These units were responsible for stopping numerous Japanese attacks during the later phases of the war.

Although the U.S. light tanks had proven effective in jungle warfare, by late 1943, U.S. Marine Corps tank battalions were transitioning their M3/M5 light tanks to M4 medium tanks. For the IJA, even though the U.S. Marines had exchanged their light tanks for M4 medium tanks, they could not; and with the less common supplement of their Type 97 Chi-Ha medium tanks, the IJA was left to do battle against U.S. Marine M4 Sherman medium tanks, with armor that had been designed and fielded in the 1930s.

Overview

When the U.S Army joined the North African Campaign in late 1942, Stuart units still formed a large part of its armor strength. After the disastrous Battle of the Kasserine Pass, the U.S. quickly followed the British in disbanding most of their light tank battalions and subordinating the Stuarts to medium tank battalions performing the traditional cavalry missions of scouting and screening. For the rest of the war, most U.S. tank battalions had three companies of M4 Shermans and one company of M3s or M5/M5A1s.

In Europe, Allied light tanks had to be given cavalry and infantry fire support roles since their main cannon armament could not compete with heavier enemy AFVs. However, the Stuart was still effective in combat in the Pacific Theater, as Japanese tanks were both relatively rare and were lighter in armor than even Allied light tanks. Japanese infantrymen were not well equipped with anti-tank weapons, and as such had to use close assault tactics. In this environment, the Stuart was only moderately more vulnerable than medium tanks. In addition, the poor terrain and roads common to the theatre were unsuitable for the much heavier M4 medium tanks, and so initially, for both sides, it was advantageous to deploy light armor. Heavier M4s were eventually brought to overcome heavily entrenched positions, though the Stuart continued to serve in a combat capacity until the end of the war.

Though the Stuart was to be completely replaced by the newer M24 Chaffee, the number of M3s/M5s produced was so great (over 25,000 including the 75 mm HMC M8) that the tank remained in service until the end of the war and well after. In addition to the U.S, UK and Soviet Union, who were the primary users, it was also used by France, China (M3A3s and, immediately post-war, M5A1s) and Josip Broz Tito’s Partisans in Yugoslavia (M3A3s and few M3A1).

After the war, some countries chose to equip their armies with cheap and reliable Stuarts. The Republic of China Army, having suffered great attrition as a result of the ensuing civil war, rebuilt their armored forces by acquiring surplus vehicles left behind in the area by the US forces, including 22 M5A1s to equip two tank companies. They would have their finest hours during the Battle of Kuningtou, for which the tank came to be known as the „Bear of Kinmen” . The M5 played a significant role in the First Kashmir War (1947) between India and Pakistan, including the battle of Zoji-la pass fought at an elevation of nearly 12,000 ft. The vehicle remained in service in several South American countries at least until 1996.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Portuguese Army also used some in the war in Angola, where its all terrain capability (compared to wheeled vehicles) was greatly appreciated. ThePortuguese Army in 1967 deployed three M5A1 Light Tanks – nicknamed ‘Milocas’, ‘Licas’ and ‘Gina’ by their crews – in northern Angola, which served with the 1927th Cavalry Battalion stationed at Nambuangongo. The vehicles were employed mostly for convoy escort and recovery duties, and limited counterinsurgency operations against FNLA guerrillas, who dubbed them “Elefante Dundum”. ‘Milocas’ was destroyed by an accidental fire in 1969 while ‘Gina’ and ‘Licas’ were withdrawn from active service in 1972, the former being sent to Luanda and the latter ended up in 1973 as an airfield security pillbox in the Portuguese Air Force’ Zala airfield. Period photographs show some modifications in the basic design, namely the omission of the bow machine gun, re-installed on a pintle mount in the roof of the turret and a small searchlight fitted in front of the commander’s copula.

The M3 Stuart is still on the active list in the Armed Forces of Paraguay where those elderly survivors are the only tracked armour used by that country.

Variants

US variants

 

Light Tank M3 in Fort Knox, 1942.
 

Light Tank M3A1 in Yad la-Shiryon Museum, Israel.

 

Light Tank M3A3 in Belgrade Military Museum, Serbia.
 

Early production Light Tank M5A1 at Worthington Tank Museum.
 

75mm Howitzer Motor Carriage M8 on display at the Musée des Blindés.
  • M3 (British designation „Stuart I„). 5,811 vehicles were produced.
1,285 M3s had Guiberson diesel installed and were called „Stuart II” by British.
Late production M3s were fitted with turret developed for M3A1, though without turret basket. These tanks were dubbed „Stuart Hybrid„.
  • M3A1 (Stuart III). 4,621 were produced from May 1942 to February 1943.
New turret with turret basket and no cupola. Gun vertical stabilizer installed. Sponson machine guns were removed.
M3A1s with Guiberson diesel were called „Stuart IV” by British.
  • M3A3 (Stuart V). 3,427 produced.
Put into production to integrate hull improvements brought by the M5 into the M3 series. Turret with rear overhang to house radio. Welded hull with sloped armor, 20° in from the vertical, on front and sides.
  • M5 (Stuart VI). 2,075 produced.
Twin Cadillac engines. Redesigned hull similar to M3A3, but with vertical sides and raised engine deck. Turret as for M3A1.
  • M5A1 (Stuart VI). 6,810 produced.
M5 with the turret of the M3A3; this was the major variant in US units by 1943.
  • 75mm Howitzer Motor Carriage M8. 1,778 units produced.
Based on M5 chassis. The gun was replaced with the 75 mm M2/M3 howitzer in open turret and a trailer hook was fitted so an ammunition trailer could be towed. Provided fire support to cavalry reconnaissance squadrons.
  • 75mm Howitzer Motor Carriage M8A1.
M8 HMC variant based on M5A1 chassis.
  • T18 75 mm Howitzer Motor Carriage.
Self-propelled gun based on M3 chassis. 75 mm M1A1 pack howitzer was mounted in a boxy superstructure. The project started in September 1941 and was abandoned in April 1942. Only two were produced, 75 mm Howitzer Motor Carriage M8 was chosen to be produced instead.
  • T82 Howitzer Motor Carriage.
Self-propelled 105 mm howitzer based on M5A1 chassis. Canceled in 1945.
  • T56 3in Gun Motor Carriage.
Self-propelled gun based on M3A3 chassis. The engine was moved to the middle of the hull and a 3-inch gun was mounted in a superstructure in the rear. The project started in September 1942 and was abandoned in February 1943.
  • T57 3in Gun Motor Carriage.
Variant of T56 with Continental engine of the Medium Tank M3. Also dropped in February 1943.
  • T27 / T27E1 81 mm Mortar Motor Carriage.
M5A1 with turret replaced by superstructure in which an 81 mm mortar was installed. Also carried .50 cal Browning M2HB machine gun. The project was abandoned in April 1944 because of inadequate crew and storage space.
  • T29 4.2in Mortar Motor Carriage.
Design similar to T27, with 4.2 inch (107 mm) mortar. Was abandoned for the same reason.
  • T81 Chemical Mortar Motor Carriage
M5A1-based 4.2 inch (107 mm) chemical mortar carrier.
  • M3 with Maxson Turret.
Anti-aircraft variant developed in 1942. Was armed with four .50 cal. machine guns in a turret developed by Maxson Corp. The project was rejected because of the availability of the M16 MGMC.
  • 40 mm Gun Motor Carriage T65.
Anti-aircraft vehicle based on lengthened M5A1. Was armed with Bofors 40 mm gun. Was ordered into production, but on Light Tank M24chassis, so became the M19 Gun Motor Carriage.
  • 20 mm Multiple Gun Motor Carriage T85.
Anti-aircraft vehicle based on same chassis as T65 (M5A1). Was armed with quad Oerlikon 20 mm cannons.
  • M3/M5 Command Tank.
M3/M5 with turret replaced by small superstructure with a .50 cal. machine gun.
  • T8 Reconnaissance Vehicle.
M5 with turret removed and mounting for .50 cal machine gun.
M3 with T2 Light Mine Exploder’.
Developed in 1942, was rejected.
  • M3/M3A1 with Satan Flame-gun.
Flame thrower was installed instead of the main gun. 20 tanks were converted for US Marine Corps in 1943.
  • M5A1 with E5R1-M3 Flame Gun.
Flame thrower was installed instead of the hull machine gun.
  • M3A1 with E5R2-M3 Flame-gun.
Flame thrower was installed in place of hull machine gun.
  • M5 Dozer.
M5 with dozer blade. Turret was usually removed.
  • M5 with T39 Rocket Launcher.
T39 launcher with 20 7.2″ rockets mounted on the top of the turret. Never reached production.
  • M5A1 with E7-7 Flame Gun.
Flame thrower was installed instead of the main gun.
  • M5A1 with E9-9 Flame-throwing equipment.
Prototype only.
  • M5A1 with E8 Flame-gun.
Turret replaced by boxy superstructure with flame thrower in a smaller turret. Prototype only.

Brazilian variants

In the 1970s, Brazilian company Bernardini developed a series of radical Stuart upgrades for the Brazilian Army.

  • X1A.
Based on M3A1, this design had new engine (280 hp (210 kW) Saab-Scania diesel), improved suspension, new upper hull armor, fire controls and DEFA 90 mm gun in a new turret. 80 vehicles were produced.
  • X1A1.
An X1A with improved suspension with three bogies (instead of two) each side and raised idler. Didn’t reach production.
  • X1A2.
Based on the X1A1, this version retained almost nothing of the original Stuart as even its hull was redesigned. The vehicle weighed 19 short tons (17 t), had crew of 3, was armed with 90 mm gun and powered by Saab-Scania 300 hp (220 kW) diesel. 30 vehicles were produced in 1979-1983.

Operators

 

Users of the Stuart tank.
  • Australia Australia
  • Belgium Belgium
  • Brazil Brazil
  • Canada Canada
  • Chile Chile
  • Republic of China Republic of China
  • Colombia Colombia
  • Cuba Cuba
  • Dominican Republic Dominican Republic
  • Ecuador Ecuador
  • El Salvador El Salvador
  • France France
  • Greece Greece
  • Haiti Haiti – eight M3A1 and five M5A1
  • India India
  • Indonesia Indonesia
  • Italy Italy
  • Mexico Mexico
  • Netherlands Netherlands
  • New Zealand New Zealand
  • Nicaragua Nicaragua – four M3A1 still in service with the National Guard (Nicaragua) in 1979
  • Paraguay Paraguay – 12 still in service 5 is operational in 2.R.C. 2010
  • Philippines Philippines
  • Poland Poland
  • Portugal Portugal – 70 vehicles in service with the Portuguese Army and other 20 with the Republican National Guard from 1956-1972
  • Turkey Turkey
  • United Kingdom UK
  • Uruguay Uruguay
  • United States USA
  • Soviet Union USSR
  • Venezuela Venezuela
  • Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Yugoslavia

AMT-WWII_07 – M8 Greyhound…

M8 – Greyhound…

The M8 Light Armored Car was a 6×6 armored car produced by the Ford Motor Company during World War II. It was used by the U.S. and British troops in Europe and the Far East until the end of the war. The vehicle was widely exported and as of 2006 still remains in service in some third world countries.

In British service, the M8 was known as the Greyhound. The British Army found it too lightly armored, particularly the hull floor where anti-tank mines could easily penetrate (crews’ solution was lining the floor of the crew compartment with sandbags). It was produced in such a large volume and, coupled with its off-roading capabilities, that this shortcoming was largely overlooked. The M8 Greyhound could virtually go anywhere, which made it a great supportive element to the advancing American and British armored columns.

Development history…

In July 1941, the Ordnance Department initiated a development of a new fast tank destroyer to replace the M6 37 mm Gun Motor Carriage, which was essentially a ¾-ton truck with a 37 mm gun installed in the rear bed. The requirement was for a 6×4 wheeled vehicle armed with a 37 mm gun, a coaxial machine gun mounted in a turret, and a machine gun in the front hull. Itsglacis armor was supposed to withstand fire from a .50 in (12.7 mm) machine gun and side armor from a .30 in (7.62 mm) machine gun. Prototypes were submitted by Studebaker (designated T21), Ford (T22) and Chrysler (T23), all of them similar in design and appearance.

In April 1942, the T22 was selected despite complaints about deficiencies, due to the need for vehicles. By then, it was clear that the 37 mm gun would not be effective against the front armor of German tanks; so, the new armored car, designated M8 Light Armored Car, took on the reconnaissance role instead. Contract issues and minor design improvements delayed serial production until March 1943. Production ended in June 1945.A total of 8,523 units were built, not including the M20 Armored Utility Car (see Variants).

In 1942, the British turned down the opportunity to use the M8 through Lend-Lease. It was named Greyhound in keeping with other U.S. armored cars already ordered by the British such as the (cancelled) T18 Boarhound, the Deerhound and the Staghound

Mission and operational performance…

 

Radio inside an M8

The Cavalry Recon troop served as a division’s or corps’ advance „eyes and ears.” This mission demanded speed and agility, not firepower and armor. When on the march, the Cavalry’s mission was make contact with enemy forces at the earliest practicable moment and maintain it thereafter. In this role, the recon troops identified hostile units and reported their strength, composition, disposition and movement. During withdrawals, the cavalry often served as a screening force for the main units.

The M8 performed this function with distinction. Each M8 armored car was equipped with a long-range radio set to assist in the exercise of command, or for the purpose of relaying information received from subordinate elements to higher headquarters. Another short-range radio set served to communicate within a Cavalry Reconnaissance platoon, reconnaissance team, or with headquarters. The M8 weighed 16,400 lb (7,400 kg) fully loaded with equipment and crew, and was capable of cruising 100–200 mi (160–320 km) cross country or 200–400 mi (320–640 km) on highways without refueling. On normal roads, a sustained speed reach 55 mph (89 km/h), hence its nickname.

 

The telescopic sight used to aim the main 37 mm gun

Unfortunately, the M8 was not designed for offensive combat, and its firepower was adequate only against similar lightly-armored enemy vehicles and infantry. The armor of the vehicles provided a fair degree of protection against small-arms fire but nothing more. Crews needed to survive by using speed and mobility to avoid hits instead of withstanding them. With a meager .12 in (3 mm) of floor armour, the M8 was particularly vulnerable to German mines.

The vehicle’s other drawback was limited mobility in heavily wooded areas and on broken terrain, and armored Cavalry units preferred using the ¼-ton reconnaissance car (Jeep) in these environments. A large turning radius, limited wheel travel, open differentials, and limited mobility cross-country made the M8 armored car susceptible to immobilization off-road in off-camber terrain or defiles. This limited operators to operating the vehicle mostly on existing roads or paths, where it became vulnerable to ambush. The lack of continuous tracks and poor tread contact area-to-weight ratio also hampered its off-road performance in mud, snow, or alpine terrain, and in soft terrain the M8 frequently sank to its axles. Conversely, performance on hard surfaces was exceptional. As a wheeled vehicle, the M8 was generally more reliable than tracked vehicles of similar size, and required far less maintenance and logistics support.

Description…

 

Shells for the main 37 mm gun are stored on racks inside the turret. The barrel of anM1 carbine, carried for personal defense, is visible at left.

The M8 was fitted with a 37 mm M6 gun (aimed by M70D telescopic sight) and a coaxially mounted .30 in (7.62 mm) Browning machine gun in an open-topped, welded turret. A .50 in (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine gun was sometimes carried on a ring or pintle mount for anti-aircraft use; this was not standard on early vehicles, but was a frequent unit modification.

The crew of four comprised the commander (who doubled as loader), gunner, driver, and radio operator (who could also act as a driver). The driver and radio operator were seated in the forward section of the hull, while the commander and gunner rode in the turret, commander in the right side.

The vehicle carried 80 37 mm rounds when fitted with a single radio. Vehicles with a second radio installed carried as few as 16 main gun rounds, although unit-level modifications could raise this as high as 40 or more. Machine gun ammunition consisted of 1500 .30-in rounds and 400 .50-in rounds. In addition, it carried 16 hand grenades, four smoke pots (M1 or M2), six landmines (Anti-tank and HE types) and M1 Carbines for the crew.

The armor ranged from .12 in (3 mm) on the hull floor, to .75 in (19 mm) on the front hull and turret. The M8 was powered by a Hercules Model JXD in-line 6-cylinder 320 in³ gasoline engine giving it a top speed of 56 mph (90 km/h) on-road, 30 mph (48 km/h) off-road. With a 59-gallon tank and an average fuel consumption of 7.5 mpg, it could manage an average range of 400 mi (640 km).

Service history…

World War II…

The M8 Light Armored Car, the „Greyhound”, entered combat service with the Allies in 1943. It was purpose designed to serve as the primary basic command and communication combat vehicle of the U.S. Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops.

The M8 first saw action in Italy in 1943 and was used by the U.S. Army both in Europe and in the Far East. In the latter theater, it was used mostly on Okinawa and the Philippines, and was occasionally employed in its original tank destroyer role as most of the Japanese armor was vulnerable to its 37 mm gun.

Over 1,000 were supplied via lend-lease channels to US’ Allies; United Kingdom, free France and Brazil.

 

American troops in an M8 passing the Arc de Triomphe after the liberation of Paris

The vehicle was considered fast, sufficiently reliable (after some technical problems were solved) and armed and armored well enough for reconnaissance missions. However, cavalry units criticized its off-road performance, which was even worse than the M3A1 Scout Car it replaced. In the mountainous terrain of Italy and in the deep mud and snow of North European winter, the M8 was more or less restricted to roads, which greatly reduced its value as a reconnaissance vehicle. It was also very vulnerable to landmines. An add-on armor kit was designed to provide an extra quarter-inch of belly armor to reduce landmine vulnerability. Some crews placed sandbags on the floor to make up for the thin belly armor. Another problem was that commanders often used their reconnaissance squadrons for fire support missions, for which the thinly-armored M8 was ill-suited. When it encountered German armored reconnaissance units, the M8 could easily penetrate their armor with its 37 mm gun. Conversely, its own thin armor was vulnerable to the 20 mm autocannons that German scout cars were equipped with.

The U.S. Army Armor School’s paper The Battle at St-Vith 17–23 December 1944 describes an engagement during the Battle of the Bulge, between an M8 (Troop B, 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron) and a Tiger I. The M8 crew was the victor, firing three 37 mm rounds into the rear armor of the Tiger from 25 yd (23 m), setting it on fire.

The U.S. Army started to look for a replacement for the M8 as early as 1943. Two prototypes, the Studebaker T27 and Chevrolet T28 were finished in summer 1944. Both were found superior to the M8, but it was decided that at this stage of the war there was no more need for a new armored car.

Post-War…

 

M8 armored car on occupation duty withConstabulary markings, 1952.

After the war, the M8 was used for occupation duty, saw combat in the Korean War and was retired by the U.S. Army shortly thereafter. France continued to use the M8 until the Indochina War (1946–1954) and Algerian War (1954–1962). Many vehicles formerly used by the U.S., Britain and France were exported to NATO allies and third world countries. As of 2002, some still remained in service in Africa and South America.

During the Vietnam War, the French organized Vietnamese armored regiments, each consisting of three companies equipped with a mixture of M3 halftracks, White scout cars, M8 Greyhound armored cars and M8 towed howitzers.

In Congo in 1961 the Indian troops clashed with a Katangan column moving from Jadotville towards Elisabethville, near Sabena Guesthouse. Using recoilless rifles, the Indians knocked out one M8 Greyhound scout car.

Notably, several Greyhounds were deployed in Bogota on March 8, 2007, as part of security measures before U.S. President George W. Bush’s visit. They are regularly used as checkpoint security by the Colombian Military, and usually can be seen in the northern parts of the capital.

List of operators…

Past and present operators of the vehicle include:

  • Algeria Algeria
  • Austria Austria
  • Belgium Belgium
  • Benin Benin
  • Brazil Brazil
  • Burkina Faso Burkina Faso
  • Cambodia Cambodia
  • Cameroon Cameroon
  • Colombia Colombia
  • Cyprus Cyprus
  • El Salvador El Salvador
  • Ethiopia Ethiopia
  • France France
  • Germany Germany[nb 1]
  • Greece Greece
  • Guatemala Guatemala
  • Haiti Haiti
  • Iran Iran
  • Italy Italy
  • Jamaica Jamaica
  • Japan Japan
  • Laos Laos
  • Madagascar Madagascar
  • Mexico Mexico
  • Morocco Morocco
  • North Vietnam North Vietnam
  • Niger Niger
  • Norway Norway
  • Paraguay Paraguay
  • Peru Peru
  • Philippines Philippines
  • Poland Poland
  • Portugal Portugal
  • Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia
  • Senegal Senegal
  • South Korea South Korea
  • South Vietnam South Vietnam
  • Republic of China Taiwan
  • Thailand Thailand
  • Togo Togo
  • Tunisia Tunisia
  • Turkey Turkey
  • United Kingdom United Kingdom
  • United States USA
  • Venezuela Venezuela
  • Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Yugoslavia
  • Zaire Zaire

Variants…

 

T22.

 

M20 Armored Utility Car at the US Army Ordnance Museum.

 

T69 Multiple Gun Motor Carriage.

  • T22 Light Armored Car – Prototype.
  • T22E1 Light Armored Car – A 4×4 prototype.
  • T22E2 Light Armored Car – Prototype eventually standardized as M8.
  • M8 Light Armored Car – Production variant.
  • M8E1 Light Armored Car – A variant with modified suspension. Two vehicles were produced in 1943.
  • The M20 Armored Utility Car, also known as the M20 Scout Car, was a Greyhound with the turret removed. This was replaced with a low, armored open-topped superstructure and an anti-aircraft ring mount for a .50-in M2 heavy machine gun. A bazooka was provided for the crew to compensate for its lack of anti-armor weaponry. The M20 was primarily used as a command vehicle and for forward reconnaissance, but many vehicles also served as APCs and cargo carriers. It offered high speed and excellent mobility, along with a degree of protection against small arms fire and shrapnel. When employed in the command and control role, the M20 was fitted with additional radio equipment. Originally designated the M10 Armored Utility Car, it was redesignated M20 to avoid confusion with the M10 Wolverine tank destroyer. 3,680 M20s were built by Ford during its two years in production (1943–1944).
  • T69 Multiple Gun Motor Carriage – In late 1943, an anti-aircraft variant of the M8 was tested. The vehicle was armed with four .50-in machine guns in a turret developed by Maxson Corp.. The Antiaircraft Board felt that the vehicle was inferior to the M16 MGMC and the project was closed.
  • M8 TOW Tank Destroyer – M8 upgraded by the US company NAPCO. The main gun was replaced by an .50-in machine gun and a BGM-71 TOW launcher was installed above the turret. Upgraded vehicles were used by Colombia.
  • M8/M20 with H-90 turret – A French upgrade, using the turret of the Panhard AML 90 armored car.
  • CRR Brasileiro – A version developed in 1968 by the Brazilian Army Engineering Institute (IME). The middle axle was removed and a new engine (120 hp (89 kW) Mercedes-Benz OM-321) installed to create the VBB-1 of which one prototype was completed, the vehicle being found to be inferior. The Vbb-1 was in turn the basis for the CRR which reverted to a 6×6 configuration and eight vehicles were produced for evaluation. The EE-9 Cascavel was developed from the CRR.
  • M8 (Diesel) Hellenic Army Armored Car – A number of M8 Armored Cars were upgraded with a Steyr diesel engine in place of the Hercules JXD gasoline engine, this required a rearwards extension of the engine compartment by 11.8 in (300 mm), as well as some heightening. Also fitted were a new radio, indicator and new hooded lights, rear view mirrors, while the M2HB anti-aircraft machinegun was moved to the right front of the turret, where a new pintle socket was bolted on the partial roof (the turret rear socket being retained) and the coaxial 0.30-in M1919A4 replaced by a 7.62×51 mm NATO MG3 machinegun. Used for coastal defense and retired from service in the late 1990s.
  • Colombian AM8 – This is a Colombian fusion of antiair artillery of WWII in turret whit a modern motor in M8. It is a Coin weapon against guerrilla ambush in mountains of Colombian since speedways.